[ G.R. No. L-861. September 30, 1947 ] G79 Phil. 308
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-861. September 30, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANGEL ZAPANTA Y TUAZON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
At about midnight of September 15, 1945, the accused Angel Zapanta y Tuazon and one Antero Gomez proceeded to the house of Policarpio Salazar on Francisco Street, Tondo, Manila. Gomez removed the bamboo pole that barred the gate, and both climbed the stairs, and knocked at the door of the dwelling. Answering a question of Policarpio’s wife, one of the nocturnal visitors falsely identifying himself as “Maning” requested admittance pretending that he wanted “to tell something” to her husband. As the door was opened, the two entered, pistol in hand, and then the accused pointing his gun at Salazar asked, “Are you Totoy Kalabaw?” (nickname of Salazar). The next instant Salazar and the accused were grappling for the possession of the firearm. At this moment Gomez shot Salazar to death. Thereafter both assailants hurriedly fled.
Police officers subsequently investigating the affair were handed the gun which had fallen from the hands of the accused in the scuffle, he having forgotten to retrieve it in his flight from the scene of the shooting.
It was later discovered, upon investigation, that two days before the fatal incident Antero Gomez, informing the accused that he had a quarrel with Salazar, asked for assistance to kill him; and the accused agreed to help.
Antero Gomez was not prosecuted because he died before the presentation of the information, he having been reportedly killed in an affray with the police.
Haled into court for murder and confronted with the evidence of the People above related, the defendant-appellant Angel Zapanta y Tuazon attempted to prove an alibi with his lone testimony, which the trial judge discredited, obviously because, (1) it was uncorroborated, (2) for all his youth, the prisoner was a confirmed lawbreaker (See footnote) and (3) because he was positively identified by an eyewitness, the wife of the deceased, Ponciana Isidro, and her assertions were backed by the finding of appellant’s gun in the house and by the latter’s confession, Exhibits C and Q.
Appellant’s counsel sensibly abstain from insisting on that defense; but in their carefully prepared brief, they discuss several errors allegedly committed by His Honor, to wit: (a) in holding there was conspiracy between appellant and Antero Gomez; (b) in ruling that Zapanta was duly identified and (c) in considering the latter’s confession.
In criminal cases the identification of the culprit has always been a paramount question. Several instances of miscarriage of justice on that score are known in judicial annals. Therefore, judges can not be overly cautious in analyzing evidence on the point. On the other hand, where conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. And this is more so where the witness is the victim or his near-relative, as in this case, because these usually strive to remember the factions of the assailants. In this expediente no reasons exist to question the veracity of the bereaved widow, and it is admitted that a kerosene lamp lighted the place. Hence, considering the confessions of appellant in Exhibits C and Q, he should be deemed sufficiently identified.
It is true that, as contended by counsel, the herein accused would not be responsible for the murder, in the absence or conspiracy between him and Gomez (who actually did the killing). But unluckily for him, such conspiracy was established by proof that he had agreed to help Gomez assassinate Salazar, that both at midnight repaired to the house, tricked the inmates into opening the door, and rushed inside with drawn pistols, almost immediately eliminating the surprised “kalabaw.” There was concerted action, and the common homicidal intent was unmistakable, from which solidary criminal responsibility arose.[1]
The record discloses that when in custody of the police, herein appellant made the following admissions of guilt:
“Two days before Totoy Kalabaw was shot by Antero Gomez, Antero told me that he and Totoy Kalabaw had a quarrel. Antero told me to go with him and kill Totoy Kalabaw and I agreed. Antero and I were both armed with .45 Cal. automatic pistols when we proceeded to the house of Totoy Kalabaw. When we arrived at Totoy Kalabaw’s house, we found the gate closed and a bamboo bar was slung across the gate. Antero picked up the bamboo bar and placed it near the gate. We then climbed up the stairs of the house. Antero knocked several times on the door and after ten (10) minutes a woman opened it. Antero drew his gun when he entered the door and I followed him. We saw Totoy Kalabaw as soon as we entered standing beside the woman who opened the door and when I went near him, he suddenly grabbed me by the arms and tried to get my pistol at my waist. He tried to grab for my gun and was able to wrest it away from me but at this time Antero shot him. We then run down the house and fled, in our haste to get away I left my .45 automatic pistol at the place where Totoy Kalabaw fell.” (Exhibit C.)
“I together with Antero Gomez went to the house of Totoy Kalabaw and when his wife opened the door, I drew my pistol from my waist but before I was able to do so, Totoy Kalabaw grappled with me and we wrestled for the possession of the pistol. I was hit then by the pistol on my right index finger. Antero Gomez, seeing that Totoy Kalabaw had the edge on me, shot at Totoy Kalabaw about two times as I remember.” (Exhibit Q.)
Contending that the trial judge erred in considering this confession, appellant’s counsel do not assert it was obtained through violence or fraud. They merely claim that it contains improbabilities, and should therefore be disregarded. But mere improbability should yield to actual facts told by the accused himself. If the confession was voluntarily signed—there was evidence to that effect—the appellant should not be heard to impugn the events therein described on grounds of improbability, because he would thereby be saying: “that is my story, but do not believe it because I lied”.
The offense charged was murder. The facts proved established it, the destruction of Salazar’s life having been accomplished with evident premeditation (article 248, Revised Penal Code). Although there are the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua only, in view of the dissent of some members of this Court (article 47, Revised Penal Code). Consequently, .the judgment of the court below is affirmed, it being in accordance with the law for such cases made and provided.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.