[ G.R. No. L-1505. May 12, 1948 ] 80 Phil. 848
[ G.R. No. L-1505. May 12, 1948 ]
VALENTIN CAMACHO, BONIFACIO MACARAHAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ANGELES CANSON AND TERESA MELGAR DE CARRETERO, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which reversed that of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice that ordered a 70 per cent and 30 per cent division in favor of the petitioners hereinafter deducting from the gross produce the expenses of harvesting and threshing, the palay planted in the haciendas of the now respondents located in the Municipality of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, during the agricultural year of 1946-1947.
The decision appealed from declares that the participations of the parties in this case should be governed, not by the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 34 which amended section 8 of Act No. 4054, as decided by the said Tenancy Division of the Departure nt of Justice, but by an oral, contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties, in accordance with section 8 of Act No. 4054 which according to the lower court’s theory recognizes the validity of an oral contract. The grounds on which the Court of Industrial Relations bases its decision is that, although “the records show that Act No. 4054 had been proclaimed effective in the Province of Pangasinan in January, 1937, Act No. 53 seems to recognize an oral contract inspite of section 4, of said Act No. 4054;” and there being an “oral contract embodying the old customs of tenanoy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year,” Republic Act No. 34 which amended Act No. 4054 in force in Pangasinan. since 1937 oan not be applied to tenancy relation between the parties in this case without impairing the obligations of contract and infringing the Constitution.
After a mature deliberation, we ere of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision of the lower court is contrary to law and, therefore, must be reversed.
Section 4 of Act No. 4054 provides that “the contract on share tenancy in order to be valid and binding shall be in writing, drawn in triplicate in the language known to all the parties thereto to be signed or thumbmarked both by the landlord or his authorized representative and by the tenant before two witnesses, one to be chosen by each party.” But, in view of the provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53, promulgated on October 17, 1936, which prescribes that “where a covenant or oontraot made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof has not been reduced to writing or has not been set forth in a document written in a language known to the lessee or tenant, the testimony of such lessee or tenant “shall be accepted as prima facie evidence on the terms of a covenant or contract,” the lower court concluded that oral contracts are recognized by law inspite of the provision of section 4 of Act No. 4054 quoted in the preceding paragraph, and therefore the oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties in this case prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year, was valid in Santa Barbara, Pangasinan, inspite of the provisions of section 4 of Act No. 4054; and that the effectivity in Pangasinan of Republic Act No. 34, which amended section 8 of said Act No. 4054 relating to saare basis, started from November I2, 1946, when the President issued Proclamation No. 14 declaring the provision of Act No. 4054, as amended, to be in full force and effect throughout the Philippines, and not before.
It is obvious that the conclusions of the lower court that (1) the so called oral contract between the parties in this case was valid and binding upon the parties during the agricultural year 1946-1947, and (2) that Republic Act No. 34 amendatory of section 8 and other sections of Act No. 4054 became effective in Pangasinan on November 12, 1946 the date of the Proclamation, No.14, are erroneous because they are based on incorrect premises.
(1) The major premise of the first conclusion is not correct. It is elementary rule that a subsequent general law should not be construed to repeal or modify a prior special law; and that repeal by implication is not favored, and therefore the former and subsequent act must if possible, be so construed as to give effect to both. Hence, Commonwealth Act No. 53 which refers to “covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof” in general, and does not mention or make any reference to Act No. 4054 should be construed to apply to tenancy contracts on all other agricultural products which may be oral, as well as to tenancy contract on rice in provinces where Act No. 4054 had not yet then made effective by Proclamation in which oral tenancy contracts were valid; but not in those where said No. 4054 was proclaimed to be effective and, therefore, oral contracts are not valid and binding. Because, if in the latter oral contract is not valid and binding, no amount of evidence of whatever kind can be admitted to prove the legal existence and terms thereof; and besides it is unconceivable that the Legislature had intended, for it would be retrogressive, to practically repeal section 4 of Act No. 4054 enacted for the purpose of preventing serious controversies that may arise as a result of the conflicting interpretation of verbal contracts and other agreements affecting rice tenancy between landlords and tenants.
The provisions of Act No. 4054, which provides in its section 4 that an oral contract or share tenancy is not valid and binding, having been in force in the province of Pangasinan since January 20, 1937, there could not legally exists an effective oral contract between the parties embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year, and therefore the rice sharing tenancy between the parties must be governed since the year 1937 by the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 4054 and its amendments.
(2) The major premise of the other conclusion is also incorrect. Proclamation No. 14 issued by the President of the Philippines dated November 30, 1946, which declares the provisions of Act No. 4054, as amended, to be in full force and effect throughout the Philippines, was obviously intended for territories in the Philippines in which said Act had not yet been declared in force by Proclamation Prior to said date, and not to provinces, like Pangasinan, where Act No. 4054 had already been put in force since January 20, 1937, which Proclamation was never set aside or suspended. It is therefore clear that Act No. 34, amendatory of said Act No. 4054, became effective ipso facto in Pangasinan since the date of its passage, September 30, 1946, in which, according to the express provision of section 4 thereof became effective; because an amendment of a law being a part of the original which is already in force and effect in a certain territory, must necessarily become effective therein as a part of the amended law at the time the amendment takes effect. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 34 provides that the Act shall take effect immediately, that is, upon its passage or approval by the President on September 30, 1946; and a statute which is to take immediate effect is operative from the exact instance of its becoming law.
Taking into consideration that our Constitution, not only does not place any limitation on the general legislative power, but ordains Congress to “regulate the relations between landowner and tenant” (section 6, Article XIV), and provides that “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State” (section 5, Article II); that it is a “well settled rule that the history of a legislation is also important in interpreting the intention of the legislative body, and therefore courts may refer to messages of the executive to the legislature (2 Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, (3rd ed., Section 5002, 5004, pp. 481-489); that the President in its message to Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1946, in recommending the earliest approval of the proposed amendments to the tenancy lam embodied in Republic Act No. 34, which “establish the fairest possible contractual basis between the tenant and landowner,” according to the Message, the President said that “In view of the fact that the planting season of rice is under way and that the harvest mill take place before the next session of the Congress, I earnestly request that this matter receives your early attention and that the proposed amendment be enacted at an early date'1; and that Act No. 34 was passed by Congress and approved by the President on September 30, 1946 to take effect immediately; it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the Congress to make it applicable to the harvest of rice during the agricultural year 1946-1947.
No retrospective effect would be given to said provision of section 8 of the Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. 34 relating to share basis, if applied to the rice harvested during agricultural year 1946-1947; because said Act No. 34 became effective on September 30, that is before the expiration of the agricultural 1946-1947, for “one agricultural year shall mean the length of time necessary for the preparation of the land sowing, planting and harvesting a crop” (section 6, Act No. 4054), and the crop in question had been, according to the conclusion of fact of the lower court, planted during May and harvested during the months from October to December, 1946, and even January, 1947. And it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that statute is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage (See cases cited in 37 Words and Phrases, pp. 530-533).
But even if to apply Republic Act No. 34 to the tenancy relations in agricultural year 1946-1947 between the parties would be tantamount to giving said Act retroactive or retrospective effect, our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property without due process of law, that is, which do not divest rights of property and vested rights. It is evident that there being no valid or binding oral tenancy contract, nor a written one for that matter, between parties prior to the date Act No. 34 became effective, no obligations of contract could be impaired by the application of said Republic Act No. 34. And no vested right having been acquired by the parties over the 1946-1947 rice crop under the provision of section 8 of Act No. 4054, applicable to the division of the crop in the absence of a contract in writing between the parties, before it was amended by Republic Act No. 34, no vested right could be affected by the application of said Act No. 34 to the tenancy share in 1946-1947 rice crop.
In view of all the foregoing, and the fact that the conditions set forth in section 8 of Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. 34, are complied with in the present case as found by the lower court in its decision that is, that the tenant owns the work animals and the necessary implements, that he defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation, and that the cost of harvest and threshing were deducted from the gross produce, the decision appealed from is reversed or set aside, and the decision by the Tenancy Lava Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, in so far as it applies the provisions of said Act No. 34 to the present case, be carried out, with costs against the respondent. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Parás, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, and Padilla, JJ. concur.