[ G.R. No. L-2068. March 08, 1949 ] G.R. No. L-2068
[ G.R. No. L-2068. March 08, 1949 ]
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, JUDGE OF BRANCH II OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N
TUASON, J.:
This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration. In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito, et al. vs. Arellano, G. R. No. L-1336: “The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.” We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose of the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject. It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court[1] infringes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.[2] It is said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs substantive rights. We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J. 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J. 27; 52 C. J. S. 1026.) As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S. 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is “the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings” - is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So. 419, 179 La. 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down Section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. In Beazell vs.. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 L. ed. 216, the United States Supreme Court said:
“Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed. 648, 650; Cummings v. Missouri, Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed. 356, 364; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed. 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 27 L. ed. 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 42 L. ed. 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 575, 28 L. ed. 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380, 43 L. ed. 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed. 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382, 38 L. ed. 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570.”
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. The distinction between “remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F. 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P. 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court’s power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution’s approval. This power is “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,” which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones. The motion is denied. Moran, Paras, Labrador, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur. Perfecto, J., We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito can still shows a motion for reconsideration should be frauded. Reyes, J., took no part.