[ G.R. No. 1159. January 30, 1947 ] 77 Phil. 933
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 1159. January 30, 1947 ]
CECILIO M. LINO, PETITIONER, VS. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, LAMBERTO JAVALERA, AND JOHN DOE, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MAYOR, CHIEF OF POLICE AND OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, ALL OF THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondents’ return that ten of the petitioners had already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco, are being held in custody because of charges filed against them in the municipal court for unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively.
After hearing, by minute-resolution we dismissed the case with respect to the ten petitioners already released and we ordered the release of the remaining two, Montaniel and Deoduco, without prejudice to a reasoned decision which we now proceed to render.
The case of the ten petitioners has become academic by their release. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is only to set them free. After they are freed, the writ is purposeless. If they have been tljie victims of illegal arrest or detention, they can have recourse to criminal actions in the proper courts.
As regards the remaining two petitioners, the pertinent facts as admitted at the hearing by respondents, are as follows: Pascual Montaniel was arrested without warrant by the police officers of Manila on November 8, 1946, for inciting to sedition, and Pacifico Deoduco, on November 7, 1946, for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders. On November 11 when this petition for habeas corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still under arrest. They were thus held in confinement for three and four days, respectively, without warrants and without charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of November 11. Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient evidence was found to warrant the prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to sedition and of Pacifico Deoduco for resisting arrest, but both remained under custody because of informations filed with the municipal court charging Montaniel with unjust vexation and Deoduco with disobedience to an agent of a person in authority under the second paragraph of article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. These informations were filed on the same day when this case was heard before this Court, that is, on November 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment are shown to have been issued by the municipal court pursuant to the informations thus filed.
Under these facts, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. (Article 125, Rev. Pen. Code, as amended by Act No. 3940.) Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11, 1946, that is, four and three days, respectively, after they were arrested. The illegality of their detention was not cured by the filing of information against them, since no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment have been issued by the municipal court up to the hearing of this case before this Court.
It must be observed, in this connection, that in said informations, the two petitioners1 are charged with light offenses punishable by law with arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both, according to the second paragraphs of articles 151 and 287, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of that character, “the judge with whom the complaint or information is filed, shall not issue any warrant or order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the latter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer to the complaint or information,” although in particular instances he may also “order that a defendant charged with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing bail.” The general rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court expressly so orders in the exercise of its discretion. In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor exercised its discretion to order the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they are still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as a continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers. While an arrest may be made without warrant when there are reasonable grounds therefor (Rule 109, section 6, Rules of Court), the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law, unless a warrant is procured from a competent court. (4 Am. Jur., p. 49; Diers vs. Mallon, 46 Neb., 121; 50 Am. St. Rep., 598; Burk vs. Howley, 179 Penn., 539; 57 Am. St. Rep., 607; Karner vs. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App., 460; 34 S. W., 656; Johnson vs. Americus, 46 Ga., 80; Leger vs. Warren, L. R. A., 216-218 [Bk. 51.] It is obvious in the instant case that the City Fiscal had no authority to issue warrants of arrest (vide authorities cited above, and Hashim vs. Boncan and City of Manila, 71 Phil., 216) and was powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely filing informations or by any order of his own, either express or implied.
It is not necessary now to determine whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, for even if he were, the petitioners’ case was referred to him long after the expiration of the six hours provided by law. And since the City Fiscal, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order either the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses (Adm. Code, section 2460), the petitioners’ further confinement after their case had been referred to the City Fiscal was but a mere continuation of their illegal detention by the police officers. In the eyes of the law, therefore, these prisoners should have been out of prison long before the informations were filed with the municipal court, and they should not be retained therein merely because of the filing of such informations it appearing particularly that the offenses charged are light and are not, as a general rule, grounds for arrest, under Rule 108, section 10. Under such circumstances, only an order of commitment could legalize the prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order has ever been issued. Indeed, the municipal court could acquire jurisdiction over said prisoners only by the issuance of a warrant of arrest, an order of commitment or a writ of summons as provided in the aforementioned rule.
We reiterate the minute-resolution above mentioned.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C. J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in this decision.