[ G.R. No. L-1257. October 30, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 421
[ G.R. No. L-1257. October 30, 1947 ]
NICANOR TAVORA, PETITIONER, VS. BONIFACIO N. GAVINA AND PEDRO O. ARCIAGA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
There is no question about the fact alleged in the petition, that the petitioner was appointed justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, and took possession of his office on or about April 16, 1916, that he has not resigned nor has he been removed therefrom, and that he has ceased to act as such justice of the peace on December 1941, but reassumed his office after liberation, that is, on April 27, 1945.
According to section 9 Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
The fact that the petitioner has performed the duties of justice of the peace of the municipality of San Fernando, La Union, during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, by virtue of appointment made by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, did not constitute an abandonment of his office held under the Commonwealth, because the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a foreign government, but a government established by the military occupant as an agency thereof to preserve order during the occupation. This Court, in its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), held among others the following:
“(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth continued in the Philippines by the belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan, and their judgments and proceedings being acts of foreign courts can not now be considered valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth Government after the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our decision the fundamental reasons why said courts, while functioning during the Japanese regime, could not be considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient now to invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240, which we did not deem necessary to quote in our decision, in which it was held that ’the courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no prize.’ (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; 14 Law. ed., 240.)”
The appointment by President Osmeña of the respondent Bonifacio N. Gavina as ad-interim justice of the peace of San Fernando on February 18, 1946, did not oust the petitioner from his office, not only because such appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, but because the petitioner had the constitutional right to continue in office until he has reached the age of seventy years, and the President of the Commonwealth had no power to remove the petitioner from office without just cause and previous investigation.
The appointment of the other respondent Pedro O. Arciaga as justice of the peace of the same municipality made by the President of the Republic of the Philippines and approved by the Commission on Appointments on July 27, 1946, did not remove the petitioner from his office as justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, since the petitioner had the constitutional right to continue as such justice of the peace until he has reached 70 years; and upon the cessation of the American sovereignty over these Islands and the proclamation of the Philippine Independence, the petitioner did not cease to be justice of the peace of said municipality of San Fernando, La Union. In this connection the writer of this opinion in his concurring opinion in the case of Brodett vs. De la Rosa (77 Phil., 752), held the following:
“The petitioners impugn the validity of the judgment of the respondent judge on the ground that, as said respondent was not re-appointed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, he must have ceased to be judge upon the proclamation of the Independence of the Philippines. Presumably the petitioners’ contention is based on the legal maxim of statutory construction—expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and the provision of our Constitution relating to the officers of the Commonwealth who should continue in office after the proclamation of our Independence, which says:
" ‘The officials elected and serving under this Constitution shall be constitutional officers of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and qualified to function in all respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall serve their full terms of office as prescribed in this Constitution.’
“The Philippine Independence Act promulgated by the Congress of the United States on March 24, 1944, provides in its section 2 (b) (2) as follows:
" ‘(b) The constitution [of the Philippines] shall also contain the following provisions, effective as of the date of the proclamation of the President recognizing the independence of the Philippine Islands, as hereinafter provided:
" ‘(2) That the officials elected and serving under the constitution adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall be constitutional officers of the free and independent Government of the Philippine Islands and qualified to function in all respects as if elected directly under such Government, and shall served their full terms of office as prescribed in the Constitution.’
“The last quoted provision which is incorporated in paragraph or section 1 (2), Article XVII, of the Constitution, constitutes a limitation on the power of the framers of our Constitution to provide for the continuance or cessation of the officers therein mentioned. As they were not at liberty to insert or not said provision, its inclusion in our Constitution can not be considered as the expression of their intention that the officers therein mentioned shall continue as officer of the free and independent government of the Philippines. Consequently, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is based upon the rules of logic and the natural working of the human mind and serve as a guide in determining the probable intention of the makers of laws and constitutions expressly mentioning some and not others, can not be applied or invoked in support of the contention that, from the inclusion of said provision it may be inferred that it was the intention of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention which drafted our Constitution that appointive officers and employees and other elective officials should cease or not continue in office upon the proclamation of our Independence.
“On the other hand, as the framers of our Constitution were free to provide in the Constitution for the cessation or continuation in office of all appointive officers and employees and all other elective officers under the Commonwealth, if it were their intention that they should not continue or cease, they could and should have so expressly provided; but they did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitution prescribes that “The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office,’ (section 9, Article VIII); that ‘The Auditor General shall hold office for a term of ten years and may not be reappointed’ (section 1, Article XI); that ‘No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law’ (section 4, Article XII).
“There is no doubt that the Constitution of the Philippines is a Constitution for the Commonwealth and the Republic. Article XVIII thereof provides that ‘The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of the Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.’ The only provisions of the Constitution not applicable to the Commonwealth are those of Article XVII which became effective upon the declaration of the Independence of the Philippines; and the provisions of the Constitution not applicable to the Republic of the Philippines are those of Article XVI, or the transitory provisions from the former colonial or territorial to the Commonwealth Government.
“The Constitution, referring to the transition from the former Philippine Government to the Commonwealth, provides in its section 4, Article XVI, that ‘All officers and employees of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification of their succesors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.’ Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution deemed it necessary to so provide in order to avoid any doubt about their authority to continue in office; because the said officers and employees were appointed by authority of the People of the United States represented by the Congress and the President of the United States, or the Jones Law; while the officers and employees of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were to be appointed by authority of the People of the Philippines in whom the sovereignty resides and from whom all government authority emanates, according to section 1, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines.
“But there is no similar provision in the Constitution covering the transition from the Commonwealth to the Republic. Evidently, it was not deemed necessary to provide expressly in the Constitution for the continuation of all the officers and employees of the Commonwealth Government, because they had to continue, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, for they are officers and employees appointed by authority of the People of the Philippines, since the Commonwealth as well as the Republic are government established by the same Filipino people in the exercise of their sovereignty, limited under the Commonwealth and complete or absolute after the proclamation of our independence.
“That the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that ‘Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them’ (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States. The late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, ‘As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations—in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood.’ (Congressional Record Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173). And it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is ‘a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects.’
“A contrary construction, that is, that all appointive officers and employees of the Government of the Commonwealth, from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to an office messenger, had ceased ipso facto or automatically upon the proclamation of the Independence of the Philippines, would lead to enormous public inconvenience, a complete paralization of all the functions of the government, since it would necessarily require a considerable period of time to appoint the new officers and employees in their place. And if they were to hold over or continue in office until their successors are appointed, as there is no limitation provided in the Constitution as to the time within which the appointing powers may or must appoint their successors, a sort of Damocles’ sword would be left hanging and ready to fall over the heads of said officers and employees for an indefinite period of time, to the detriment of the pr6per discharge of their functions and the independence that is to be expected from judges in the performance of their duties, essential for a good and clean government.
“In view of all the foregoing, it is evident that the respondent judge had the constitutional right to continue acting as judge after the proclamation of the Philippine Independence, and that, therefore, the judgment rendered by him in the present case is that of a judge de jure and valid.”
The fact that during the pendency of the present case before this Court, the petitioner reached the age of seventy years, can not affect the question involved in the present case, that is, whether or not the petitioner was the rightful justice of the peace of San Fernando, La Union, at the time the respondent Arciaga was appointed on July, 1946, justice of the peace in lieu of the petitioner, and afterwards until he has reached the age of seventy years.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude and hold that the petitioner had the right to continue in office until he has reached the age of seventy years, with all the privileges and emoluments appurtenant to the office; and that the ad-interim appointment of respondent Gavina disapproved, and of the respondent Arciaga approved, by the Commission on Appointments, had no effect whatever on the status of the petitioner as justice of the peace of San Fernando until he has reached the age of seventy years.
Moran, C.J., Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
PARAS, J.:
I concur in the result.