[ G.R. No. L-1029. November 28, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 612
[ G.R. No. L-1029. November 28, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO RAMOS Y LINAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. R E S O L U T I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a case certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground that it is “of the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed in this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by the lower court.”
When this certification was submitted to this Court, the question arose as to the procedure to be followed by the Court of Appeals in certifying cases to this Court under section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 52, which reads as follows:
“Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.”
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provision of the law, must of necessity depend upon the correctness of that opinion. There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from exercising its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review, the Court of Appeals is bound to make in its order of certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides that where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over the case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so “with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor.” The requirement of clear and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.
Furthermore, the words “shall refrain from entering judgment thereon” appearing in the provision above quoted, are a sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon, it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. Since the certification is the only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for they supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction. This is similar to a complaint or petition filed in a court, which must show on its face the jurisdictional facts, and the court will assume jurisdiction where the facts thus set out are sufficient, regardless of whether it turns out upon trial or hearing that the sum to be recovered or the penalty to be imposed is within the jurisdiction of lower courts.
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this Court. It is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer.
As a matter of fact, we have been so doing in other cases transferred to this Court under section 145-H of the Administrative Code. Under such provision, whenever an appeal is taken erroneously to the Court of Appeals, the case shall be sent to this Court “which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it.” Some of the cases transferred to this Court under this provision have been returned to the Court of Appeals, thus reversing the opinion of that court on questions of law relating to jurisdiction. And there can be no reason why the same thing cannot be done in cases transferred under section 145-K of the Administrative Code.
It is already a rule that this Court may reject claims upon its jurisdiction, predicated upon issues that are not real or substantial. Thus, we have rejected direct appeals to this Court upon the issue of jurisdiction which was found to be unsubstantial and not real. (People vs. Imas, 64 Phil., 419; Uy vs. Villafranca, 64 Phil., 561.) And in at least one instance, we rejected an appeal found to be frivolous. (De la Cruz vs. Franco, 1 Off. Gaz., June 1942, p. 582.) If this is so, there can be no valid reason why we cannot reject transfers made by the Court of Appeals which we find to be not only unsubstantial but clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. To hold that this Court is bound to assume jurisdiction over an offense only because the Court of Appeals, through mistake, believes that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death, which in truth and according to the findings of fact of that same Court, the penalty should be lower or much lower, is tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating jurisdiction to a mere matter of method or procedure.
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals.
Messrs. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado and Briones agree with this theory. Messrs. Justices Bengzon, Padilla and Tuason do not.
The present case is, however, accepted by this Court because the order of certification issued by the Court of Appeals is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law and of the rules for it makes reference to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contains sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant.
Messrs. Justices Pablo, Perfecto and Padilla agree with this conclusion. Messrs. Justices Bengzon and Tuason agree on other grounds. Messrs. Justices Paras, Feria, Hilado and Briones do not.
From all the foregoing, let the appeal in this case take its course in this Court until final determination upon its merits.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C. J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Briones voted in the manner stated in this opinion.