[ G.R. No. 1219. February 25, 1947 ] 77 Phil. 1026
[ G.R. No. 1219. February 25, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SIXTO VELEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. RESOLUTION
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion filed by the Solicitor General with this Court to dismiss the appeal, interposed by the attorney for the offended party, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental that dismissed the information against the accused, upon motion of the latter’s counsel, on the ground that the supposed libelous document is a privilege communication. The provincial fiscal did not oppose to the motion for dismissal filed by the defendant in the Court of First Instance, because he was also of the opinion that the letter which was the subject matter of the case was a privilege communication.
It is true that the offended party or his attorney may commence a criminal action and file the proper complaint, but according to section 15, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, he may intervene in the prosecution of the criminal action so commenced only if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it, subject always to the direction and control of the fiscal under section 4 of the same Rule 106. Said section 15 of Rule 106 provides as follows:
“SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.”
It appearing from the record that there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged libelous document, filed by the offended party against the same defendant (p. 28, Record), the offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of this case, and consequently can not appeal from the order of the court dismissing the information. The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case if he has waived his right to institute a civil action arising from the criminal act, or has reserved or, a fortiori, already instituted the said civil action, is that he has no special interest in the prosecution of the criminal action.
Besides, even if the offended party has not instituted a separate civil action nor reserved his right to do so, and has intervened in the prosecution of the criminal action, as his intervention is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal, that is, the provincial fiscal or the Solicitor General, the latter in the exercise of his authority to control the prosecution has the right to move for the dismissal of the appeal interposed by the offended party, if such dismissal would not affect the right of the offended party to civil indemnity. And in the present case the dismissal of the information or the criminal action does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal or extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil one under section 1 (d) Rule 107, Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
“(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered;”
In view of the foregoing, the appeal interposed by the offended party is dismissed, with costs against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.