G.R. No. L-1065

FLAVIANO AZURIN AND ESTANISLAO MACADAEG, PETITIONERS, VS. BERNARDINO QUITORIANO, JUDGE-AT-LARGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, RAYMUNDO ASUNCION AND LOURDES ASUNCION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-1065. July 22, 1948 ] 264 Phil. 81

[ G.R. No. L-1065. July 22, 1948 ]

FLAVIANO AZURIN AND ESTANISLAO MACADAEG, PETITIONERS, VS. BERNARDINO QUITORIANO, JUDGE-AT-LARGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, RAYMUNDO ASUNCION AND LOURDES ASUNCION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

This is an original petition for a writ of certiorari to annul a judgment rendered in cadastral case No. 33, G.L.R.O. cadastral record No. 1179, The Director of Lands’ petitioner, versus Pancracio Adiarte et al.,  claimants which confirmed the title to, and decreed the registration of, lots Nos.  17241,  17247,  17258,  17262 and  25092 in said  cadastral case,  in the name  of Lourdes  Asuncion and Raymundo  Asuncion,  one-third  undivided   share  to each, and of Estanislao Macadaeg and Flaviano Azurin, one-sixth undivided share to each—the decree No. 75376 entered on 16 July 1941 in accordance with the judgment, and the original certificate of title No. 24053 issued on 7 June 1946 pursuant to the decree, on the ground that the petitioners, on the one hand, and the respondents surnamed Asuncion, on the other, within the time prescribed by law had filed answers in the cadastral case, the former claiming ownership and title to the aforesaid lots to the exclusion of the latter; that despite said adverse claims filed by the parties on said lots, on 18 February 1941, without notice to the petitioners or their attorney, the cadastral court, presided over by Judge Emilio Rilloraza, heard the evidence of the respondents surnamed Asuncion upon the assurance made to the court by Raymundo Asuncion that the lots were not contested; that the petitioners have not been notified of the judgment rendered in the cadastral case and have learned of said judgment and of the issuance of the Torrens title for said lots on August 1946 only when they went to Laoag; that upon discovery thereof, they filed   a petition for the review and annulment of the judgment, but that on 5 September 1946, after hearing, the respondent court denied the petition, as well as the motion for the reconsideration of the order denying it, on the ground that the petition filed on 27 August 1946 was beyond the period of one year from 16 July 1941, the date of the entry of the decree, within which it may be reviewed. In their answer, the respondents surnamed Asuncion do not deny the facts pleaded in the petition, but reiterate the opinion of the respondent court, as set forth in the order of 5 September 1946; and plead that there is nothing in the petition to show that the respondent court had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. The filing by the petitioners and the respondents surnamed Asuncion of their answers in the cadastral case No. 33, G.L.R.O. cadastral record No. 1179, claiming lots Nos. 17241, 17247, 17258, 17262 and 25092, after previous notice as by law provided, clothed the cadastral court with complete jurisdiction not only over the lots—the subject matter—but also of the parties—the petitioners and the respondents Asuncion. When the cadastral court heard the evidence of the respondents Asuncion upon representation made by Raymundo Asuncion to the cadastral court that the lots claimed by them were uncontested—despite the fact that they were contested and that the petitioners had not been notified of the hearing—such misrepresentation and failure to notify the petitioners did not divest the cadastral court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim on said lots. The misrepresentation would constitute fraud against which there is a remedy provided for by law, but section 38 of Act 496, as amended, requires that the petition for review be filed “within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.” Neither is the failure to notify the parties of the hearing a sufficient ground to review a decree, unless such failure should constitute fraud. Petitioners did not file their petition within one year after entry of the decree, so the remedy to have the decree reviewed on the ground of fraud has been lost to them. If the respondents Asuncion in whose favor the decree had been entered had had nothing to do with the failure to notify the petitioners of the hearing, the blame for such failure may be laid upon the clerk of court or his subordinates. It is in such cases that an action for damages may be brought, as provided for in sections 101 and 102 of Act 496. Besides the remedy afforded the rightful owner of a parcel of land wrongfully registered in the name of another provided for in the last mentioned sections of the Act, when the review of the decree provided for in section 38 of the Act is no longer available on account of the expiration of the period of one year, there still is available to him the equitable remedy to pray the court to compel the person in whose name the parcel of land had been wrongfully registered to reconvey it to him, provided, of course, that the parcel of land had not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. Such being the case, we fail to see how the remedy sought herein by the petitioners may be granted. To grant it would be to undermine the very foundation and stability of the Torrens system. Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur. Feria, J.: I concur and reserve my right to write a separate opinion. Paras, J.: I certify, that Chief Justice Moran voted to deny the petition.