[ G.R. No. 718. March 24, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 145
[ G.R. No. 718. March 24, 1947 ]
JULIANA ETORMA, ROSARIO INDEFENSO AND GREGORIO SALUMBIDES, PETITIONERS, VS. LUCILA RAVELO AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, RESPONDENTS. R E S O L U T I O N
FERIA, J.:
The petition for certiorari filed in the above entitled case on July 13, 1946, assailed the validity of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in December, 1942, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the petitioners, on the ground that the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals during the Japanese occupation was null and void, because the question involved in the litigation was the validity or invalidity of a free patent issued by the Governor General of the Philippines under the authority granted by an Act of Congress of the United States; one of the parties in the case was the Director of Lands, as officer in charge with the administration and alienation of public lands placed under the control of the Government of the Philippines; and the petitioners were claiming vested rights, not only under the laws in force in the Philippines, but also under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The decision of the Court of Appeals was also attacked as being in violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners, for the reason that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas did not contain findings of facts, that is, whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the free patent in question, and the Court of Appeals made its own findings of fact without hearing the appellants nor giving them opportunity to be heard on the questions of fact therein raised. And the petitioners prayed that the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, to which the case was remanded several years ago for the execution of the judgment by the Court of Appeals, be required to send the record of said case to this Court for consideration and decision.
We dismissed the petition for certiorari in a minute resolution of August 14, 1946, which reads as follows:
“Considering the petition filed in G.R. No. L-718, Juliana Etorma et als., petitioners, vs. Lucila Ravelo et al., respondents, praying that the decision jointly rendered in the case referred to in the petition, as well as all the proceedings had in said cases after January 1, 1942, be declared null and void; that the Court of First Instance of Tayabas be required to send up the records of said cases, and that the appeal interposed by petitioners be considered and decided by this Court: it is ordered that the petition be dismissed.”
This Court did not deem it necessary to render a reasoned decision in deciding the petition for certiorari, for it considered the latter without merits. Because the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 22, 1942, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, has become final several years ago, and the judgments of the Courts in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation are valid and binding in accordance with the ruling of this Court in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113). The fact that the question involved was the validity of a free patent, and the Director of Public Lands was a party, and that the authority to grant free patent was conferred upon the Governor General, and the power to regulate the procedure to obtain it upon the Legislature of the Philippines by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not make the judgment rendered thereon of political nature. The Acts authorizing and regulating the grant of free patents to occupants or possessors of public lands are municipal laws, and the judgments of the courts which apply said laws are not of political complexion.
Now the attorney for the petitioners alleges that the ruling or doctrine laid down in the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon is not applicable to the present case, inasmuch as the petitioners herein had refused, by going up to the mountains, to submit themselves to the authority of the Japanese invaders and the government established by them in these Islands; and for that reason he now asks this Court to render a decision stating the reasons on which it is based, in accordance with section 12, Article VIII, of our Constitution.
The allegation that the petitioners had refused to submit themselves to the invaders was not set up in their petition for certiorari, and therefore could not properly be taken into consideration now for the purpose for which the present petition has been filed. But to meet this new contention, it is sufficient to state that the omission on the part of the petitioners or their attorney to take proper steps, if there were any, to withdraw the case appealed by them out of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, which was continued by the occupant during the Japanese regime, until the latter has rendered a decision against them, constituted an implied submission to the jurisdiction of the said court, and the fact admitted in the paragraph VI of their petition for certiorari, that after the attorney for the petitioner was notified of the decision of the Court of Appeals of December 22, 1942, he had filed a motion with the Court of Appeals asking that he be granted a period of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration of said decision, was an express submission to the said jurisdiction, since the acts of an attorney in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure bind his clients (section 21, Rule 127). The subsequent filing of “an exception or protest against the decision” of the Court of Appeals, instead of a motion for reconsideration, could not have the effect of a withdrawal by said petitioners from the court’s jurisdiction; for a court does not lose its jurisdiction acquired over a party by the latter’s subsequent refusal to recognize it, specially after the court has decided the case against him. To allow the petitioners to avoid the decision rendered against them by the Court of Appeals would be utterly untenable, for it stands to reason that they should not assail now the validity of said judgment had it been in their favor.
The dissenting opinion of Messrs. Justices Hilado and Perfecto is made to rest, not only upon the reasons set forth in their dissenting opinion in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, but principally on the proposition that, in deciding that the governments established in these Islands by the Japanese military forces of occupation, under the name of Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, were de facto governments, this Court attempted to exercise a power which exclusively belonged to the political departments of the United States and the Commonwealth Government; because according to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Jones vs. U.S. (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696), the question “Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as other officers and subjects of the Government.” And after citing said excerpt of the decision, the said dissenting opinion says:
“According to the doctrine just quoted, the first question to be determined by the legislative and executive departments of the government is: Who is the sovereign of the territory? The next is: Is he a de jure or de facto sovereign? The determination of this second question necesarily decides whether the government of that sovereign is de jure or de facto, for it is not possible to speak of a sovereign in the instant acceptation of the term, without linking him with his government. And a de jure sovereign cannot have a de facto government, any more than a de facto sovereign have a de jure government. * * * Differently expressed, the proposition would be: If the question of who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, that of whether the government in the territory is de jure or de facto, cannot but be a political question.”
This new ground is predicated upon the clearly erroneous assumption that the determination of the question whether a government is de facto or de jure involves necessarily the question of sovereignty. It is correct that a government established in a territory under a sovereign de jure is a government de jure, but it is not true that a government established in a territory under a sovereign de jure cannot be a government de facto. The three classes of governments de facto set forth in the decision of this Court in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and recognized by all the publicist and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, are governments de facto established in a territory which continued under the same sovereign de jure, or in which there was no change of sovereignty. In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court said: “There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or goverment de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession.”
Were the theory advanced in the dissenting opinion correct, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the following cases in which it held that the governments in a territory temporarily occupied by the invading enemy forces during war, or set up by the insurgents during insurrection or rebellion, were de facto governments, would be also necessarily erroneous, and we do not think the dissenting Messrs. Justices Hilado and Perfecto mean to so hold. The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of U.S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 258), that the government established in Castine, Maine, occupied temporarily by the British forces in the war of 1812 was a de facto government. The same Court held in the case of Fleming vs. Page (9 How., 614), that the government established by the American forces in Tampico, Mexico, during the war between the latter and United States was a de facto government. In the cases of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1) ; Williams vs. Bruffy (95 U.S., 176 [quoting the decision in the case of Horn vs. Lockhert, 17 Wall., 570]), and Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U.S., 388), it was held that the goverments set up by the Confederate States during the war of secession were de facto governments. And in the case of McCleod vs. United States (229 U.S., 416), the same Supreme Court of the United States held that the short-lived government established by Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish American War, was a de facto government.
The dissenting opinion further says:
“If President Roosevelt had considered the regime imposed upon this country by the Japanese occupation army as a de facto government, within the meaning of International Law, he would not have branded the ‘Philippine Republic’ as a ‘puppet government’, and, since he must be presumed to know that a de facto government in international law is a form of government, with powers and duties of its own, as contradistinguished from a mere ‘puppet’, and that such a government is entitled to recognition among civilized nations, he would never have so vehemently announced in his message to the Filipino people on October 23, 1943, that neither the one nor the other had the recognition or the sympathy of the government of the United States—he would not have condemned them.
* * * * * * *
“If President Quezon and the other Filipino leaders * * * had considered (said government) as not de facto government * * *,” they would not have requested of the Senate and House of Representatives of Congress of the United States, the introduction of what later became S. J. Res. No. 93, which became law on June 29, 1944, wherein the government thus imposed upon the Filipinos by the Japanese’s ‘own puppet government which was conceived in intrigue, born in coercion, and reared primarily for the purpose of Japanese selfishness and aggrandizement.’ "
In reply to these remarks, suffice it to say that the President and Congress of the United States in describing and branding the Philippine Executive Commission and the so-called Republic of the Philippines as puppet governments, did not recognize them as legitimate or de jure governments, and not being de jure they are de facto governments under the rules of international law. An organized government established in a territory must be either de jure or de facto, since there is no other class of organized government known in political as well as in international law. There is no genuine or false de facto government.
It is evidently erroneous to say that the majority “in laying down the doctrine in the Co Kim Cham case it has unwittingly refused to be bound by the aforesaid prior and adverse determination of the United States and Commonwealth governments.” The decision of this Court in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon is precisely in conformity with the previous determination of the above mentioned message of President Roosevelt and resolution and Act of Congress of the United States, in which the so-called Republic of the Philippines was branded as “a puppet government, which was conceived in intrigue and born in coercion” that is, not a government de jure. We have held in the said case of Co Kim Cham that “The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same—the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, ‘under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the “Republic of the Philippines” was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people’s will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.’ Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations.”
Therefore, the conclusion that the governments of the Philippine Executive Commission and the so-called Republic of the Philippines were now governments de facto, because they were not recognized and were called puppet governments by the executive and legislative departments of the United States, is untenable, for it is premised upon a wrong conception of what a government de facto is. It is evident that if said governments established in the Philippines had been recognized by the executive and legislative departments of the United States, they would have been de jure and not de facto governments; and they were called puppet governments because they were not established by legitimate sovereign, but they were governments de facto. It is simply gratuitous to state that “It goes without saying that a puppet government is no government at all, not even a de facto government.” A puppet government is one that acts as another wills or dictates. The Republic of the Philippines was a puppet government, because although set up apparently as a free and independent government, was, in truth and in fact, a government de facto established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese military forces, as we have already stated in the case of Co Kim Cham above quoted.
And as to what may be considered as territory occupied by the enemy, and Mr. Justice Hilado’s contention that the laws of international law relating to government de facto over territory occupied by Japan are not applicable, because the latter started treacherously against the United States, we may quote the following from our resolution on the motion for reconsideration filed in said case of Co Kim Cham:
“(1) It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese was not actual and effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and even towns and villages; and consequently, no government de facto could have been validly established by the Japanese military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and the law of nations.
“The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to these places, was not sufficient to make the military occupation ineffective, nor did it cause that occupation to cease, or prevent the constitution or establishment of a de facto government in the Islands. The belligerent occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became an accomplished fact from the time General Wainright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in Luzon, and General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao, surrendered and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and the invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.
" ‘According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States Army, belligerent or so-called military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government of the territory invaded.’ (International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by Hyde, Vol. II, pp. 361, 362.) ‘Belligerent occupation must be both actual and effective. Organized resistance must be overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures to establish law and order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied district.’ (Id., p. 364.) ‘Occupation once acquired must be maintained * * *. It does not cease, however, * * *. Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless the legitimate government is reestablished and the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla operations.’ (Id., p. 365.)
* * * * * * *
“(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the Philippines, because Japan started war treacherously and emphasized war as an instrument of national policy; and that to give validity to the judicial acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese would be tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
“In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which impose upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure ‘1’ordre et la vie publice,’ that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.
* * * * * * *
“The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with the said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy’s territory, and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.” (75 Phil., 371.)
The resolution above quoted which upholds the validity of judicial acts which are not of political complexion of de facto governments established by the military occupant in an enemy territory, is based on the Regulations of the Hague Convention that contain the generally accepted principles of International Law, adopted as a part of the law of the Nation in section 3 of our Constitution, and is supported by Dr. Lauterpacht in his 6th edition of Oppenheim, page 51, footnote, in which it is said:
" ‘In particular, the illegality of the war undertaken in breach of the provisions of the Pact does not automatically deprive the guilty belligerent of the rights of warfare, including those resulting from the law of neutrality.’ (P. 157.) Subsequently he adds: ‘For war waged in violation of the Treaty is nevertheless war conferring upon the guilty and innocent belligerents alike all the rights flowing from the accepted law of war and neutrality.’ (P. 512.) He further declares: ‘No authorization to disregard the duties of neutral impartiality against the State breaking the Treaty can be deduced from the passage in the preamble which lays down that “any signatory power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty.” The benefits furnished by the Treaty are immunity from war waged as an instrument of national policy, not a guarantee of the observance of rules of International Law, including the rules of neutrality.’ " (International Law by Hyde, p. 1684, Vol. III, Second Revised Edition.)
Petition is, therefore, denied.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.