[ G.R. No. L-1523. April 30, 1949 ] 83 Phil. 503
[ G.R. No. L-1523. April 30, 1949 ]
BIÑAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. FIDEL IBAÑEZ, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondents on the ground that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of execution dated June 28, 1947, of a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna on March 22, 1943, which is null and void, according to the petitioner, because the latter had not been notified of the hearing of the case and of the rendition of said judgment or decision, and this allegation is denied under oath by the other respondent.
According to the facts appearing from the pleadings and their annexes, the record of the case having been lost or destroyed during the Philippine liberation, the Court of First Instance of Laguna, upon motion of the plaintiffs in said case, now respondents, and notice to the defendant, the petitioner herein, ordered the reconstitution of the pleadings and of the decision lost or destroyed and declared them reconstituted on December 20, 1946. The petitioner, alleging that she became aware of the rendition of the said decision only after its reconstitution, because she had not received notice of the trial and rendition of the said decision before that time, filed motions for new trial under Rule 37 and for relief under Rule 38, which were denied by the respondent Judge on the ground that they were filed after the period fixed by law had elapsed. The order of the respondent Judge granting the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution complained of, copy of which is attached as Annex 6 to the verified answer of said respondent, contained an uncontradicted recital of the dates in which attorneys for the petitioner were notified or became aware of the decision in question and filed their motions for new trial and relief under Rule 37 and 38, and said order reads as follows:
“The following petitions were heard before this Court on June 12, 1947, at 9:00 a. m., in accordance with the order of May 30, 1947:
“(a) Motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Marcial G. Mendiola as counsel for the defendant Biñan Transportation Company dated May 19, 1947, praying to reconsider and set aside the order of April 15, 1947, which revokes a previous order of March 7, 1947, granting the defendant a new trial;
“(b) A petition addressed to the Clerk of Court dated May 1, 1947, filed by Atty. Simon Samaniego as counsel for the plaintiffs praying for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the reconstituted decision dated March 22, 1943.
“At the hearing of the said petitions on June 12, 1947, Attorney Mendiola appeared and argued orally in support of his motion for reconsideration and upon his request he was given five days from said date within which to present the transcript of the proceedings of the reconstitution taken before Judge Juan P. Enriquez. Attorney Samaniego, for the plaintiffs, presented his written opposition dated June 12, 1947, objecting to the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Mendiola.
“Pending resolution of the aforementioned petitions, another petition for relief from effect of judgment dated May 20, 1947, was filed by Attys. Nabong and Sese as counsel for the defendants without notice of hearing.
“After a careful consideration of the aforementioned pleadings of the parties and the affidavits accompanying them, the Court hereby renders the following resolutions:
“(1) The motion for reconsideration of Atty. Mendiola dated May 19, 1947, is hereby denied in view of the fact that according to the affidavit of Judge Juan P. Enriquez dated March 24, 1947, before whom the decision of March 22, 1943, was reconstituted, counsel for the defendant Biñan Transportation Company, after reading the decision sought to be reconstituted and was advised that the decision tallies with the docket of the Court, offered no objection to the reconstitution of said decision which was then and there ordered reconstitution of said decision which was then and there ordered reconstituted with the knowledge of said counsel for the defendant Biñan Transportation Company. As declared in the order of April 15, 1947, which is hereby reiterated, the defendant Biñan Transportation Company by its counsel, Atty. Marcial G. Mendiola, was constructively served on December 20, 1946, with the decision rendered on March 22, 1943.
“(2) That the petition for relief from effect of judgment of Attorneys Nabong and Sese dated May 20, 1947, is likewise denied. As stated in the order of April 15, 1947, defendant Biñan Transportation Company was constructively served on December 20, 1946, with notice of the decision dated March 22, 1943. Petition for relief from judgment under section 2, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court must be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six months after said judgment was entered (section 3, Rule 38). The petition for relief from judgment was filed on June 19, 1947, before which the defendant Biñan Transportation Company, thru counsel, learned of the decision, and more than six months after the said judgment was entered on March 22, 1943.
“(3) That the petition of Atty. Simon Samaniego for the issuance of an alias writ of execution is hereby granted in view of the fact that the decision of March 22, 1943, has long become final and executory. So ordered.
“Santa Cruz, Laguna, June 19, 1947.”
Section 69, subsections (m) and (ee) of Rule 123, provides that it is to be presumed juris tantum that “the official duty has been regularly performed” and that “the law has been obeyed”, and therefore the presumption is that the petitioner was notified of the dates of the trial of the case in which the decision impugned as void was rendered, and of the rendition of said decision; and that presumption may only be rebutted by evidence to the contrary presented at a hearing which may be granted by the Court upon motion for relief filed under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. But the respondent Judge denied the motion for relief under said Rule because it was not filed within the period of time fixed by said Rule 38, according to the above quoted order of the Court.
If the Court has erred in denying said motion, the proper remedy would have been appeal according to a long line of decisions of this Court. Certiorari does not lie because there was appeal, and because the Court has jurisdiction either to grant or deny the motion of the petitioners, and it may only err but not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion if it denies the motion.
Petition is therefore denied with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.