[ G.R. No. L-841. April 30, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 418
[ G.R. No. L-841. April 30, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SIMEON MIRANDA Y DANA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, the defendant Simeon Miranda y Dana pleaded guilty to the information charging him with illegal possession of a carbine with rounds of ammunition, committed on or about July 27, 1946, in Quezon City within 2½ miles from the limits of the City of Manila. He was consequently sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 1 day to 6 years of imprisonment, and to pay the costs. Notwithstanding his confession in open court, he appealed; but his attorney de oficio appointed here reached the conclusion that the sentence was truly in accordance with the law under which he was prosecuted.
However, said counsel cells attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether oar not, at the tine appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil., 87, 88), in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. “* * * If we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly”. (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil., 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil., 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
Counsel also suggests that the accused be given a new trial so that he may take advantage of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1 fixing September 30, 1946 as the last day within which firearms may be surrendered without criminal liability. It is enough to point out that such proclamation does not legally excuse possession of firearms until the day fixed, under all circumstances.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed upon him is within the range prescribed by law (Rep. Act No. 4), the decision is affirmed. No costs.
Paras, Pablo, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.