[ G.R. No. L-1120. August 31, 1948 ] 81 Phil. 453
[ G.R. No. L-1120. August 31, 1948 ]
INOCENCIO ROSETE, PETITIONER, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim of Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the amount of P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant, which according to the appellant’s claim were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse, of the Emergency Control Administration, ECA, located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the appellant, but only on the question whether, assuming them to be true, the Insular Auditor erred in denying or dismissing the appellant’s claim. The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code, which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
“ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.
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“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311), this Court held the following:
“* * * Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: ‘The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.’ The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: " ‘That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.’ (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
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‘That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and.the regulations.’ (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.) ‘That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of article 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.’ (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)”
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control Administration did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not responsible for the damages caused through such negligence. The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by the appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case recovered under the special provisions of articles 826, 827, 828 and 830 of the Code of Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the Collector of Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not on the ground of tort in general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil Code. Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter’s decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Paras, Actg. C. J., Pablo Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.