[ G.R. No. L-1419. July 31, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 846
[ G.R. No. L-1419. July 31, 1947 ]
ROSARIO OCHING ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. SOTERO RODAS, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND BARTOLOME SAN DIEGO, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. L-1420, July 31, 1947] M. C. DE SALVACION ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. SOTERO RODAS, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND BARTOLOME SAN DIEGO, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. L-1421, July 31, 1947] DIONISIA ABUEG ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. SOTERO RODAS, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND BARTOLOME SAN DIEGO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
The sole question presented for our decision involves the applicability of the debt moratorium, Executive Order No. 25 as amended by Executive Order No. 32, to execution of monetary judgments in actions brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The petitioners obtained such judgment, which is now Anal, against Bartolome San Diego, one of the respondents herein, and moved for its execution, San Diego pleaded the Moratorium Order, and the Honorable Sotero Rodas, judge, denied the motion.
The pertinent provision of Executive Order No. 32 amending Executive Order No. 25 is as follows: “Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.”
That this provision suspends execution of judgments for money is now settled. (Palacios vs. Daza and Provincial Government of Batangas, 75 Phil., 279; Tarnate vs. Daza, 76 Phil., 853.) That it excludes from its operation obligations arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act in favor of employees for physical injuries sustained in the line of duty and other labor accidents is untenable. Executive Order No. 32 is very comprehensive and evinces no intent to make any exceptions, save as to the time the debt was incurred. It is plain and unambiguous leaving no occasion for construction. A cursory reading thereof brings the inescapable conclusion that it embraces “all debts and other monetary obligations” regardless of their source, or the indigence of the creditor, or the opulence of the debtor and his ability to pay. Deeply sympathizing with the petitioners, the courts can not lend them a helping hand. Their remedy lies elsewhere.
The petition is denied without costs.
Paras, Bengzon, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.