[ G.R. No. L-884. June 30, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 570
[ G.R. No. L-884. June 30, 1947 ]
PATRICIO CONTRERAS AND JERUSALEM GINGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. ALFONSO FELIX, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND THE CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
The case concerns a proposed modification of a final judgment. The earnestness with which the petition is maintained will be our excuse for making this decision more lengthy than the nature of the case in other circumstances would warrant.
Patricio Contreras and Jerusalem Gingco brought a suit against the China Banking Corporation, Inc., and Juan V. Molina and Teodora Arenas, husband and wife, to annul a mortgage executed by the spouses in favor of the Bank and to recover damages. The Court of First Instance of Manila, the Honorable Jose O. Vera presiding, absolved the Bank and condemned the other two defendants to pay various amounts in various concepts with certain deductions. The lower court’s judgment in full is as follows:
“Por los hechos y razones expuestos, se dicta decision en esta causa, declarando:
“(1) Que la hipoteca otorgada a favor de The China Banking Corporation es valida, pues el banco obro de buena fe;
“(2) Condenando a Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas a pagar a Jerusalem Gingco en concepto de indemnizacion de daños y perjuicios la cantidad de P2,000;
“(3) Obligando a los conyuges Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas a pagar la deuda hipotecaria al banco The China Banking Corporation a fin de que las accesorias y las dos puertas adicionales no tengan gravamen alguno. Si no lo hacen dentro de treinta dias despues de quedar firme esta sentencia, Jerusalem Gingco puede hacer ese rescate, cargando la deuda hipotecaria a cuenta de Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas, pudiendo incluirse en la ejecucion que se expida en esta causa el cobro de lo que Jerusalem Gingco pague al banco por dicha hipoteca;
“(4) Del credito de Jerusalem Gingco contra Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas de P4,836.31 en la causa No. 44960, se debe deducir el exceso de lo pagado por Teodora Arenas en la subasta publica que hubo con motivo de la ejecucion expedida en la causa No. 36669. Dicho exceso es de P576.25, que se debe deducir de los P4,836.31.
“(5) Que los conyuges Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas paguen a Jerusalem Gingco P2,520 por los alquileres de las dos puertas adicionales a razon de P30 mensuales (P15 por puerta), correspondiente al periodo del 4 de Septiembre de 1934 al 4 de Septiembre de 1941. Desde esta ultima fecha, dichos demandados deberan pagar a Jerusalem Gingco P30 mensuales hasta que dichas puertas adicionales sean entregadas a su propietaria Jerusalem Gingco.
“(6) Los demandantes, tan pronto hayan cobrado algo de los demandados Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas, deben pagar los derechos de escribania por esta causa.
“(7) Se condena a Juan V. Molina y a Teodora Arenas a pagar las costas del presente juicio.”
From that judgment, the plaintiffs appealed, but not any of the defendants. The parts of the decision to which the plaintiffs took exception were thus specified in the notice of appeal:
“(a) En cuanto declara valida la hipoteca otorgada por los demandados Juan V. Molina y Teodora Arenas a favor de su codemandada The China Banking Corporation, y al no condenar a esta a pagar indemnizacion a los demandantes.
“(b) En cuanto declara que, si los demandados Molinas dejaren de pagar su deuda hipotecaria al Banco demandado a fin de que las accesorias en cuestion esten libres de toda carga y gravamen, la demandante Jerusalem Gingco puede hacer el rescate, pudiendo incluirse en la ejecucion que se expida en esta causa el cobro de lo que esta pague al Banco por dicha hipoteca y,
“(c) En cuanto declara que, el credito de Jerusalem Gingco contra los demandados Molinas a cuenta del importe de la sentencia en el asunto civil No. 44960 era solamente de P4,836.31 en vez de P6,951.31.”
In due time this court rendered judgment couched in these words:
“For all the foregoing, the deed of mortgage dated November 8, 1930, is declared null and void as to the one-half of the mortgaged property belonging to Jerusalem Gingco and rescinded as to the remaining one-half belonging to the spouses Molina, and the appealed decision is modified by ordering all the defendants to pay Jerusalem Gingco the amount of P6,951.31, plus the additional amount of P30 monthly from September 4, 1934, to September 4, 1941, and to continue paying the same monthly amount thereafter until the two new doors of the accesoria in question are delivered to said Jerusalem Gingco. The defendants shall also pay the filing fees of the complaint in the lower court and the costs in both instances.” (Contreras and Gingco vs. China Banking Corporation, 76 Phil., 709, 716, 717.)
After this judgment was entered, the case was sent back to the lower court and execution was issued. The sheriff at first undertook to collect from the China Banking Corporation one-half of the judgment, upon the indication, it is claimed, of the plaintiffs’ attorney, but objection by the bank having been filed with the court, the Honorable Alfonso Felix, judge, one of the respondents herein, ordered that the portion of the judgment due from this defendant was only one-third. The latter amount was later paid by the bank and turned over to, and receipted for by, the plaintiffs’ counsel. It so happened that the other defendants were insolvent, whereupon the execution creditors asked for an alias execution against the bank for the unpaid balance of the judgment. That motion was denied and the present petition for mandamus was the off-shoot.
It was contended below, and it is contended here, that the act of the bank was tortuous and falls under the provision of article 1902 of the Civil Code so that its liability is joint and several.
There is no dispute, and it can be said with confidence, that the China Banking Corporation’s liability under the terms of the judgment of this court is merely joint, joint in the sense in which the word is understood in the civil law, “It is already a well-established doctrine in this jurisdiction that, when it is not provided in a judgment that the defendants are liable to pay jointly and severally a certain sum of money, none of them may be compelled to satisfy in full said judgments.” (Oriental Commercial Co. vs. Abeto and Mabanag, 60 Phil., 723, citing De Leon vs. Nepomuceno and De Jesus, 37 Phil., 180, and Sharruf vs. Tayabas Land Co. and Ginainati, 37 Phil., 655.) That ruling is in entire harmony with articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code.
Under that doctrine the lower court has no legal authority under any circumstances to make the change sought by the plaintiffs; and this court itself may not make the change after the judgment has become executory. According to that decision a mistake such as that here alleged, if it be a mistake, is not clerical; it goes to the very substance of the controversy.
Only clerical errors, or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied after the judgment has been entered. “The power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprisions and to make the record speak the truth by nunc pro tunc amendments after the term does not enable them to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect. Consequently it is well settled that, in the absence of statute permitting it; the law does not authorize the correction of judicial errors, however flagrant and glaring they may be, under the pretense of correcting clerical errors.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, pp. 269-271.)
“The general power to correct clerical errors and omissions does not authorize the court to repair its own inaction, to make the record and judgment say what the court did not adjudge, although it had a clear right to do so. The court cannot under the guise of correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it never made or rendered, or add something to either which was not originally included although it might and should have so ordered or adjudged in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses and omissions to do what it could legally and properly have done at the right time. A court’s mistake in leaving out of its decision something which it ought to have put in, and something in issue of which it intended but failed to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the entry conform to the actual judgment rendered.” (Id., p. 273.)
Slight reflection will show the wisdom of this rule. The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interests of society impose it. The opposing view might make litigation “more unendurable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.” It would create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment or order was. As this court has announced, “public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.” (Layda vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil., 521.)
We have no cause to depart from this rule. It is a rule that must be adhered to regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case. It is not a legal concept of the flexible kind, capable of being individualized to meet the needs of varying conditions. “We have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the overmastering need” of certainty and immutability of judicial pronouncements. The loss to the litigants in particular and to society in general “would in the long run be greater than the gain if judges were clothed with power to revise” their decisions at will. “Perhaps, with a higher conception” of the administration of justice and its needs, “the time will come when even revision will be permitted if revision is in consonance with established standards” of court functions, “but the time is not yet.”
It would be tedious to give illustrations of clerical mistakes, errors and omissions, correction of which might be permitted. It suffices for the purpose of this decision to say that the mistake under consideration, if it be a mistake, is not of the apparent exceptions, at least in this jurisdiction.
In truth, there is no proper and sufficient showing here that the alleged mistake was due to inadvertence on the part of the court. We have been through with the decision and have not detected in it any clear purpose or intention to make the defendants jointly and severally liable. In all probability, the nature of defendants’ liability (whether joint or joint and several) was not touched upon at all by the parties and was not even given thought by them or by the court. The point was involved in obscurity. As the judgment of the lower court plainly indicates, the case was very intricate, complicated by a multiplicity of claims and counterclaims arising from different juridical acts and sought from different parties who sustained diverse relationships to the plaintiffs and to each other with reference to the separate items. It is not to be wondered at if the finer point of solidarity among the defendants was swallowed up and lost in the maze of these claims and counterclaims over the validity of which the three-cornered contest was centered and bitterly waged. The uncontroverted facts alone are so complex that more than one close reading of either decision is needed to get a comprehensive grasp of them.
The fact that the plaintiffs’ attorney instructed the sheriff to levy execution on the bank for only one-half of the judgment, when it could have demanded the whole amount from that entity if its liability was joint and several, offers itself as possible proof that in the mind of the petitioners themselves this defendant was to bear only a pro-rata share of the indebtedness. In other words, if the bank’s liability, in plaintiffs’ opinion, was solidary, they had the option to exact the payment of the entire amount due from any of the defendants, subject to the right of the payor to collect from the others their proportionate shares of the obligation. It would seem that the plaintiffs became wise to the question of solidarity among the defendants only when the matter of whether the bank should pay one-half or one-third of the judgment came before the court below.
It is said that the judgment is at variance with the context of the decision. Granting this for the moment to be the case, yet the discrepancy pointed out is not of the nature that would justify modification of the judgment. The principles we have cited in the preceding paragraphs should put this matter at rest. More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. “A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, * * * there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6.) At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that “the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons.” “It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not.” (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51.) It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.
But is there really any conflict between the considerations or findings and the judgment of this court? It appears that the sole reliance of the petitioners is on the statement in the decision, viz.: that “the assignment of error is also well taken” and that “the China Banking Corporation must answer for the amounts above-mentioned as a consequence of our conclusion as to the nullity of the mortgage.” That statement had reference to the second assignment of error which complained, in the words of this court, of the trial court’s “failure to order the China Banking Corporation to indemnify Jerusalem Gingco in the amount of P6,951.31, which was adjudicated in her favor in Civil Case No. 44960 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and which appellant failed to collect in view of the third-party claim filed by said bank, and the rents which said appellant failed to collect from accesorias Nos. 1635, 1630 (1637) and 1639 at the rate of P65 a month, beginning from September 4, 1934.” That comment and the second assignment of error did not exhibit any intention, let alone plain intention, to hold the China Banking Corporation liable in solido. The idea of solidarity is no more manifest than the idea of mere joint liability among the co-obligors. If there was any intention to make the defendants’ obligation under the judgment solidary, it is not apparent from the language employed. If there was inadvertence on the part of the court, the omission was not so obvious as to justify rectification. Nowhere in the decision is there any reference to article 1902 of the Civil Code, or unequivocal declaration that each of the defendants was bound to the performance or payment of the entire judgment.
Even if the liability of the bank arose from tort and is in solido, it is now too late to enforce that liability in the manner specified in the applicable provisions. When a claim or demand has been put in suit and has passed on to final judgment, it is merged and swallowed up in the judgment and loses its vitality. All the particular qualities of the claim are merged in the judgment. And this rule applies to all claims or demand. (34 C. J., 752, 754.) In another connection this court has ruled: “It is of no consequence that * * * the obligation contracted by the sureties was joint and several in character. The final judgment, which superseded the action brought for the enforcement of said contract, declared the obligation to be merely joint, and the same cannot be executed otherwise.” (Oriental Commercial Co. vs. Abeto and Mabanag, supra.) It is immaterial, therefore, whether the obligation of the defendants arose from law, contract or culpa. It is “the final judgment (that) determines and is the source of the rights and obligations of the parties * * *.” (Oriental Commercial Co. vs. Abeto and Mabanag, supra.)
Emphasis is also laid on the fact that the spouses Molina and Arenas did not appeal. The petitioners advance the proposition that since these defendants did not appeal they were excluded from the appellate court’s jurisdiction. They go so far as to insinuate or say that the China Banking Corporation alone is answerable for the judgment rendered by this court The position thus taken by the petitioners is highly untenable and inconsistent with their main thesis.
If Molina and Arenas did not question the trial court’s decision, the plaintiffs did appeal from the judgment, not as it affected the bank only but also the other defendants. The notice of appeal will show that the plaintiffs opened up, among other questions, that of the extent of Molina’s and his wife’s liability to the plaintiffs as well as the bank’s. The bank did not appeal either, for that matter, but it was condemned nevertheless. That Molina and his wife did not appear and Ale a brief in this court did not operate to rule them out of the case. The best refutation of the petitioners’ contention is the fact that the amounts which Molina and his wife were sentenced to pay by the court below were increased by this court.
The authorities cited by the petitioners do not shed any light on this issue. It can be seen at a glance that there is no analogy between this case and the cases relied upon by counsel.
There is one feature of the case affecting the question of practice and procedure which should not be allowed to escape our attention.
A motion for reconsideration styled “Motion for Clarification” was presented in this court before the present petition was docketed. That motion was denied on the grounds that clarification was unnecessary and that the judgment had become final. (This, by way of parenthesis, may be said to mirror the concept which this court had of the alleged error; namely, that the error, if it be error, was of judicial and not clerical character.) By the motion for an alias execution the petitioners were after exactly the same thing that we had refused to grant them. They simply turned around and took a circuitous and narrower path that led to the same goal. By appealing from the lower court’s denial to issue an alias execution, the plaintiffs now try to obtain by indirection what they failed to get directly. The procedure is indeed anomalous and success of the petition would lead to anomalous consequences. How?
“It is well settled that a decision concurred in by the entire bench cannot be modified, except on regular reconsideration.” (5 C. J. S., 1485.) The change the petitioners would have us make would constitute modification of the judgment; they would have a new matter of substance inserted therein. This matter—that the bank’s liability is not joint but solidary—was not put in issue in the original case and there does not appear to have been any hearing or voting on this specific point. This matter goes to the merits, and hearing and voting thereon can properly be had only by going into the whole record of the main case. On the other hand, adequate study of the whole case can not be accomplished except on a regular motion for reconsideration such as the one we dismissed. In other words, for the purpose of modifying the judgment the proceeding must be direct and not, like the present proceeding, collateral. Direct proceeding on a regular motion for reconsideration would be all the more necessary, if the motion for amendment were to be entertained, because some of the justices who signed the decision have resigned and the new members who have taken their places did not have the benefit of hearing the arguments and going over the pleadings and evidence. The scope of our authority on a petition for mandamus, which is a special proceeding, is limited to an examination of the allegations therein and in the answer, and perhaps of the decision of this court, which was not attached to as part of the, petition. Under such petition the pleadings, the evidence and the briefs in the main cause are not legally brought before us. Quite apart from this technical barrier, the record of the case has actually been returned to the court of origin.
Granting of the petition for mandamus would not be an amendment by this court of its decision. In form, it would be a command to the court below to do as the petitioners asked. In its implications, it would be a sanction for inferior courts, in the process of execution, to change judgments of courts of superior jurisdiction in the light of what they believe is the intention of the higher court as gathered from statements in the body of the decision. It would be taken as a green-light signal for inferior courts to probe into the decisions of superior courts to verify if the judgment conforms to the text. The result of such practice would be intolerable. That the lower court’s decision might be appealable would not remedy the situation greatly. In the present case there would be the added paradox that we would reverse the lower court for refusing to allow precisely what this court itself—the author of the decision which was in the best position to say what the decision meant—denied because the judgment was clear and had acquired finality.
For the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied without costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Hilado, Bengzon, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.