[ G.R. No. L-2062. August 11, 1949 ] 84 Phil. 292
[ G.R. No. L-2062. August 11, 1949 ]
JESUS B. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, LINO GUTIERREZ, JUDGE GUILLERMO CABRERA, AND SHERIFF OF MANILA, RESPONDNETS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
These proceedings have been brought against the Honorable Rafael Dinglasan, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Lino Gutierrez, the Honorable Guillermo Cabrera, Judge of the Municipal Court, and the Sheriff of Manila, to compel Judge Dinglasan to approve an appeal in a case for certiorari pending in his court and to forward the record thereof to this Court. The petitioner also seeks a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of the judg ment of respondent Judge Cabrera pending the appeal.
According to the allegations of the petition, in a case for unlawful detainer commenced in the municipal court of Manila, in which respondent Lino Gutierrez was plaintiff and petitioner herein, Jesus B. Lopez, was defendant, the parties submitted the case “for decision on a compromise agreement.” Accordingly, Judge Cabrera rendered Judgment “in the tenor of the foregoing agreement, enjoinihg both the plaintiff and the defendant to adhere to and comply (with) all the terms and conditions (thereof), without special pronouncement as to costs.” Referring to the effect of that judgment, petitioner says that, “being a judgment by compromise,” the same “was non-appealable.”
Alleging that some of the terms of the agreement had been violated, plaintiff in the detainer case, Lino Gutierrez, asked for execution of the judgment, and Judge Cabrera granted the motion. Inasmuch as, says Lopez in his petition at bar, “there was no appeal from the decision of Judge Cabrera and there was no other adequate remedy at law, and as the respondent Judge Cabrera refused to cancel and set aside the writ of execution despite motions filed asking for its cancellation, the petitioner had to file, and did file, a petition for certiorari with the respondent Judge of First Instance of Manila, the Honorable Rafael Dinglasan,” with a prayer for preliminary injunction. On January 12, 1948, Judge Dinglasan, after hearing both parties on whether a writ of preliminary injunction should issue, denied Lopez’s motion, stating that “no sufficient ground exists therefor.” From Judge Dinglasan’s refusal to enjoin the execution of Judge Cabrera’s decision, Lopez, on February 17, 1948, filed a notice of appeal with the request “that under Rule 41, section 17, the original record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court, and that a supersedeas bond be fixed.” The appeal was disallowed in an order of February 21, 1948.
It is to compel Judge Dinglasan to approve the appeal that the present application for mandamus was instituted.
Section 2, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court reads:
“No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.”
“Interlocutory orders or judgments are not appealable, because, prior to the rendition of the final judgment, they are, at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments as the court may deem proper. This does not mean, however, that they are not appeadable at all. Appeal may be taken therefrom but after final judgment is rendered.” (I Moran’s Rules of Courts, 729, 730, citing Manila Electric Co. vs. Artiaga, 50 Phil., 147, and Olsen & Co. vs. Olsen, 48 Phil., 238, 240.)
There is no doubt, and there is no contention to the contrary, that Judge Dinglasan’s refusal to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the judgment of the municipal court was an interlocutory or incidental order and is not a proper subject of appeal.
After the oral argument, the parties in a written. stipulation submitted the case “for decision on the merits upon the present state of the record, with the same effect as if this case had been brought up to this Court upon appeal from the orders of the respondent Judge Dinglasan, as appear alleged in the body of the petition herein, instead of upon the prayer therein for mandamus to forward said appeal to this court.” This stipulation was approved.
After a more thorough consideration of the pleadings and the issues, and of the nature of the instant action, we reach the conclusion that the stipulation was out of order, and should not be sanctioned. The stipulation would have this Court decide a case on appeal without a record on appeal and briefs with specification of errors essential to appellate review. What is more anomalous is that there is no judgment to review no judgment to affirm, reverse or modify. The parties to all intents and purposes would have us act as a court of first instance. Parties can not by stipulation confer upon an appellate court jurisdiction to hear and finally decide a case still in the process of trial in the lower court.
It is true that this Court has original jurisdiction in extraordinary legal remedies concurrent with the courts of first instance, but it is no less true that where an action of this kind was actually commenced in one of the latter courts, the Supreme Court can take cognizance of that particular action only on appeal, after all the steps and processes prescribed in such cases have been complied with.
The petition is dismissed with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.