[ G.R. No. L-1153. June 30, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 599
[ G.R. No. L-1153. June 30, 1947 ]
CRISPULO TALABON, PETITIONER, VS. THE ILOILO PROVINCIAL WARDEN, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo denying the petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus.
On November 2, before the attorney for the petitioner was notified of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated October 31 denying the petitioner’s petition, another petition for habeas corpus was originally filed with this Court by the same petitioner based on substantially the same grounds. In view of the objection of the attorney for the respondent to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the original petition for habeas corpus, based on the ground that the petitioner had also appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo denying his petition, the attorney for the petitioner, in his reply, moved that the petition and other pleadings filed originally with this Court, together with the papers sent up from the lower court, be considered as an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
The grounds of the petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and with this Court are, that the “petitioner was charged of (with) murder and was confined in the concentration camp and in the provincial jail of Iloilo since 1942 up to the present time, and under the pretext of a fantastic trial he was continually imprisoned and restrained of his liberty without having promulgated the corresponding authority of any decision against him;” and “the petitioner is deprived of his absolute right of appeal and denied of prompt and speedy justice,” because “he cannot prosecute any appeal to a higher tribunal of justice;” for the reason that the judgment which convicted the defendant to be imprisoned for not less than 12 years and 1 day to not more than 20 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, was rendered verbally by the trial judge, without the court’s finding of facts.
According to the return of the respondent to the petition filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, as well as his answer or return to the petition filed with this Court, the petitioner is in custody under warrant of commitment issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and signed by the clerk of said court which reads as follows:
“To the Provincial Warden of Iloilo “Somewhere in Passi
“SIR:
“I hereby commit to you the person of Crispulo Talabon, who is sentenced by this Honorable Court of First Instance, First Branch, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of from twelve (12) years to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) and to pay the costs of the action. One-half of the preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused herein is credited to him.
“Issued by Hon. Judge Ceferino de los Santos of First Instance, Iloilo, this 22nd day of January, 1945.
(Sgd.) “TEODORO A. LUNTAO “Deputy Clerk of Court”
According to section 13 of Rule 102: “If it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint;” and section 4 of the same rule provides:
“SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. * * *”
The above-quoted provision of section 4 of Rule 102, is in conformity with the well-established rule that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure the discharge of one restrained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment, is a collateral attack upon the said judgment; and the writ lies only where the judgment attacked is absolutely void, because the court that rendered it had no jurisdiction; and it does not lie where it is merely voidable by reason of errors, omissions, irregularities, or defects in the judgment (III Freeman on Judgments, 3171-3173).
The sole question involved in this appeal, therefore, is whether or not the court that convicted the petitioner had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner and of the offense, and to impose the particular penalty above stated; for as above stated, it is “well settled that where the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the prosecution, and the punishment imposed by the court is of the character prescribed by law for the offense, habeas corpus will not He for the release of the prisoner because of mere errors, irregularities, and defects in the sentence.” (25 Am. Jur., pp. 184-185.) And “it has been held that one who is imprisoned under a judgment may not procure his discharge by aid of the writ upon the ground only that an error was made by the clerk in recording the sentence; that the judgment failed to state the particular offense of which he was convicted or to adjudge expressly the defendant’s guilt; that the trial judge fixed the prisoner’s punishment within the limits prescribed by a statute when the jury should have done so; that an order for the issuance of an execution was omitted in a judgment imposing a fine; that the verdict was received and sentence imposed by a judge other than the one who presided at the trial; that two defendants who had been tried under a joint indictment had been given a joint sentence; or even that the wrong name was inserted in a sentence, at least if the prisoner was sufficiently designated to preclude any mistake.” (25 Am. Jur., p. 186.)
After considering the facts and law of the case, it is obvious that the lower court did not err in denying the petitioner’s petition, because the lower court had jurisdiction over the petitioner, the offense with which the latter was charged and of which he was convicted, and to impose upon him the penalty above stated. And for that reason, the petitioner does not question the jurisdiction of the trial court. The principal ground alleged in the petition is, that the petitioner is illegally detained for the reason that the judgment rendered by said court is not in writing and does not contain findings of facts as the basis of conviction, in violation of the provision of section 2, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court which was enacted in conformity with the provision of section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, and provides the following:
“SEC. 2. Form of judgment.—The judgment must he written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctively a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the defendant and upon which the judgment is based. If it is of conviction the judgment or sentence shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the. defendant, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there is any; (b) the participation of the defendant in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the defendant; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the defendant by the offended party, if there is any.”
The fact that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was made verbally without prejudice to put it subsequently in writing, and that no written decision with findings of facts has been rendered up to the filing of the petition, did not make that judgment absolutely void, because failure on the part of the court to comply with the above quoted provisions of the Rules of Court and the Constitution did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction acquired over the offense and the petitioner. In many cases (among them, those of Montelibano and Sichon vs. Director of Lands, 21 Phil., 449; Ungson vs. Basco and Zandueta, 29 Phil., 575; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil., 117) in which the trial court had failed to comply with the provision of section 133 of the old Code of Civil Procedure requiring that a decision in civil cases must be in writing and contain findings of facts, this Court did not dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court a quo had thereby lost its jurisdiction, but remanded the case to the lower court for compliance with said requirement. To hold otherwise would be to rule that a court that has jurisdiction will preserve it if it does not commit any error or applies correctly the law, and it will lose its jurisdiction if it does not act in accordance with the law, which is obviously untenable.
The provision of section 12, Article VIII, of the Constitution that “no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,” which had been incorporated substantially in section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers only to the form of the judgment. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court rendering it. The substance of the judgment is defined in section 1, of said Rule 116, which says that it is “the adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the penalty provided for by law on the defendant, who pleads or is found guilty thereof.”
It is evident that noncompliance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution by a court of competent jurisdiction, as noncompliance with the provision of a statute relating to the same matter, is an error or irregularity; but it is not jurisdictional, nor does it make the judgment absolutely void for lack of jurisdiction. The Constitution is superior to a statute, and is called the supreme law of the land, not because it is different in nature or character from the latter, nor because noncompliance therewith is jurisdictional, where it does not so provide, but because it is the fundamental or organic law. A constitution only differs from a statute in that the latter must provide the details of the subject of which it treats, whereas a constitution states the general principles and builds the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government, and for that reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void.
The judgment that convicted the petitioner-defendant, not absolutely void because the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over him, the offense and the particular penalty imposed therein, is defective because it does not conform to the form required by the law and the Constitution, and the proper remedy for the petitioner is to appeal from said judgment, or petition for mandamus to compel the Judge of the Court of First Instance to put in writing the decision of the court in said case. As a matter of fact, according to the return of the respondent filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and this Court, and not denied by the petitioner, a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction has been filed by the petitioner. Although the petitioner had the right to wait, that the judgment of said court be put in writing before filing his notice of appeal (Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil., 117), had he proceeded with his appeal, this Court would have entertained it by remanding the case to the lower court for the rendition of a judgment in writing with findings of facts on which it is based. Besides, in criminal cases the appellant is not required to make any assignment of errors (section 7, Rule 120), for generally the question involved in the appeal is whether or not the evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt, and the appellate court has the obligation to revise all the evidence in the record and apply the law to the case.
The allegation or claim of the petitioner, through his Atty. Pedro R. Davila in the present case, that there was an unreasonable delay in the trial of the defendant is groundless, for he can not ignore the fact that the delay was due to unsettled conditions then prevailing in the unoccupied territory wherein he was prosecuted, as shown in the pleadings and other papers attached to the record; and said Attorney Davila was precisely one of the judges presiding the Court of First Instance of Iloilo that tried cases in areas not occupied by the Japanese, although for some justifiable reason the trial of the case against the petitioner was transferred from the branch presided by him to that presided by Judge Ceferino de los Santos.
From the pleadings and the certified copies of the correspondence in connection with said trial, attached to the record sent up to this Court for the purpose of the appeal in this case, the following appear: A certified copy of the letter of the Acting Clerk of Court dated November 29, 1943, enclosing a subpoena issued by order of Pedro R. Davila, then Judge of Court of First Instance of Iloilo (now attorney for the petitioner) to be served upon the witness Procopio Talabon, requiring him to appear and testify at the trial of the case against the petitioner on December 14, 1943; a certified copy of a letter written by the Acting Clerk of Court to “The Executive Secretary, Somewhere,” (that is, address unknown) of the Philippine Government, informing him that the trial of the case for murder against the petitioner was set for hearing on December 14, 1943, at Bocare, Tubungan, Iloilo; another certified copy of a communication dated December 15 from the same Acting Clerk of Court to “The Executive Secretary, Somewhere,” informing the latter that “in view of the heavy rainfall and flood it was difficult and dangerous to go ahead with the trial,” which was again set for the 20th of the same month in one of the barrios of Miagao, Iloilo, and presumably could not have been held there, because according to a certified copy of a subpoena issued by the Deputy Clerk of Court, Procopio Talabon was required to appear as a witness before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, second branch, to testify at the trial of the petitioner to be held on July 30, 1944, at 9 o’clock a. m. somewhere in Bato, Tubungan; and a certified copy of a letter dated July 29, 1944, written by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal to the Deputy Clerk of Court, advising the latter not to forget “to subpoena Dr. Garces for the trial of Talabon case the coming Monday,” and also to subpoena other witnesses, “despite our motion contesting the qualification of Judge Davila to hear the case himself.”
The reason why Judge Ceferino de los Santos who presided the court that convicted the petitioner could not render a written decision containing findings of fact on which the judgment of conviction is based, is given in the answer or return of the respondent to the petition filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and is not contradicted or denied by the petitioner. The return says:
“That when the Americans landed in Iloilo in March, 1945, the said Judge De los Santos was advised that he ceased to be Acting Judge of the Court of First Instance and he left the said case without a written sentence against the accused;
“That the said Judge, Hon. Ceferino de los Santos was reappointed as Judge only a few months ago and upon being asked regarding his decision in the said case, signified his intention of rendering same as soon as he has the records of the case in his possession as well as the transcription of the stenographic notes of the trial;
“That on August 3, 1946, the same attorney, Mr. Pedro R. Davila, filed a motion praying this Honorable Court for the immediate release of the prisoner, alleging the same reasons as he alleged in this petition of Habeas Corpus;
“That this Court, presided by Honorable Manuel Blanco, on August 12, 1946, issued an order requesting the said Judge De los Santos, who is now presiding the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, through the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, to render the corresponding sentence in the said criminal case No. 4;
“That in compliance with the said order of this Honorable Court the Clerk of Court on August 15, 1946, sent by registered mail to said Judge, Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, the said motion of Attorney Davila;”
Not only the delay in the termination of the trial of the case and in the rendition of the judgment was not unreasonable or without justification—and the arguments advanced to support the contrary are based on mere conjectures or baseless assumption of facts not found in the record; but even assuming, arguendo, that there was such a delay, it does not constitute a sufficient ground for issuing a writ of habeas corpus and discharging the petitioner herein.
Not the delay in putting the oral judgment in writing, because “the constitutional right to a public and speedy trial does not extend to the act of pronouncement of sentence” (Reed vs. State, 147 Ind., 41; 46 N. E., 135, 136). Trial and judgment are two different stages of a judicial proceeding: the former is provided for in Rule 115, and the latter is covered by Rule 116, of the Rules of Court. “The period of the trial terminates when the judgment begins” (Felismino vs. Gloria, 47 Phil., 967). Therefore, the decision of this Court in the case of People vs. Conde (45 Phil., 650), in which no trial was ever held, can not correctly be invoked as a precedent in order to grant the petition in the present case; and the phrase “enjuiciado pronta y publicamente” is not a correct translation of “public and speedy trial,” and it is more comprehensive than the latter, and can not serve as a basis for a contrary conclusion because the English text must prevail (section 15, Adm. Code).
And not the delay, if any, in the prosecution of the trial, because it is obvious that, the case against the petitioner having already been tried and judgment rendered against him, the petitioner can no longer invoke his right to a speedy trial as a ground for his discharge on habeas corpus, inasmuch as said right is waived if not exercised in due time. If the trial of a criminal case is unreasonably delayed, the detention of the defendant becomes illegal, and habeas corpus is the only legal remedy for obtaining his release, in order to avoid his detention for an unreasonable period of time. After trial has terminated, the delay of the Court to render the sentence does not make the detention illegal, because the defendant may, by mandamus, compel the court which unreasonably delays rendering the decision to do so, and for that reason the defendant or prisoner is not granted the constitutional right to a speedy judgment.
In view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo denying the petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hontiveros, and Tuason, JJ., concur.