[ G.R. No. L-1888. March 23, 1948 ] 80 Phil. 506
[ G.R. No. L-1888. March 23, 1948 ]
BATO ALI, PETITIONER VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO AND NATANCOP INDOL, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. L-1889] ISMAEL MAROHON, PETITIONER vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO AND MACAOROAO BALINDONG, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
These two motions of protest being companion cases and raising the same issues will be discussed and disposed of jointly. They present the identical question of the sufficiency of the allegations in the motions of protest to bring these under the jurisdiction of the court. In case No. L-1888, the pertinent part of the motion of protest, copied verbatim, is as follows:
“That the Protestant and the Protestee are candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Dansalan, Province of Lanao, in the last election on November 11, 1947; “That on November 21, 1947, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of Dansalan, proclaimed the Protestee as the winner with a total number of two thousand two hundred sixty six (2,266) votes and the Protestant placed second with a total of one thousand nine hundred seventy six (1,976) votes.”
The motion of protest in case No. L-1889 is couched in the same terms except that the municipality where the election was held is Malabang; the date of the proclamation by the municipal board of canvassers was November 15, and the numbers of votes said to have been polled by the protestant and the protestee are 610 and 558 respectively. The protestees each filed a motion to dismiss and on denial of their motions instituted the present petitions to prohibit the respondent judge from proceeding with the trial of the protests on the merits. The ground of the motions to dismiss was that the complaint does not allege that the protestant was a candidate voted for and “presented a certificate of candidacy.” In a long line of decisions both of this Court and of American courts, it has been uniformly held that courts of special and limited jurisdiction, as are the courts of first instance in election contests, do not acquire jurisdiction unless the jurisdictional facts are shown. Tengco vs. Jocson, 43 Phil. 750, is the Philippine leading case on the subject, and the principal case relied upon in the motions to dismiss. We do not believe that decision and others cited support the petitioners. The allegation that the protestants were “placed second” in the voting more than suffices, in our judgment, to sustain the court’s jurisdiction on the first point. The idea that the protestants were voted for is the clear import of such allegation. Stated otherwise, this allegation is a literal equivalent of the averment that each protestant was voted for. As this Court has put it, “No stretch of the imagination is needed to understand that when it is said that the contestants obtained a certain number of votes it means that they were voted for; how could they have obtained any votes if they have not been voted for? May the Board of Inspectors or the Municipal Board of Canvassers adjudicate votes to a person who did not obtain them in the election? May the Board adjudicate votes to a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy? Section 464 of the law itself answers, No.” (Anis vs. Contreras, 55 Phil. 924.) The other requisite jurisdictional fact that the protestant, in the language of Section 174 of the Revised Election Code, “presented a certificate of candidacy” is also apparent on the motions of protest. Although there is no direct averment to the effect that the protestants filed a certificate of candidacy, yet that is the necessary consequence and the explicit meaning of the averment that they were candidates and were each credited by the board of canvassers with a number of votes only lower to that received by the protestee. As the board of inspectors or the board of canvassers may not adjudicate votes to a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy, (Anis vs. Contreras, ante), the reader is made to understand that the protestants filed such certificate, when they claim that they were candidates and that, according to the returns and the proclamation, the second highest number of votes was cast in their favor. Quite apart from this, the legal presumption that the protestants filed a certificate of candidacy springs from the averment that their names were included in the list of candidates, for such inclusion would not have been made had certificates of candidacy not been submitted. (Anis vs. Contreras, ante.) To confer jurisdiction to a court of special and limited jurisdiction it is not necessary that jurisdictional facts be recited in precise and technical form, although that may be the better practice in proper cases. When, from the allegations of the pleadings, taken together, the matters required to be averred may be gathered, the court will entertain jurisdiction. It is enough that all the essential facts be substantially alleged, alleged in such a way as to enable the adverse party properly to plead. As we have indicated, this is not a departure from the doctrine laid down in Tengco vs. Jocson, ante, and other cases cited. The Tengco-Jocson decision itself merely says that the jurisdictional facts should appear on the face of the proceedings, not that the sacramental words of the statute should be reproduced. It cannot be too often emphasized that pleadings must be liberally and sensibly construed “in order not to nullify the rights of the parties.” (Anis vs. Contreras, ante.) It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed, to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely technical objections. To that end immaterial defects in pleadings should be disregarded and necessary and proper amendments should be allowed as promptly as possible. Heyfrom vs. Mahoney, 18 Am. St. Rep. 757, 763; McCrary on Elections, 3rd Ed. Sec. 396. (Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269.) Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions are denied with the costs of their respective cases charged against the petitioners. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, and Hilado, JJ., concur.