[ G.R. Nos. L-1433 to L-1435. June 30, 1948 ] 81 Phil. 203
EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. L-1433 to L-1435. June 30, 1948 ]
EDILBERTO MORALES, PETITIONER, VS. MELECIO ZAMORA, RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
These three cases jointly tried and decided in the Court of First instance of Manila by agreement of the parties, were on appeal disposed of by the Court of Appeals in one single decision. They are presently before us upon petition for certiorari.
In the first, Edilberto Morales seeks to compel Melecio Zamora to accept the sum of P30 as monthly rental for May, 1945, of the premises he actually occupies as lessee at 1204 Rizal Avenue, Manila. The second, is a suit by Zamora to eject Morales from the same premises. And the third is another action by Zamora to recover damages occasioned by Morales refusal to vacate. The Manila court dismissed the first and third cases but ordered, in the second, that defendant Edilberto Morales shall surrender the premises to the plaintiff Melecio Zamora paying to him P30 monthly from May 1, 1945, up to the time he leaves the place. Costs were also awarded. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.
Edilberto Morales brought these cases up for review. Hereafter to be called petitioner, he submits these two main propositions: (a) “That Republic Act No. 66 specifically provides that the plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be ejected from the premises because the one year period as specifically provided in the said act has not yet elapsed” and (b) “that the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the premises commercial is against the provision of Republic Act No. 66 as stated in the last sentence of Section 1 of the said Act”.
The Court of Appeals found, — and we must accept its findings of fact —“that pursuant to an oral lease contract between Melecio Zamora and Edilberto Morales, the latter, since the month of December, 1941, had been occupying the premises in litigation located at 1204 Rizal Avenue, where since then he has been operating a barbershop, at a monthly rental of P25 payable during the first five days of each month, which amount was later raised to P31 s month. It also appears, without contradiction on the part of Morales, since the month of November, 1944, that he failed to pay the monthly rent on time, and for this reason, and because appellee Zamora needed the premises in question to establish therein a business of his own, on May, 1945, he notified appellant (Exhibit A) that the lease contract had expired and that he should vacate the premises accordingly. Morales contended that Zamora did not object to his continuing in the occupancy of those premises as long as he kept paying the monthly rentals, but as already stated, the payment of the rentals was very irregular and in violation of the terms of said contract.”
Said Court of Appeals concluded from the above statement that the owner was entitled to his realty under the provisions of article 1581 of the Civil Code providing that “if no term has been fixed for the lease, it shall be understood as from year to year when an annual rent has been fixed, from month to month when the rent is monthly, and from day to day when it is daily”.
The appellate court refused to apply the amendatory provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, explaining that these were not intended to cover “buildings or houses located in a commercial zone and devoted, as the one involved in this litigation, to Hie business of a barbershop”. In amplification of its view, the court reasoned “that Rizal Avenue, starting from its intersection with Echague Street in a northerly direction up to its intersection with Blumentritt Street, is within the purlieus of a commercial or business district. There is hardly any single building or premises located on Rizal Avenue which is not occupied for some business or commercial enterprise or purpose, but even granting that the upper portion of any such building were occupied for dwelling, such fact does not nevertheless change the nature of the premises which is controlled by its location”.
This last consideration is forcefully questioned by the attorney for herein petitioner. There may be some ground to his protest against the pronouncement that the premises are to be deemed commercial simply because they are located in Rizal Avenue between Echague and Blumentritt streets. But the fact remains that said court found that herein petitioner used the premises for his “barbershop business” — and that he may not invoke Republic Act No. 66 which applies to “dwellings” only.
On the other hand, it appearing that the upper portion of the structure is used as residence of the family of Morales he quotes the same law which directs that “buildings used both as dwelling of the lessee and also as place of business of the latter for home industries intended for the support of the family shall be deemed included in the provisions of this Act” (Republic Act No. 66).
On this question we note that the Court of Appeals found the place devoted to “the business of a barbershop”. The respondent states without contradiction that petitioner’s establishment has six chairs (barber’s) and employs a number of hair-cutters who do not belong to his family. Wherefore, under the circumstances we do not believe that herein petitioner may successfully plead the maintenance of a “home industry” as distinguished from a business establishment. When a barber or tailor pursues his calling by serving customers in his dwelling, he is merely exercising a home industry and his place of abode does not thereby become commercial. But when he engages other tailors or barbers to expand his business and increase his returns, his establishment becomes commercial, and the incidental fact that his family lives therein would not include him in that class of tenants especially favored by recent emergency legislation on housing.
It would be ridiculous indeed to hold that the well-appointed barbershops of Sta. Cruz and Quiapo would be considered “residences” simply because the family of one of the barbers happened to be quartered there.
This distinction between the pursuit of his industry by an artisan (tailor, barber, shoemaker, tinsmith, etc.) and his setting up of a commercial establishment for purposes of gain and employing others, is admitted fin legal circles.
For instance, the sales made by artificers in their workshops of the objects produced by them is, by express statutory provision, considered civil. (Article 326, Code of Commerce). But authors are unanimous that some sales are commercial, where the artificer for purposes of gain, sets up a shop, and employs others, etc.
“It is indisputable that, taking into account the nature of the mercantile purchase and sale, the sales made by artificers of the products of their labor deserve the qualification of being mercantile, provided always that they have to purchase in order to resell the materials on which they exercise their trade. It is, however, to be admitted that not all of them have the same end in view when they acquire the necessary materials for manufacturing purposes, or when they sell the articles manufactured by them. Some of them perform these acts as an indispensable means of the exercise of their industry, while others, on the contrary, execute the same with the purpose of obtaining gain or profit. This difference in purpose which serves to attribute or deny mercantile character to the same act, is generally manifested by the circumstances under which the artificer or manufacturer sells his products. When he does not execute the work himself, but desiring to obtain profit, employs laborers who are paid by him in order to have at the disposal of the public a large supply of the articles manufactured by them, and exposes such articles in shops or establishments, it is evident that such person has in view speculation or profit. But he who confines himself to the manufacture, in his own shop, under orders placed with him, of articles which constitute his industry or art, has no other purpose but to obtain a livelihood from the product of his industry. Because of this difference, sales made by the former class of artificers are regarded commercial, and those by the latter as civil.” (3 Echavarri 245-246; 3 Estasen 212-213.) (Italics ours) (Code of Commerce by Tolentino, Vol. I, pp. 175-76).
For these reasons we concur in the view of the Court of Appeals that petitioner herein may not validly invoke the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66. Being of that opinion, we deem it unnecessary at this time to consider or expound the extent and scope or practical application of the change effected by the one-year period provided in the aforementioned statutory enactments.
Judgment affirmed. No costs.
Parás, Actg. C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.