G.R. No. 920

CHING JUAT, PETITIONER, VS. BONIFACIO YSIP, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. 920. January 27, 1947 ] 77 Phil. 848

[ G.R. No. 920. January 27, 1947 ]

CHING JUAT, PETITIONER, VS. BONIFACIO YSIP, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

PERFECTO, J.:

Maria Ching was found guilty by the respondent judge of illegal marriage, as punished by article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, for marrying Co Heong on June 21, 1946, because at the time of her marriage she was only 16 years old, that is, lacking the required age to marry. Due to her minority, sentence against her was suspended and her commitment to the Welfareville Correctional Institution at Mandaluyong, Rizal, was ordered.

Having appealed in due time, she was allowed to be released on bail upon posting a bond in the sum of P1,000 in an order issued by respondent on August 27, 1946. Petitioner impugns the validity of the order because by the minor’s release on bail, she was taken by her husband and co-accused Co Heong, who was able to have and to hold her, and petitioner was illegally deprived of his patria potestas as father of the minor.

Petitioner’s complaint has no ground in law. A minor found guilty, in the lower court, of a criminal offense is not deprived, because of the fact of his minority, of the right to appeal. The decision or judgment finding him guilty and ordering his commitment to a correctional or educational institution as provided by article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, is stayed and is unenforceable until it becomes final and executory. Appeal suspends its effects. This is logical, because appeal may result in reversal. When a minor appeals from a judgment finding him guilty of a criminal offense, he is generally entitled, as all other accused, to be allowed provisional release on bail. The order to commit him to the custody of a correctional or educational institution should not be enforced in the meantime, because the order of commitment provided by article 80 of the Revised Penal Code becomes only executory when the decision or judgment upon which it is based becomes final and executory. There is no reason why a minor should be excluded from the benefits of constitutional and legal provisions on bail. A minor is entitled to more protection from the law, never to less.

That upon the minor’s release on bail, instead of going to her father’s custody, she sought to join her husband’s company, is no reason for petitioner to complain of the lower court’s action in issuing the order of August 27, which was within his legal power to issue, nor is it a ground for the petitioner to advance the novel theory that he was deprived of his patria potestas. Deprivation of patria potestas is a negative action and cannot result from the affirmative action of the lower court in allowing Maria Ching to be released on bail. The freedom granted to her could not have the effect of depriving petitioner the right to have her under his custody, in the hypothesis that he still retains patria potestas over his daughter. Unfortunately for petitioner, it is not even possible to entertain such an hypothesis, because by his daughter’s marriage, the latter became emancipated from her parent’s custody, her marriage having the effect of transferring her to her husband’s care and protection, there being no question that the marriage is valid, as the offense of which the newly-weds were found guilty by the lower court cannot affect the validity of the marriage. Petitioner himself had not even attempted to put in doubt its validity. Petition denied.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.