[ G.R. No. L-332. June 18, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 503
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-332. June 18, 1947 ]
ALEJANDRO R. SANTOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CATALINA DE ALVAREZ, CARLOS TANSECO, AND MANUEL ALVAREZ, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
Alejandro R. Santos, plaintiff-appellee herein, filed a suit in ejectment for the premises designated as No. 22, Altura Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, occupied since September 1942 by defendants-appellants, Catalina de Alvarez, Carlos Tanseco, and Manuel Alvarez. Santos obtained judgment in his favor in the municipal court of Manila, which was affirmed on appeal to the Court of First Instance. This appeal is now from the judgment of the Court of First Instance wherein defendants Alvarez et al. are ordered to vacate the premises, to pay the plaintiff back rent from April 1, 1945, at the rate of P35 a month up to the time the premises are vacated, and to pay the costs of the suit.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 66, amending Commonwealth Act No. 689, provides:
“In a suit for ejection or for the collection of rents due and payable by virtue of a contract of lease of buildings destined solely for dwelling, not being a room or rooms of an hotel, and lots, the fact that the rents are unjust and unreasonable shall constitute a valid defense. Except as provided in section twelve of this Act, no lessee or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate nonpayment of rents or when the lessor has to occupy the building leased.” (Italics ours.)
Under this provision, a lessee cannot be ejected even for non-payment of rents, where such non-payment is not willful and deliberate and the lessor does not need the property for himself and the lessee has never subleased it without authority. In other words, a lessee who is unable to pay on time the agreed rents because of poverty or of any other circumstance beyond his control cannot, under the present law, be ejected from the leased property, if the other two circumstances are not present. The purpose of the law is evidently to relieve the present situation arising from the scarcity of housing facilities by protecting particularly the thousands of impoverished people who in the war of liberation lost their houses together with almost all their belongings and found shelter in houses owned by others. By the very nature of its purpose, this measure of social justice, which is temporary in character (four years), is applicable to all lessees or occupants at the time the law was passed, regardless of the dates of their contracts. Manifestly the law seeks to relieve an existing condition affecting the life and happiness of the people, a condition that is not less important because of its age. Indeed, a poor lessee does not cease to be poor because his contract bears an earlier date than that of the law. It is expressly ordained by said law that “no lessee or occupant shall be ejected in cases other than for willful and deliberate non-payment of rents,” a negative and all-inclusive expression which is mandatory and embraces within its protection all lessees and occupants without distinction at the time the law was passed. The only exceptions to the rule as above indicated are (1) when the lessee or occupant subleased the property without the consent of the lessor; (2) when there has been willful and deliberate non-payment of rents; or (3) when the lessor has to occupy the building leased. Under the facts of the instant case, the first and second exceptions cannot be invoked. As regards the third, the lessor, according to his testimony reiterated in his brief, wishes to secure the premises for his two sons or near relatives. But the exception applies only when the lessor “has to occupy the building leased.” It does not apply when the lessor needs the building for others. In other words, the need contemplated by law is only the lessor’s need. His sons or near relatives are not the lessors. The sons should live with their father if they are minors, and if they are of age they are no longer dependents of their father. The near relatives have no standing in the lease, hence their need cannot be considered.
Moreover, there is the defendant’s allegation that plaintiff has other properties which he has been leasing to others rather than to his two sons and near relatives, which allegation is not denied and is indirectly admitted in appellee’s brief.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed in so far as it fixes the monthly rent for the premises in question at P35, and reversed in so far as it orders defendants-appellants to vacate said premises and to pay the costs. Plaintiff-appellee will pay the costs of this suit.
Pablo, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.