[ G.R. No. L-1218. September 15, 1948 ] G.R. No. L-1218
[ G.R. No. L-1218. September 15, 1948 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROBIN VILLASIS AND SIM VILLASIS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
On July 30, 1946, the Chief of Police of Escalante, Occidental Negros, filed with the Justice of the Peace of, the said municipality a complaint against Robin Villasis and Sim Villasis for slight physical injuries, alleging:
“The Chief of Police, after having been duly sworn to, accuses ROBIN VILLASIS and SIM VILLASIS of the Crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, committed as follows:
“That on or about the 5th day of July, at approximately 5'00 P.M., in barrio Bug-ang, Municipality of Escalante, Province of Negros Occidental. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this. Honorable Court, the said accused referred to above are brothers, confederating together and helping one another, did and use personal violence upon the person of one Policarpo Celeste, by then and there giving them several blows with a wooden cane and striking with a bolo, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries to wit:
“(1) Wound lacerated scalp parietal left “(2) Contusion back left “(3) Wound lacerated hand left from hype themar to base of little finger and part of dorsal as pect of hand “(4) Wound lacerated forearm left “(5) Wound, lacerated thumb and little finger right “(6) Wound lacerated leg right.
“Which injuries incapacitated Policarpo Celeste from performing his daily labor and it will require 7 to 10 days to heal, as per medical certificate herein attached.”
On August 22, 1946 upon being arraigned, the two accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced to ten days of arresto menor and to pay the costs.
The accused began serving the sentence. On August 25, 1946, three days after the promulgation of the sentence, the Chief of Police filed with the same Justice of the fpeace, In the same case, under the same title and with (the same Case No. 103, an amended complaint, charging the same two accused with serious physical injuries and reading as follows:
“The Chief of Police, after having been duly sworn to, accuses Robin Villasis and Sim Villasis of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
“That on or about the 5th day of July, 191+6. at approximately 5:00 P.M., in barrio Bug-ang Municipality of Escalante, Province of Negros/Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused referred to above, are brothers, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Policarpo Celeste and striking with a bolo, thereby inflicting upon the latter Serious Physical Injuries, to wit:
“(1) Wound lacerated scalp parietal left “(2) Contusion back left “(3) Wound lacerated hand left from hype themar to base of little finger and part of dorsal as pect of hand “(4) Wound lacerated forearm left “(5) Wound lacerated thumb and little finger right “(6) Wound lacerated leg right.
“Which injuries caused curation for 23 days. Inflicting wound on the left hand causing deformity.”
On September 2, 1946, a warrant was Issued for the arrest of the two accused, their bail having been fixed at P3,000. On September 4, the accused filed a pleading renouncing preliminary investigation and praying that the record be remanded to the Court of First Instance or Negros Occidental, wherein, on September 19, 1946, the following information based on the amended complaint was filed:
“The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Robin Vlllasis and Sim Villasis, of the crime of ‘SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES,’ committed as follows:
“That on or about July 5, 1946, in the municipality of Escalante, province of Negros Occidental, Republic of the Philippines, and herein accused, being then provided with wooden cane and a bolo, respectively, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Policarpo Celeste, thus inflicting upon the latter several injuries in the different parts of his body which required medical attendance for more than 30 days and causing deformity on his left arm.”
On October 16, 1946, defense counsel filed a motion to quash the information, on the ground that accused have already served the sentence of 10 days arresto menor for slight physical injuries of which they were convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court of Escalante upon the {same facts alleged in the information.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the case upon two grounds. First, because the amended complaint was filed after the judgment on the original complaint, in violation of Section 13 of Rule 106 that provides that the information or complaint may. be amended only before judgment has been rendered and, therefore, the court has not acquired Jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the persons of the defendants; and second, because the accused have been placed in double jeopardy (People vs. Tarok, G.R. No. 47453, decided on October 9, 1941).
The prosecution appealed against the order of dismissal.
Appellant holds that the trial court erred in finding that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the accused, in view of the fact that the amended complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Escalante was not an amended complaint but an original complaint.
The contention is evidently aimed at eluding the clear and indisputable provision of Section 13 of Rule 106.
Because the accused have expressly waived their right to a preliminary investigation, appellant intimates that the accused understood the. amended complaint not as an amended complaint; but, to all intents and purposes, as van original complaint falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The argument is so thin that it vanishes into nothingness. Unless the Chief of Police had no idea of the meaning of his two words, there is no possible Mistake that his intention was to amend the original complaint. The amended complaint was sworn to before the Justice of the Peace who thereupon issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The Justice of the Peace would not have allowed himself to officiate an empty ceremony where the Chief of Police swore to an amended complaint he intended to be original. Besides, it is too much to expect people as ignorant as the accused—one can hardly write his name and the other had to thumbmark his waiver to a preliminary investigation,— to follow the complex mental processes and to be made to understand that “amended” means “not amended” and that words are written to express ideas contrary to what they have always conveyed.
Appellant has proposed to show that the trial court erred in holding that the accused have been placed in double jeopardy.
There is no dispute that under the ruling in People vs. Tarok, supra, and upon the facts in this case, the accused have been placed in double jeopardy. The appellant impugns the validity of Section 9 of Rule 113, the authority upon which the ruling in the Tarok case was laid down, which provides that the conviction or acquittal of defendant shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Appellant contends that the guaranty against double jeopardy provided for in Section 9 of Rule 113 is in virtue of the constitutional rule-making power of the Supreme Court which, according to Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, may not however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The proposition is untenable. The rule in question does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, but only points out that there are procedures that must be followed to enforce, and to avoid violations of, the following provision of the fundamental law:
“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.” (Sec. 1(20), Art. III of the Constitution.)
The argument advanced by appellant about the rise of the word “offense” in the first clause and of the word “act” in the second clause of the constitutional provision on double jeopardy appears to be immaterial to the question raised regarding the disputed provision of Section 9 of Rule 113. The disputed provision offers a rule of ‘interpretation for the word “offense,” and all matters of interpretation are procedural in nature. The Supreme Court has construed the words “same offense” in the constitutional inhibition, and to provide that an offense which necessarily includes the one charged in a complaint or informaition is the same as the latter is just an interpretation of the words used by the drafters of the fundamental law, and no reasonable person nay validly hold that, in the light of history and experience and of a legal situation intended to be clarified, the Supreme Court has given an unreasonable interpretation of the thought of the drafters.
The appealed order is affirmed.
Paras, and Briones, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., see concurring opinion. Feria, J., see dissenting opinion Bengzon, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Pablo, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justices Feria, and Padilla. Padilla, J., see dissenting opinion. Tuason, J., in the result.