[ G.R. No. L-1229. February 28, 1947 ] G.R. No. L-1229
[ G.R. No. L-1229. February 28, 1947 ]
RAMON DOMINGO Y REYES, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Ramon Domingo y Reyes against the Director of Prisons. It is alleged therein that the petitioner was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, presided over by Judge Rafael Dinglasan, and that on August 20, 1946, he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. However, on August 30, 1946, when the case was called for trial before the same court, counsel for the accused Atty. Celestino de Dios, made a statement to the effect that the accused would plead guilty to the crime not of murder but of homicide, to which the Fiscal answered that he had no evidence to prove murder and that he was therefore agreeable to a plea of guilty for homicide. The court without inquiring from the accused himself whether he was pleading guilty to a charge of homicide, sentenced him for such crime with the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P2,000, this sentence having been pronounced in open court. The accused failed to appeal and the period therefor has already expired, the judgment having been signed on August 31, 1946. The petition for habeas corpus dated December 10, 1946, was received in this Court on December 16, 1946.
The respondent, in his return, alleges that the petitioner is at present confined in the Iwahig Penal Colony of the Bureau of Prisons pursuant to a commitment order and judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated August 31, 1946, issued in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Section 13 of Rule 102 reads:
“When the return evidence, and when only a plea.—If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint; but if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody must prove such facts.”
And section 4 of the same rule provides in part:
“When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the; court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; * * *.”
These provisions are self-explanatory. The trial court had jurisdiction over the offense and of the person of the accused, and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to try the case and render judgment therein. The allegation, if true, that the judgment of conviction was rendered without a plea of guilty properly entered by the accused to the lesser offense of homicide, is merely a defect of procedure, not of jurisdiction, though it may have the effect of voiding the judgment. And this error of procedure cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings wherein the only issue is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to release. And the petitioner is not entitled to release even if we have power to set aside the judgment upon the ground aforementioned, for, in such event, the proper procedure would be to reopen the criminal case and order the trial court to proceed further as if no judgment has ever been entered therein, that is, it must arraign the accused for the lesser offense of homicide after the information is duly amended, then try the case if the accused pleads not guilty, and the latter in the meantime should remain in confinement if he is not on bail. But this correction of procedure can be done only in an appeal or in an action for certiorari wherein the trial court is made respondent and is amenable to our orders.
It appears, upon the other hand, that there are in this case enough grounds for disbelieving petitioner’s theory to the effect that he had not been duly arraigned for the lesser offense of homicide nor pleaded guilty thereto. The trial judge himself expressly states in his judgment that the accused “pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide,” and the deputy clerk of court in her affidavit assures that she rearraigned the accused for the lesser offense on August 30, 1946, and that the accused pleaded guilty. All this is corroborated by the circumstance that the accused failed to protest in time against the judgment of conviction either by filing a motion for reconsideration or interposing an appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was filed three months and a half after notice of his conviction and this passive attitude is an indication of conformity with the proceedings and that the petition is but an afterthought.
Petitioner offered his mother’s affidavit and that of Sinforoso Pilares to substantiate his theory that there had been no rearraignment nor plea of guilty. His mother does not know how to sign her name and it is doubtful whether she had enough understanding to distinguish in a court proceeding what is an arraignment and a plea of guilty. Pilares’ affidavit seems to admit impliedly that there has been “rearraignment of Ramon Domingo y Reyes, in connection with the killing of Benito Espiritu alias Fidel” but that “Ramon Domingo y Reyes was not asked by the Judge to plead himself guilty to the crime of homicide nor did he utter any word during the proceedings.”
Another evidence presented by the accused is the silence of the transcript on his plea of guilty. That silence cannot, however, prevail over the positive assertion made to the contrary by the trial judge and the clerk of court. And, besides, the stenographer may take note of the plea of guilty entered by an accused, but he is not bound to do so, that proceeding being a proper subject matter for the minutes to be entered by the clerk of court.
For all the foregoing, petition is dismissed for lack of merits, without costs.
Feria, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.