[ G. R. No. 49308. May 13, 1948 ] 81 Phil. 1
[ G. R. No. 49308. May 13, 1948 ]
MARIA LUISA MARTINEZ, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL H. BARREDO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
On April 11, 1940, a taxicab owned by Fausto Barredo and driven by Rosendo Digman collided in a Manila thorough fare with a Chevrolet car driven by Maria Luisa Martinez. The collision gave rise to mutual charges for damage to property through reckless imprudence, one by Maria Luisa Martinez against Digman, and the other by Fausto Barredo against Maria Luisa Martinez. After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Digman and quashed Barredo’s complaint. Digman entered a plea of guilty in his criminal case and was therefore sentenced to pay a fine of P605.97 and to indemnify Maria Luisa Martinez in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. Digman failed to pay any of these amounts and had to undergo corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. Due to the inability of Digman to pay the indemnity, Maria Luisa Martinez, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as Digman’s employer, for the purpose of holding him subsidiarily liable for said indemnity under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal code. At the trial Maria Lulsa Martinez relied solely on the judgment of conviction against Rosendo Digman, the writ of execution Issued against him, a certificate of the Director of Prisons regarding Digman’s service of subsidiary imprisonment, and the information filed against Digman. Maria Luisa Martinez obtained a favorable judgment from which Barredo appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter court, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance, held that the Judgment of conviction was not conclusive against Barredo and its weight as prima facie evidence was overcome by the evidence presented by Barredo. Hence the present appeal of Maria Luisa Martinez by way of certiorari. The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed decision makes reference to two earlier decisions of this Court, namely, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 586, holding that such judgment of conviction is not admissible, and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 75, in effect holding that it is merely prima facie evidence, and to the prevailing view in the United States to the effect that the person subsidiarily liable is bound by the judgment if the former had notice of the criminal case and could have defended it had he seen fit to do so, and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence. After very careful reflection, we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiarily liable. The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should not be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the driver, excelling “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”, could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could be free from any blame when said indemnity is sought to be collected from his employer, although the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act of the driver. The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver’s criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver’s conviction and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476, 54 L. ed. 1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v. Tolentino, G. R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.) It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and consequently doing away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied. It becomes unnecessary to rely on the circumstance that the filing of mutual charges by Fausto Barredo and Maria Luisa Martinez, with the result, as above stated, that while the fiscal proceeded in filing the information against Digman, he quashed the charges of Fausto Barredo, may easily lead to the presumption that the latter should have had knowledge of the criminal case against his driver. We need not also make any pronouncement to the effect that the prevailing American view is based upon substantive and procedural laws not similar to those obtaining in this jurisdiction. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and Fausto Barredo, now substituted by his heirs and legal representatives, are hereby sentenced to pay, subject to Executive Order No. 32 on Moratorium, to the petitioner, Maria Luisa Martinez, the sum of P605.97, with, legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. So ordered with costs against the respondents. Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon,and Briones, JJ., concur.