[ G.R. No. L-1266. August 29, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 122
[ G.R. No. L-1266. August 29, 1947 ]
CO CHIONG AND LIM CHIU GUAN, PETITIONERS, VS. RAFAEL DINGLASAN ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioners on January 7, 1947, against the respondent judge who issued an order dissolving a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same judge, which enjoined the other respondents to refrain from ejecting the petitioners from the market stalls, the petitioners ask this Court to annul the said order and command the respondent judge to forthwith reissue such writ, and that, pending final judgment in the instant proceedings, this Court issue ex-parte a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondent to refrain from ejecting the petitioners from the said market stalls.
This Court denied the petition ex-parte for a preliminary injunction during the pendency of this proceeding in this Court, and ordered the respondents to file their answer to the petition or complaint. On January 18, 1947, respondents filed their answer, and after the answer was filed the hearing of the petition was set for January 24, 1947. At the hearing both parties were granted permission to file their respective memoranda, and on February 10 the petitioners submitted their reply to the respondents’ memorandum. Since that date February 10, 1947, this case was considered submitted to this Court for decision.
The respondent Secretary of Finance suspended motu proprio the operation of the Department of Finance Order No. 32, and for that reason the other respondents refrained from ejecting the petitioners from the market stalls, notwithstanding the above stated dissolution of the injunction by order of the respondent judge who had issued it and the denial by this Court of the petitioners’ petition that this Court issue ex-parte a preliminary injunction during the pendency of this case in this Court.
On April 24, 1947 the petitioners filed with this Court a petition called Manifestation, which reads in part as follows:
“That the above-entitled special civil action was instituted by the petitioners for the purpose of annulling the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction granted in Civil Case No. 1436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled ‘Co Chiong et al. vs. Miguel Cuaderno et al.’; and
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“Rule 39, section 4 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
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“If a petition for prohibition to restrain the enforcement of a law and/or administrative order can be considered as an action for injunction within the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court, then there is no longer any need to review and annul the interlocutory order of the respondent judge dissolving the preliminary injunction, the same having been revoked and superseded by the said respondent judge’s subsequent judgment. * * *”
From a reading of the facts alleged in the petition filed with this Court, as well as in the complaint in the court below, it appears that the principal action of which the present is an incident is not a special civil action of prohibition, although it is so entitled, for the simple reason that the defendants or respondents do not exercise any judicial or ministerial functions, and there is no allegation in the complaint that they acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction for they have no specific jurisdiction granted by law, or with grave abuse of discretion since the law docs not give them any discretion in the performance of the acts complained of. It is, in reality, an action of injunction filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants to restrain the latter from enforcing the provisions of the Republic Act No. 37 and Department of Finance Order No. 32, on the alleged ground that they are unconstitutional, and their enforcement will injuriously affect the enjoyment of their right to continue occupying the market stalls leased to them.
“The usual ground for asking injunctive relief against the enforcement of statutes is their invalidity, but that, of itself, is not sufficient to warrant the exercise by equity of its extraordinary injunctive power. In other words, the mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. Further circumstances must appear bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, and presenting some actual or threatened and irreparable injury to complainant’s rights for which there is no adequate legal remedy. If it is apparent that the law can furnish all the relief to which the complainant is entitled, the injunction will be refused. It is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an invalid law where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its enforcement, or where the right of a person to conduct a lawful business or calling will be injuriously affected thereby * * *.” (28 American Jurisprudence, pp. 369-371.)
In view of the foregoing, the question raised by the petitioners in this case has become a moot question, since it is no longer necessary for us to decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the relief demanded, and if they are to order the respondent judge to set aside the order dissolving the preliminary injunction and to reissue or revive the latter, in order to prevent the defendants from doing the acts complained of during the pendency of the suit. Because, aside from the fact that, as above stated, the Secretary of Finance has suspended the operation of the Department’s Order No. 32, which the respondents were about to enforce, the principal action being an ordinary action of injunction, and the respondent judge having rendered since April 19, 1947 a judgment granting the injunction (called Prohibition), said judgment or order is effective and its operation was not stayed after the rendition and during the pendency of the appeal taken by the defendants to this Court, for the lower court did not order otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of section 4, Rule 39, which reads as follows:
“SEC. 4. Injunction, receivership and patent accounting, not stayed.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court a judgment in an action for injunction or in a receivership action, or a, judgment or order directing an accounting in an action for infringement of letters patent, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The trial court, however, in its discretion, when an appeal is taken from a judgment granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction during the pendency of the appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.”
As to the necessity for this Court to decide as soon as possible the question as to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37, and Department of Finance Order No. 32, the proper time for deciding that question is when we decide on the merits the appeal pending before us. We cannot decide it now, because it is not necessary for this Court to do so in order to dispose of the present case. It is a well settled rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, p. 231).
In view of all the foregoing, petitioners’ petition for certiorari and mandamus, is dismissed without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.