[ G.R. No. L-1418. August 30, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 165
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-1418. August 30, 1947 ]
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF NUEVA ECIJA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND FELICIANO VALDERAMA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
HILADO, J.:
Feliciano Valderama, one Bolong, Francisco (alias Inggo), Jose Simbulan (alias Peping), Enting, Eugenio (alias Geniong Dusa), and Arsenio (alias Bulahap) were charged in an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by the Provincial Fiscal as follows:
“That on or about the 8th day of October, 1946, in the municipality of Gapan, province of Nueva Ecija, P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Feliciano Valderama, together with one Bolong, Francisco alias Inggo, Jose Simbulan alias Peping, Enting, Eugenio alias Geniong Dusa and Arsenio alias Bulahap, who have not as yet been apprehended, all with arms, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, by means of violence against and intimidation of persons and with intent to gain, did then and there voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally take and carry away the following personal properties:
2 pairs of West Point Clothes valued at P40.00 1 Blanket valued at 20.00 1 hat (Bangkuang) valued at 1.00 ________ P61.00
belonging to Inocencio Mateo and
1 blanket valued at P20.00 1 shirt (Indian Head) valued at 10.00 1 pair of slippers valued at 5.00 1 pair of rope (Guyuran) valued at 4.00 ________ P39.00
belonging to Leonides Pablo in the aggregate sum of P100, against their will and to their damage and prejudice in the said sum of P100.”
On March 4, 1947, the other accused not having been apprehended, only Feliciano Valderama was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the information. Thereupon, the prosecution called the first witness Leonides Pablo, who gave his testimony. After the conclusion of this witness’s testimony, the prosecution called its second witness named Emerenciana de San Jose “to prove the robbery committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo,” as petitioner alleges in paragraph 3 of the petition.
According to the respondent judge’s order (Annex B of the petition), “after arraignment and while the second witness for the prosecution was testifying, the defense counsel objected to her testimony tending to prove that a robbery was committed in the house of Inocencio Mateo, after the first witness had testified to a robbery committed in the house of Leonides Pablo.” This objection provoked the raising of a question which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari and mandamus. That question is whether or not the defendant Feliciano Valderama in not moving to quash the information upon the ground that more than one offense was charged therein before pleading thereto, waived all objection upon that ground later in the proceedings.
The respondent judge ruled in his aforesaid order Annex B that under Rule 113, section 10, waiver of objection for duplicity can only be predicated upon failure to move to quash upon such ground where the duplicity “clearly appears on the face of the information.” His Honor was of opinion that in the above-quoted information said defect is not clearly apparent.
Whether two offenses of robbery are alleged in the information, or only one, we do not decide. But even hypothetically supposing that the former is the case, that the information would have been subject to objection for duplicity if timely made, the fact is that for failure to raise the objection before pleading to the information, the defendant “shall be taken to have waived” such objection. Rule 113, section 10 partly provides:
“* * * If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same * * *.”
Upon this point, we should consider as of decisive importance a very radical innovation introduced by Rule 113, sections 1, 2, and 10, in relation with General Orders No. 58, upon the subject “demurrer and pleas”, particularly sections 19 and 21. Section 19 provided that “If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day”, to demur or plead to the complaint or information. Section 21 provided:
“The defendant may demur to the complaint or information when it appears on the face thereof—
* * * * * * *
“3. That more than one offense is charged; except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various allied offenses.”
* * * * * * *
On the other hand, Rule 113, section 1—evincing an aim at a speedier trial than General Orders No. 58 did—directs that,
“Upon being arraigned the defendant shall immediately (italics supplied), unless the court grants him further time, either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both. If he moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead” (italics supplied).
Section 2 provides:
“* * * The defendant may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
* * * * * * *
“(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;”
* * * * * * *
Section 10 mandatorily ordains:
“* * * If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. * * *”
The mandatory provision last above quoted did not exist in General Orders No. 58. Neither was there an equivalent provision therein.
And in the jurisprudence which developed from the above-quoted provisions of section 21 of General Orders No. 58, it came to be held that when the accused does not demur upon the ground of duplicity and goes to trial under the complaint or information charging him with more than one offense, he could not be heard to complain on appeal against that defect. (U. S. vs. Zapanta, 13 Phil., 409; U. S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260; U. S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil., 305; People vs. Alafriz, 53 Phil., 583; People vs. Benito, 57 Phil., 587.) In other words, he was held to have waived the objection. On the other hand, Rule 113, section 10, dispenses entirely with the necessity of the defendant without objection going to trial down to the final judgment of the trial court, in order to hold him to have waived all objections based upon any ground on which a motion to quash could have been made. If he does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto “he shall (italics supplied) be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash * * *.” If we are now to require, before declaring the waiver to have taken place, that the defendant first go to trial down to the final judgment of the trial court, as before, we would be writing the very important innovation thus introduced by said section 10 entirely off the Rules of Court. Mark that said provision uses “shall” characteristic of mandatory precepts. We are clearly of opinion that this provision denied the trial judge all discretion in the matter, and made it his peremptory duty to take the defendant as having waived the objection, and to proceed with the already commenced trial accordingly. So long as this rule remains in force, it must be obeyed not alone by the parties and counsel in criminal cases, but more particularly by the judges who are to take cognizance of, try and decide them.
Wherefore, judgment will be entered ordering the respondent judge to proceed with the trial of the above-mentioned case, which has already been commenced, upon the information already referred to by continuing the examination of the second witness for the prosecution, Emerenciana de San Jose, its conclusion, and proceeding with the rest of the evidence of one and the other party in the usual manner, down to final judgment. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.