[ G.R. No. L-2009. April 30, 1949 ] 83 Phil. 518
[ G.R. No. L-2009. April 30, 1949 ]
SUNRIPE COCONUT PRODUCTS CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SUNRIPE COCONUT WORKERS’ UNION (CLO), RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations holding that the “parers” and “shellers” of the petitioner, Sunripe Coconut Products Co., Inc., are its laborers entitled to twelve days sick leave (one day for each month of service), notwithstanding the fact that they are piece-workers under the “pakiao” system. The contention of the petitioner is that said “parers” and “shellers” are independent contractors and do not fall within the category of employees or laborers.
The Court of Industrial Relations has relied upon the rule laid down in the case of Philadelphia Record Company, 69 N.L.R.B., 1232 (1946), to the effect that when a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent contractor, which make him fall within an intermediate area, he may be classified under the category of an employee when the economic facts, of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than one of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the correctness or applicability of the rule, but it is vigorously contended that, in the case at bar, the economic facts characteristic of the independent contractor far outweigh the economic facts indicative of an employee. We are not called upon to rule on the accuracy of petitioner’s contention, since the conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations on the matter is binding on this Court. In other words, the ruling that the “parers” and “shellers” have the status of empoyees or laborers, carries the factual verdict that the economic facts showing such status outweigh those indicative of an independent contractor. Some facts expressly invoked by the Court of Industrial Relations are: That the “parers” and “shellers” work under some degree of control or supervision of the company, if not under its absolute direction; that said “parers” and “shellers” form stable groups composed of matured men and women who regularly work at shelling and paring nuts; that for the most part they depend on their work in the Sunripe Coconut Products Co., Inc. for their livelihood; that they are admittedly working in the factory of said company, alongside persons who are indisputably employed by said company. As already stated, whether these specific facts are outweighed, as contended by the petitioner, by facts demonstrative of the status of an independent contractor, is a question decided adversely to the petitioner when the Court of Industrial Relations held that the “parers” and “shellers” are laborers or employees.
It is also pretended for the petitioner that the Court of Industrial Relations departed from the definition of the word “employee” or “laborer” found in the Workmen’s Compensation Law, namely: " ‘Laborer’ is used as a synonym of ’employee’, and it means every person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for, an employer. * * *" (Section 39 [b], Workmen’s Compensation Law, as amended.) The Court of Industrial Relations of course adverted to the following definition: “An employee is any person in the service of another under a contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written.” (Section 7, Labor Unions by Dangle and Scriber, p. 7, citing Mcdermott’s Case, 283 Mass. 74; Werner vs. Industrial Comm., 212 Wis., 76.) In essence, however, the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations does not run counter to the definition given in the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
Counsel for the petitioner have stressed the argument that the principal test in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is the employer’s right of control over the work, and not merely the right to control the result, it being intimated that the “parers” and “shellers” are controlled by the petitioner only to the extent “that the nuts are pared whole or that there is not much meat wasted.” Even under the criterion adopted by the petitioner, it would not be amiss to state that the requirement imposed on the “parers” and “shellers” to the effect that “the nuts are pared whole or that there is not much meat wasted,” in effect limits or controls the means or details by which said workers are to accomplish their services. It is inconceivable that the “parers” and “shellers”, in order to meet the requirement of the petitioner, would not follow a uniform standard in the performance of their work.
Petitioner also insists that the “parers” and “shellers” are piece-workers under the “pakiao” system. In answer, suffice it to observe that Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, expressly provides that “A minimum wage or share shall be determined and fixed for laborers working by the hours, day or month, or by piece-work, and for tenants sharing in the crop or paid by measurement unit. * * *” (Section 5.) The organic law of the Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, even orders that laborers may be paid by piece-work; and for tenants are paid a fixed amount for a fixed number of nuts pared or shelled, does, not certainly take them out of the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 103.
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the other facts pointed out by the petitioner in support of the proposition that said “parers” and “shellers” are independent contractors, because a ruling on the matter would necessarily involve a factual inquiry which we are not authorised to make. Even so, we would undertake to advance the general remark that in cases of this kind, wherein laborers are usually compelled to work under conditions and terms dictated by the employer, a reasonably wide lattitude of action and judgment should be given to the Court of Industrial Relations with a view to settling industrial disputes conformably to the intents and purposes of its organic law. Without in the least intimating that the relation between the “parers” and “shellers” on the one hand and the petitioner on the other, as planned but by the latter, was conceived knowingly to deprive said workers of the benefits accruing to workers who are admittedly employees or laborers under Commonwealth Act 103 or the Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not difficult to surmise that a contrary decision is likely to set a precedent that may tend to encourage the adoption of a similar scheme by many other or even all employers.
The appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is therefore affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Tuason, J., concurs in the result.
Montemayor, J., I reserve my vote.