[ G.R. No. 1208. January 30, 1947 ] 77 Phil. 983
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 1208. January 30, 1947 ]
BERNARDO VELASQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner Bernardo Velasquez alleges he has been in prison since June, 1944, pursuant to an order of the Zambales court of first instance, pending the revision of his case by this Court, to which he had appealed in May, same year. He asserts that his incarceration for more than two years and six months violates his constitutional right to speedy trial, and that, as a consequence, the Government, in failing to act with dispatch on the matter, lost its authority to detain him further.
Answering the petition, the Solicitor General, for respondent, explains: (1) the prisoner is confined under a commitment order of the aforesaid court, dated May 8, 1944, in accordance with its decision sentencing him, for murder, to life imprisonment and to pay P2,000 as indemnity, with costs; (2) appeal from said decision was interposed, but on July 13, 1944, defendant filed with this Court a motion withdrawing such appeal; and (3) supposing that such appeal is still pending despite the withdrawal, petitioner has no reason to protest because he has taken no steps to reconstitute the records of his case. The Solicitor General submitted a copy of the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner filed a reply, but did not traverse the respondent’s main allegations, specially that concerning the withdrawal of his appeal, which consequently must be deemed admitted. (See Rule 102, section 13.) And we have no record of the proceedings against petitioner in the Zambales court; it must have been destroyed together with many others during the battle for the liberation of Manila.
Now then, inasmuch as petitioner is restrained of his liberty by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is unquestioned, the writ may not be issued, because section 4 of Rule 102 expressly prohibits the issuance thereof, in the circumstances.
Nor is petitioner in a position to complain of unjustified delay in the disposal of his appeal, because he desisted from such appeal, and even granting that the withdrawal had not been acted upon, the delay is due to the publicly known destruction of court papers, as above stated, and partly to his failure to apply for the reconstruction of his expediente, supposing, as he affirms, that his voluntary desistance did not finally end it.
However, it should be noted that the preceding remarks do not necessarily imply unqualified endorsement of the petitioner’s underlying hypothesis, to wit, that defendant’s right to speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution extends to and governs proceedings in the appellate courts. This is an angle which is unnecessary to explore for the present, because conceding validity to his supposition and major premise, we find here no such inexcusable violation of defendant’s privileges as to require vindication in the form of a directive for his immediate release, as was authorized in Conde vs. Rivera and Unson (45 Phil., 650), and analogous decisions.
Wherefore, without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original record which the parties may institute, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied. No costs.
Moran C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.