[ G. R. Nos. L-1970-72. October 02, 1948 ] 81 Phil. 566
[ G. R. Nos. L-1970-72. October 02, 1948 ]
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA FILIPINAS (CLO), PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
In case No. 73-V and 73-V (1) of the Court of Industrial Relations, that Court in an order dated October 17, 1947, authorized and sanctioned the temporary closing by Dy Pac & Co., Inc., of its saw mill on Juan Luna St., Manila, and the laying off of its laborers, as of June 30, 1947. The order imposed this condition, to wit: “que la compañia, cuando reabra su negocio de tableria o cuando reanude la operacion de la misma, repondra o permitira que sus empleados y obreros que han quedado sin trabajo o suspendidos con motivo del cierro del negocio continuen en el servicio.” The saw mill was opened on November 17 by Central Saw Mill, a different corporation, under a contract of lease with Dy Pac & Company. Central Saw Mill brought its own personnel and took in some of Dy Pac’s former employees. Those of Dy Pac’s former laborers who were left out filed a motion for contempt, amended on November 29, against both Dy Pac & Co. and Central Saw Mill, motion which was docketed as a separate case and numbered 73-V(2). It was charged that the lease was simulated, designed “to avoid the decision of this Honorable Court being carried out”, and that the respondents “had violated and defied the authority of this Honorable Court.” It was from an adverse decision of the Court of Industrial Relations on the motion for contempt that the present appeal by certiorari was brought. The part of the order which is pertinent for the purpose of this proceeding is as follows:
“From the documentary evidence, presented in the hearing of this motion, it is clear that the Central Saw Mill, Inc., with which Dy Pac & Company, Inc., has a contract of lease, is a distinct and separate entity from the Dy Pac & Company. The fact that some members of the Board of Directors of the Dy Pac & Company and the Central Saw Mill, Inc., are the same, or, members of just one family, would not alter the fact that the two companies are two independent entities, more so, when it is considered that the Central Saw Mill, Inc., has been in operation since 1939. There is no affirmative allegation either that the contract of lease was a nullity nor could it be claimed that the contract of lease should include a clause to accept the laid-off laborers and employees, as this contingency was not contemplated in the decision of October 14, 1947, nor could the failure to include it as a provision thereof render the contract of lease void or ineffective. The position of the Court becomes more clear when it has to be remembered that there was no evidence that Dy Pac & Company has reopened its lumber mill or reestablished its business to make the case squarely fall under the terms of the decision of the Court of October 14, 1947. Undoubtedly, to make the Central Saw Mill, Inc., a party to the case and more, to hold it in contempt of Court just because it refused to re-employ all the former employees and laborers of the Dy Pac & Company, Inc., when no mention about it has been made in the contract of lease between the two lumber companies nor was it an original party to the case, would be to set at naught the independent and legal personality of the Central Saw Mill, Inc. Surely, the social Justice policy of the state should not be interpreted to mean the shielding of one and the oppression of the other. If Dy Pac & Company has sought to lease its property believing that it would redound to its benefit, it has perfectly that right considering the fact that there is no evidence that it had been resorted to negate the decision of the Court.”
The respondents ask for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that only questions of fact are involved. It is apparent from the nature of the charges and from the above-quoted order, that the question raised and the question decided by the court was a question of fact. Specifically, the question raised and the question decided was whether the two respondent companies were identical, or whether the lease by Dy Pac of its establishment to Central Saw Mill was fictitious, as the petitioners allege, executed for the main or sole purpose of circumventing the court’s order. The very argument in petitioners’ memorandum with which they press their accusation is replete with assertions and phrases that are characteristically factual, such as, to mention only some, “collusion”, “bad faith”; “fictitiously alienating the management”; “a fictitious and fraudulent contract, simulated by the parties therein, * * * to defeat the effectiveness of the decisions”; “suspicious circumstances”; “obstruction and degradation of the administration of justice”; all of which rest on evidentiary facts for their determination. Only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from an order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. (Sec. 2, Rule 44, of Court.) In consonance with this rule we have" steadfastly refused to interfere with the findings of fact of that court, limiting our attention to questions of law. (Central Azucarrera de Tarlac V. Court of Industrial Relations,[1] No. 46843, 40 Off. Gaz., 3d Supp., 319; Manila Labor Union, 40 Off. Gaz., 9 Supp. 132; Mindanao Bus Co. vs. MBC Employees,[2] Nos. 47544 & 47611, 40 Off. Gaz., 10th Supp., 114; Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. BLT Employees Labor Union[3], No. 47661, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp., 88; Leyba vs. Meralco, 40 Off. Gaz., 4th Supp., 73; Elks Club vs. Rovira[4] No. 48411, promulgated February 24, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3829.) Upon the foregoing considerations, the petition is dismissed with costs.