[ G.R. No. L-1904. April 16, 1948 ] 80 Phil. 751
[ G.R. No. L-1904. April 16, 1948 ]
C.N. HODGES, PETITIONER, VS. CONRADO BARRIOS, JUDGE OF COURT FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND JAMES REDFERN, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CLIFFORD J. COOKED, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
On December 4, 1946, C.N. Hodges, through Attorneys Gellada and Mirasol of Iloilo, filed with the Court of First Hodges vs. Barrios Instance of Manila a written claim for P500 against the estate of Clifford J. Cooke, deceased. In an order of August 25, 1947, the claim was set for hearing for September 12, 1947, by Judge Conrado Barrios. On August 30, 1947, Atty. Leon P. Gellada notified Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, counsel for the executor, that the deposition of C. N. Hodges would be taken in Iloilo City on September 8 before a notary public named in the notice. In a motion dated September 2, 1947, Atty. Guerrero moved the court to order the proposed deposition taken on written interrogatories and to postpone the hearing to another convenient date. That motion was set by the movant for Saturday, September 6, with copy thereof sent by airmail to and received by Atty. Gellada before September 12. However, the pleadings do not show whether Atty. Guerrero’s motion was taken up on the date set or any other date. At least Hodges’ attorneys never received notice of any action thereon.
Hodges’ attorneys did not appear in court on September 12, when, it seems, the claim was called. Because of Hodges’ attorneys’ non-appearance, Judge Conrado Barrios dismissed the claim “without prejudice” in an order bearing date September 23.
It is the validity of this order which Hodges impugns. Did the respondent judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the claim?
The attorneys for Hodges were not without reason to believe that the hearing of their client’s claim would not be held on September 12 because of the other party’s motion for postponement and because, as has been seen, they were not prepared on that date to submit their evidence, which was to consist exclusively of Hodges’ deposition, the manner of taking which was still to be decided by the court. And it was not the fault of Hodges’ attorneys that the case was not in shape to be heard. It was the executor’s motion which prevented the taking of the deposition in time to be ready for presentation on the 12th, and the court’s omission to act on Atty. Guerrero’s motion on time, if it did ever act on it, contributed much to the misapprehension of Hodges’ attorneys regarding the date of hearing of the claim. While Hodges’ counsel had no right to assume that Atty. Guerrero’s motion for postponement would be granted, and good practice perhaps demanded that they should have made an inquiry about the matter, yet the court was not entirely justified in expecting the claimant’s attorneys to come over from a distant province for a trial which through no fault of theirs could not be carried out, as the court knew or ought to have known. At the least, the court might have promptly denied the motion for continuance and informed the parties that the hearing would take place on the date originally set.
Upon all these considerations, and in view of the further fact that the absence of Hodges’ attorneys did not in any way retard the due disposal of the case, since even with their attendance the court could not justly have gone ahead with the hearing, we are of the opinion that the dismissal of the claim was utterly unreasonable and unjust.
One argument advanced against the petition is that the dismissal of the claim allows the petitioner to renew the same. We see no advantage to be gained by requiring bhe petitioner to file his claim anew. On the other hand, the suggested step would make it necessary for the parties to start all over again, filing the same motions and papers that are already in the record. Moreover, the new claim might, with or without reason, be opposed on the ground that it was presented beyond the period prescribed by law, thus causing further delay. The objection to the indicated procedure is aggravated by the fact that the claimant and his attorneys reside in a province far from Manila, and the amount of the claim is too small to warrant trips to the capital not needed by the interests of justice.
The order complained of should be and it is hereby set aside with costs against the respondent executor.
Pablo, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.