[ G. R. No. L-1336. May 28, 1948 ] 81 Phil. 128
[ G. R. No. L-1336. May 28, 1948 ]
POTENCIANA DEQUITO AND CARLOS SALING BUHAY, PETITIONERS, VS. HUGO O. ARELLANO, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PADRE BURGOS, QUEZON, AND OSMUNDO SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of the Justice of the Peace of Padre Burgos, Quezon. The petitioners, through the Chief of Police of that municipality, filed a complaint with the respondent Justice of the Peace for qualified trespass to a dwelling. After conducting a preliminary hearing, the Justice of the Peace issued an order of arrest. What happened after the defendant was arrested is stated in paragraph 6 of the present petition, which at the same time formulates the question submitted for decision. Paragraph 6 says:
“That immediately after the accused entered his plea of not guilty, the respondent Judge ordered the private prosecution to present its witnesses, but the said private prosecution, citing section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, declined to present its witnesses, and instead insisted that at that particular stage of the proceedings it was the duty of the respondent Judge to inform his co-respondent accused, Osmundo Santiago, of the substance of the testimony and evidence previously presented against the latter, and that the respondent accused thereafter might, if he so desired, testify, present witnesses, or evidence in his favor.”
Sections 6 and 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are as follows:
“SEC. 6. Duty of judge or corresponding officer in preliminary investigation.-The justice of the peace or the officer who is to conduct the preliminary investigation must take under oath, either in the presence or absence of the defendant, the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses to be presented by him or by the fiscal, but only the testimony of the complainant shall be reduced to writing. He shall, however, make an abstract or brief statement of the substance of the testimony of the other witnesses. “SEC. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest.-After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.”
We are in agreement with the petitioners’ contention in so far as the defendant’s right is concerned. We believe with the petitioners that the defendant can not as a matter of right compel the complainant and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest. The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him toes not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. (32 C.J.S., 456.) But the right of accused is not correlative with the tight of the examining judge or justice of the peace. If the accused is not entitled as of right to have the complainant and/or his witnesses testify in his presence, it does not follow that the justice of the peace or judge is powerless to accord him that right. The power of the judge emanates from a principle of law more ample than the procedure outlined by Section 11 of Rule 108. There are an infinite number of things which a party may not in strict law do or cause to be done but which may be permitted by the court in the exercise of its discretion and in the interest of justice. Specially is this true in matters affecting the conduct of the trial and the calling, recalling fend examination of witnesses. Thus, while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant’s right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth. The judge is not a ministerial officer reduced to Recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the examination. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused from groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicalities of practice. Regardless of section 11 of Rule 108 the judge may examine or recall witnesses or call other witnesses with a view to satisfy his mind on the matters he has to determine. His power in this respect is unchanged. It was, and still is, not only his right, but often times his duty, to examine and reexamine a witness within reasonable limits when it appears necessary to do so in order to secure a full and clear understanding of the facts or to test to his satisfaction the credibility of the witness under examination. (U.S. vs. Lim Tiu, 31 Phil. 504.) By parity of reasoning and for the same purpose, the judge may allow a party or his counsel to call back a witness who has already testified, specially one whose previous testimony was given behind the defendant’s back and whom the defendant has not had an opportunity to face and cross-examine. The defendant’s attorney, if one has been retained, who has studied the case, is, all things being equal, in a better position than the judge to test the accuracy and truthfullness of a witness and the value of his testimony. The position of the petitioners is out of tune with the enlightened and modern method of administering justice. Under petitioners’ theory, a new justice of the peace who has inherited a case from a predecessor after the latter has taken the complainant’s and the prosecution witnesses’ evidence, would have to content himself with passing on the degree of probability of the accusation exclusively by affidavits or extracts of the evidence, as though the credibility of witnesses could be gauged by a reading of affidavits and extracts of statements. It is true that the accused is given the opportunity to refute the charge by his or his witnesses’ evidence. The objection to such reasoning is, it assumes that if the defendant is not guilty it takes no more than his evidence to convince the court of his innocence. Experience shows, however, that in many cases one has to hear both sides, and sometimes more than both sides, to reach an intelligent and correct conclusion. Not infrequently it takes more than the defendant’s evidence to disabuse the mind of the judge. In some cases it is necessary to resort to cross-examination to lay bare the falsity of the complainant’s evidence, and a successful cross-examination can rarely be achieve unless the cross-examiner has seen the witness testify and heard the details of his testimony in chief. And the is a stronger reason for the accused to show the falsity of the charge in a preliminary investigation than in the trial because the law exacts stronger evidence to convict than is required to commit the accused for trial. To bind the defendant for trial if is only necessary that his guilt appears probable, not beyond reasonable doubt. To the argument that the action of the justice of the peace binding the defendant to the Court of First Instance is not a final judgment, it should be said that to be held for trial, to be committed to answer to a criminal charge in a higher court, and to have put up a bond or be kept in jail during the pendency of the case, is not an ordeal to be scoffed at as a trifle. The petition is denied with costs. Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur. Tuason, J., The Chief Justice authorized me to certify that he concurred in this decision.