[ G.R. No. L-325. October 31, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 444
[ G.R. No. L-325. October 31, 1947 ]
RAMON L. CORPUS, PETITIONER, VS. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
On January 12, 1946, respondent commission granted petitioner a certificate of public convenience to operate an auto-truck service for passengers and freight on the lines Manila-Divisoria via Santa Mesa; San Juan-Divisoria via Santa Mesa; Montalban-Manila via Quezon City and España; and Navotas-Divisoria via Malabon and Caloocan, and vice-versa. The commission provided that the certificate shall be valid only “until December 31, 1947.” Disagreeing with this limitation, petitioner came to us to seek modification.
There is no question as to the authority of the commission to fix a time limit. Section 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 provides that “no such certificate shall be issued for a period of more than 50 years.” The maximum period of 50 years is the same as the one set by section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
The issue here is whether the commission, in fixing the limit here in question, committed an abuse of discretion or exceeded the bounds of reasonable judgment to the extent of committing an injustice requiring a corrective measure from this Court. Although petitioner stated in his application that he “agrees to accept the certificate subject to a period of validity which the Commission may fix” and during his testimony he manifested his conformity to the limit up to December 31, 1947, in another identical case, such commitments do not bind petitioner to impugn a time limit which may appear to be arbitrary, unjust, or unfounded.
In the same paragraph where the time limit up to December 31, 1947, is set, the commission reserved upon itself the right to alter or modify the conditions enumerated in the decision or to impose additional conditions in order to adjust applicants’ operation to changing conditions and the eventual resumption of operation under normal conditions, considering that the service applied for is authorized during a state of emergency.
The reasons for the reserve made by the commission seem to support also the time limit set in the decision. Undoubtedly, the certificate granted is provisional in character. Being so, it is only logical that it be granted for a short period.
According to petitioner’s testimony, he would use the following vehicles in the service: a Dodge, model 1936, converted into a jitney with canvas covering; a Buick, model 1936, converted into a jitney with wooden and canvas covering; another Dodge, model 1938, also with canvas covering; a Ford truck, model 1935, to be converted into a jitney, the motor of which was bought by petitioner from a mechanic and the chassis and the wheels from another person. Petitioner bought the vehicles in July, 1945. How they were used and for what purpose, he lacks any knowledge.
Considering the age of the cars, the time limit granted by the commission cannot be unreasonable. The cars have been in use years before the war. Their long years of service and the fact that during the Japanese occupation there were no adequate means for proper repairs are reasons enough to believe that the cars cannot be of useful service for more than one year, taking into consideration the heavy pounding they will receive in the continuous daily public service in rough roads. Considering the rough handling which public service cars receive from their drivers, the great majority of whom show complete unconcern about traffic conditions, and are constantly violating traffic rules, without any regard for public safety,—a thing upon which the commission is urged to take preventive measures, in view of the extent of the evil,—we might say that the time limit granted by the commission appears to be even too long for the kind of second-hand cars used by petitioner.
Experience will show that such cars cannot be in continuous operation for many days without costly repairs which are hard to face. No evidence or valid reason has been advanced by petitioner to show that the commission acted arbitrarily in limiting the time for his certificate up to December 31, 1947. The evidence in record justifies an even shorter time limit than that granted. The commission acted wisely in reserving to itself the right to modify the conditions of the certificate granted. It is expected that the commission will exercise such keen and proper supervision as to immediately stop the operation of the service as soon as the vehicles used in same would endanger public safety. This should be one of the main concerns in this case. Transportation must be easy, cheap and above all safe. If vehicles are not in efficient condition and in proper shape as to afford safe transportation their use should immediately be stopped.
For all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Public Service Commission is affirmed.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Hilado, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur. Feria, and Briones, JJ., concur in the result.