[ G. R. No. L-1243. April 14, 1947 ] 78 Phil. 286
[ G. R. No. L-1243. April 14, 1947 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EUSEBIO LOPEZ, ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF SECOND DIVISION OF PEOPLE’S COURT, BENIGNO S. AQUINO, AND ANTONIO DE LAS ALAS, RESPONDENTS.
PERFECTO, J.:
Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Tanada, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, and Prosecutors Juan R. Liwag and Pedro C. Quinto filed, in the name of the People of the Philippines, a petition praying that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding Associate Judge Eusebio M. Lopez, of the Second Division of the People’s Court, “to desist from further proceedings in, or further exercising his jurisdiction in the trial of, and from otherwise taking further cognizance of criminal cases for treason against Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527) and against Antonio de las Alas (No. 3531), and other treason cases of the same nature actually pending before the Second Division of the People’s Court or in any other division where he may hereafter be assigned, and declaring him disqualified to sit therein.” On March 14, 1946, an information for treason was filed in criminal case No. 3534 against Guillermo B. Francisco. The accused entered his plea of not guilty and the case was heard on diverse clays in the months of June and July, 1946, before the Second Division of the People’s Court, composed of Associate Judges Salvador Abad Santos and Jose P. Veluz and the respondent judge. After the prosecution had rested its case, counsel for the accused moved to dismiss, upon the sole ground that the overt acts charged in the information were not testified to by two witnesses as required by the treason law, article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. On August 24, 1946, a decision penned by Associate Judge Salvador Abad Santos, dated August 15, 1946, and concurred in by Associate Judge Jose P. Veluz, was promulgated, dismissing the case. Associate Judge Lopez reserved his decision. On September 26, 1946, Judge Lopez promulgated a separate concurring opinion in which, according to the petition, “not satisfied with dismissing the aforementioned case on the ground raised by the accused therein, expressed views and conclusions of facts, not warranted by the evidence or by the issues raised by the parties nor necessary to the decision of the case, justifying the aid and comfort given to the Empire of Japan by the ‘Filipino leaders’ or the so-called political collaborators and holding them in effect to be patriots and therefore not guilty of the crime of treason with which they stand charged.” Upon the allegation that “the respondent judge had shown that he does not possess that unprejudiced, dispassionate, unbiased and impartial state of mind in regard to the cases of the political collaborators now pending trial in the People’s Court, which is a requisite under the statute and which is essential and necessary as a matter of right in the proper administration of justice,” the prosecution filed petitions to disqualify respondent judge from sitting and participating in any manner in the hearing and decision of the criminal cases against Benigno" S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas and other treason cases of the same nature pending before the Second Division of the People’s Court. It is alleged that the petitions were filed under section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, otherwise known as the People’s Court Act, in relation to section 1 of Rule 124. After due hearing and argument, the majority of the Second Division, Judges Abad Santos and Veluz, promulgated a resolution on November 8, 1946, granting the motions for the disqualification of Judge Lopez. On the same date Judge Lopez promulgated a resolution denying them. The petition alleges that in said separate resolution respondent judge “again manifested his bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators” and reaffirmed with more vigor the views and conclusions he expressed in his concurring opinion in the case of People vs. Guillermo B. Francisco as shown by the following excerpts:
“* * * that President Quezon gave instructions to the Filipino leaders before his departure for the United States, giving details of those instructions; that the Filipino leaders surrendered to the enemy and accepted services in the two puppet governments because they had to and because they were coerced to do so; * * * that the co-operation the Filipinos gave to the Japanese army was feigned and not real; * * *.” (P. 11, Resolution, Annex I.)
* * * * * * * *
“The prosecution asserts that under my theory of the law all the political collaborators now facing charges of treason in this court cannot be convicted because I would decide them in accordance with my concurring opinion. I am only one of the fifteen judges in the People’s Court. Even in my division I cannot presume to control the majority. But the prosecution can rest assured that if I could be given the sole power to decide the cases against political collaborators and all the other cases pending before the People’s Court, I would dismiss every single one of them if the charges were limited to acts legal under the law of the occupant and not in contravention of the limitations upon the powers of the enemy established by international law.” (P. 24, Resolution, Annex I.)
It is alleged in the petition that the respondent judge did not appeal from the resolution of the majority of his division and expressed his determination to maintain his minority view and to disregard entirely the majority opinion and has announced publicly his intention to continue participating in the consideration of the cases against Benigno S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas as well as in other treason cases of the same nature, now pending before the Second Division, and that the respondent is duty bound to respect and obey the resolution of the majority, and any further intervention in his part in further proceedings, trial and decision of the above-mentioned cases, and other similar cases of political collaborators “is without or in excess of his jurisdiction and power as Associate Judge and will constitute a grave abuse of judicial functions,” and that trial of the aforecited cases, including those against Pio Duran (No. 3324), Francisco Lavides (No. 3523), Vicente Madrigal (No. 3521), and Leon Guinto (No. 3535), will soon come up before the Second Division of the People’s Court. Judge Lopez filed his answer referring to the reasons stated in his resolution denying the petitions to disqualify him which is marked as Annex I of the petition. Respondent Benigno S. Aquino alleged in his answer that it is not true that Judge Lopez expressed views and conclusions of fact not warranted by the evidence or by the issues raised by the parties, nor necessary to the decision of the case against Guillermo B. Francisco, and that his pronouncements in his concurring opinion, on the contrary, “were made not only in compliance with the constitutional requirement that any decision rendered by any court of record must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based (Article VIII, section 12, of the Constitution), but also in obedience to the exigencies of the statute that all questions of fact and law raised by the defendant’s plea of not guilty be resolved by the court.” He alleges also that the resolution of Judges Abad Santos and Veluz, granting the petitions to disqualify Judge Lopez, is contrary to law and to the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, and that the resolution of Judge Lopez was not manifestation of his bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators, but was merely a restatement of the law and a summary of well-known principles of international law and the law of evidence; that the majority cannot remove Judge Lopez from the Second Division, and any attempt to this effect, being unlawful, can be ignored by him. As special defenses, respondent Aquino alleges that the petition is in fact an attempt to remove Judge Lopez from the People’s Court for a cause and not in a manner provided for in existing laws, contrary to the provisions of section 5, of Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People’s Court, since under the guise of disqualifying him, “it seeks to bar respondent Judge Lopez from sitting and participating in the trial and deliberation of cases assigned to the Second Division of the People’s Court,” and that there is no authority of law for the institution of the present proceedings, for the reason that under Commonwealth Act No. 682, the People’s Court can only act either in bane or in division of three judges. Respondent Antonio de las Alas denies in his answer that the concurring opinion of Judge Lopez in the Guillermo B. Francisco case expressed views and conclusions of facts not warranted by the evidence or by the issues raised by the parties nor necessary to the decision of the case, and denies the allegation that the respondent judge does not possess that unprejudiced, dispassionate, unbiased and impartial state of mind in regard to the cases of the political collaborators. The same respondent alleged as special defenses the following:
“1. That the conclusion of respondent Judge on treasonable collaborations as shown by his concurring opinion in the Francisco case, far from betraying bias or prejudice demonstrates on its face a careful and exhaustive study of the applicable principles of international law to the acts of the inhabitants of a territory under military occupation. “(a) Such findings of facts and conclusion of law therefore do not constitute bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators nor are they unfair to State or the prosecution. “2. That even on the assumption that such a conclusion of law may possibly reflect bias and prejudice in favor of political collaborators, that of itself does not suffice for the disqualification as— “(a) Disqualification may be sought only on any one of the grounds explicitly set forth in the law, bias or prejudice not being one of them (Rule 126, Rules of Court; section 7 of Commonwealth Act 682; Joaquin vs. Barreto, 25 Phil., 281; Perfecto vs. Contreras, 28 Phil., 538; U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385; Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil., 747; Arteche vs. De la Rosa, 58 Phil., 589). “3. That even if disqualification may be predicated on bias and prejudice, respondent Judge should not under the circumstances of this case be disqualified as the effect thereof would be— “(a) To penalize the respondent Judge not for an attitude of favoritism or hostility to either party in controversy but for a conclusion of law on a matter which admits of controversy, a conclusion arrived at after careful study and investigation and supported and fortified by a wealth of citation from applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court, pertinent portions of the Hague Convention and excerpts from the authoritative text writers in international law. “(b) To strike at the independence of the judiciary (Cf. Bnrromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 332) ; “(c) To contravene the principles underlying’ the creation of collegiate courts; “(d) To encroach on the appointing and removal power of the President (Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 590) ; “(e) To subject this respondent to the risk that his trial would be without due process of law.”
In the case for treason against Pedro Santos Balingit, the accused was convicted in the decision penned by Judge Veluz and concurred in by Judge Abad Santos, Judge Lopez dissenting and voting to acquit the accused. Both the majority and minority opinions are presented as an annex of the memorandum of counsel for the petitioner. The first legal problem arising out of this controversy is the determination of whether, upon the facts alleged in the petition and appearing in the annexes on record, Judge Eusebio M. Lopez is disqualified from sitting and participating in any manner in the hearing, consideration and decision of the treason cases against Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527), Antonio de las Alas (No. 3531), and of other criminal cases of the same nature pending before the Second Division of the People’s Court or in any other division where respondent judge may hereafter be assigned. This legal problem depends for its solution on the existence of (a) an applicable provision of law, or (6) an applicable provision of a judicial rule, or (c) a recognized legal principle governing the matter based on reason and justice. We have painstakingly scanned the voluminous pleadings and memoranda presented by the parties and there no other provision of law has been invoked or cited in support of the theory of respondent judge’s disqualification except section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. At the hearing and re-hearing of this case, we propounded questions to appearing counsel for any other applicable provision. The answers given failed to satisfy our curiosity. None other was mentioned or hinted. The pertinent part of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 is as follows:
“No judge of the People’s Court may disqualify himself or be disqualified except in “accordance with the provisions of existing1 laws or where the accused in a case have intervened in any previous appointment of the judge to any position in the government service.”
The above provision is composed of two parts, one, general, which makes applicable “the provisions of existing laws,” and the other, specific, where the affected judge had been previously appointed to any government position through the intervention of the accused. The last specific provision does not apply to Judge Lopez, as nobody alleged that any of the accused in the treason cases in question had any part in the previous appointment of said judge to any position in the government service. What remains to be determined are what “provisions of existing laws” are referred to in the above-quoted provision. Counsel for the petitioner offered a ready answer by pointing only to section 1 of Rule 124, which provides as follows:
“Courts of justice shall be always open, except on legal holidays, for the filing of any pleading or other proper papers, for the trial of cases, and for the issuance of orders or rendition of judgments. Justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.”
By narrowing the subject of inquiry, the specific provision upon which Judge Lopez is intended to be disqualified is the one expressed in the following words: “Justice shall be impartially administered.” Counsel’s enthymeme runs as follows: “Judge Lopez cannot administer justice impartially; therefore, he is disqualified.” But the assumed major premise, which if expressly stated would complete the syllogism, finds no support at all in the invoked reglementary provision. There is absolutely nothing in said provision or in any part of section 1, Rule 124, in support of the thesis that, because a judge cannot administer justice impartially (the minor premise of the syllogism which is yet to be determined), ipso facto he is disqualified. The question of disqualifying a judge from participating in the disposal of cases under the jurisdiction of his tribunal is a matter of grave import to be governed by more or less reasonable deductions which any one may freely take from so general and broad proposition that “justice shall be administered impartially.” As that proposition embodies the fundamental aim of a system of justice, if we should follow the way of reasoning of counsel for the petitioner, all legal and reglementary provisions intended to attain that fundamental aim can be dispensed with as superfluous. All purposes and objectives of a system of justice may be summed up in the compliance of the general mandate that “justice shall be impartially administered.” But as every one has his own individual ideas, plans, and methods of complying with said mandatory provision, and within its intellectual scope any one may logically give free reign to his imaginations, troubles and conflicts will never find their end. Specific rules were adopted to avoid the existence of such a confusing and chaotic situation. That the authors of the judicial rules, in enacting section 1 of Rule 124, did not have in mind the idea of disqualification of judges, is shown by two conclusive evidences, one negative and the other affirmative. The negative evidence is offered by the title of Rule 124 which says: “Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers.” Each and everyone of the nine sections of the rule do not include nor hint the idea of disqualification. To prove it, it would be enough to read their titles: “Section 1. Courts always open; how justice administered.—Section 2. Publicity of proceedings and records.—Section 3. Process of superior courts enforced throughout the Philippines.—Section 4. Process of inferior courts.—Section 5. Inherent powers of courts.—Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.—Section 7. Trials and hearings; orders in chambers.—Section 8. Interlocutory orders out of province.—Section 9. Signing judgments out of province.” The legal maxim” that “inclusio unius exclusio alterius” is perfectly applicable in this case. The affirmative evidence is offered by Rule 126 which is entitled: “Disqualification of Judicial Officers.” This rule is composed of only two sections as follows:
“SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of the Civil Law, or in which lie has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. “SEC. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect.— If it he claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.”
There is no question that the above provisions are not applicable in the case of Judge Lopez. Counsel for the petitioner themselves never pretended that the case of Judge Lopez falls under any of the two above sections of Rule 126. Assuming hypothetically that, by his several opinions mentioned in the petition, Judge Lopez has shown that he cannot administer justice impartially in the treason cases in question, if he cannot be disqualified under Rule 124 or 126 or under any other legal provision, what relief can be afforded to the impending miscarriage of justice which will result by allowing him to continue participating in the disposal of said treason cases? We regret that in this case we are not called upon to answer the question. If there is any legislative deficiency, whether due to lack of foresight of lawmakers or lack of perspicacity of the Supreme Court as a rule-making body, that deficiency is now beyond our power to correct. But the problem presented is not irretrievably without solution under the present rules. Rule 129, which provides for the procedure to be followed upon the filing of complaints for serious misconduct or inefficiency of judges of first instance or Justices of the Court of Appeals, is among those applicable to the People’s Court by express provision of section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. Rule 129 has been enacted in consonance with section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides: “The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.” The fact that a judge may not administer justice impartially, whether his partiality may be considered as a serious misbehavior or is a condition which may incapacitate him to discharge the duties of his office, to preclude him from causing any harm to the administration of justice, the proper procedure is not to disqualify him but to file the complaint contemplated by Rule 129, and the procedure will certainly be more speedy and effective. If there is an imminent danger to the proper administration of justice if the affected judge is allowed to continue in the discharge of his duties, after proper showing, he can be immediately suspended, and in support of the propriety and justice of such action the annals of the Supreme Court is certainly not lacking in precedent. Furthermore, the procedure will be straightforward and more in consonance with the true spirit of a proper administration of justice, which cannot thrive in a climate dominated by indirect and devious ways. The procedure for disqualification against Judge Lopez, in case it would prosper, would create a situation undoubtedly not exhilarating to those who have a high regard for public interest. It will be the situation of a judge who, notwithstanding continuing to hold his official position, with the prestige and dignity, emoluments and privileges which it carries, is kept idle, not permitted to perform his official duties in many important cases, practically a public ward of the government. The disqualification would constitute, in effect, a removal from office, without the benefit nor the opportunity for the removed judge to defend himself in the proper administrative impeachment proceedings, and will give way to a means of circumventing the constitutional provision which guarantees the stability of judges with the concomitant independence of the judiciary. No applicable legal or reglementary provision having been pointed out in support of the move to disqualify Judge Lopez, the next legal problem is to find out if there is a recognized legal principle which may supply their absence. Counsel for the petitioner invoked the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jurado & Co. vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, rendered on October 10, 1902 (1 Phil., 395, 396). Said decision outlines the procedure to be followed in case a member of the Supreme Court is challenged to sit therein in the disposal of a given case, the outline being an attempt of interpretation of the second paragraph of section 8 of the former Code of Civil Procedure. The opinion of the Court in said case, penned by Mr. Justice Willard, contains what follows:
“The application of article 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force, to a challenge directed to the competency of a judge of the Court of First Instance is free from doubt. But when the challenge is to the competency of the judge of this court the article may admit of two constructions. Under one construction the magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency; his decision is conclusive, arid the other members of the court have no voice in it. Under the other construction the magistrate challenged sits with the court and the question is decided by it as a body. “We adopt this second construction as the proper one. We can not admit as possible a third construction under which the court would decide the. question, excluding from the consideration of it” the members challenged. This construction would, if adopted, put it in the power of a party to stop all proceedings in the cause by challenging; three of the justices. The court has examined the original documents referred to at the argument, and we find nothing in them to support the challenge or which expresses an opinion on. the merits of the case.”
An analytical comparison between the above pronouncements and the provision of law intended to be interpreted will immediately show that the construction adopted runs counter to the spirit and the letter of the law. For a conclusive evidence of what we say we quote here-under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
“SEC. 8. Disqualification of Judges.—No judge, magistrate, justice of the peace, assessor, referee, or presiding officer of any tribunal shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which he is pecuniarily interested, or related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of the civil law, nor in which he has been counsel, nor in which he has presided in any inferior judicature when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. “No challenge as to the competency of any of the officials named in this section shall be received or allowed; but if it be claimed that the official is disqualified by the provisions of this section, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay of action shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in his court.”
The Court declared that the law admits of two constructions : 1. “The magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency; his decision is conclusive, and the other members of the Court have no voice in it;” and 2. “The magistrate challenged sits with the Court and the question is decided by it as a body.” The Court rejected the first and accepted the second. This is erroneous. The law provides that the party objecting to the competency of the Justice “may, in writing, file with the official his objection” and said official “shall thereupon proceed with the trial or withdraw therefrom in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification.” It is clear that the challenge should be addressed exclusively to the challenged officer. It also admits no doubt that the same official is the only one who shall determine whether to proceed with the trial or withdraw therefrom. The determination of the question of his disqualification lies on his power alone. There is no doubt in our mind that the first interpretation, rejected by the Court in the Jurado case, is the correct one. The challenge must be addressed to the allegedly disqualified Justice. The Justice decides for himself the question, and his decision is conclusive. The other members of the court have no voice in it. The procedure is the same as outlined in section 2 of Rule 127, the one reproducing verbatim and superseding the second paragraph of section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that the decision in the Jurado & Co. case does not offer any legal principle in support of the theory of disqualification of Judge Lopez. It only offers an interpretation of section 8 of the former Code of Civil Procedure which, as has been shown, appears to be mistaken and, therefore, lacks any binding or persuasive force. As a matter of fact, at the foot of the same decision appears the statement that the Chief Justice withdrew from the case, although it does not appear whether he is the one whose competency one of the parties has challenged. If he is the one challenged, the fact that he did not abide by the Court’s decision declaring the challenge groundless, and no further action had been taken, is a conclusive evidence that no member of the court considered binding the collective opinion of the same, and that the ultimate determination and decision on the question whether a member of the court is or is not disqualified and should continue in the case or withdraw, rests exclusively in said member, and whatever action he may take is final. The intervention of the court is merely advisory in nature. The challenged Justice may or may not submit the question to the court. It all depends on his discretion. If lie submits the question to the court, he is free to follow or not to follow the opinion of said body. The final result will be the same whether or not he submits the question to the court, as the last word will be his. Such happened in the case of Mr. Justice Briones when, feeling that he should desist from further taking part in the proceedings of the Supreme Court in view of the proposed resolution of impeachment filed in the House of Representatives, begged leave to refrain from further participation on September 10, 1946 (42 Off. Gaz., page 2156). The fact that he abided by the opinion of the court should not be interpreted as depriving him of the freedom of disregarding said opinion and acting with free volition in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. Such also is the case of the Chief Justice and several Justices when they decided to withdraw from the cases of De la Rama (G. R. Nos. L-268 and L-982), Teofilo Sison (G. R. No. L-398), Aurelio Alvero (G. R. No. L-820), and several others, in accordance with their respective opinions regarding section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. Lastly, in this very same case the question as to whether the Chief Justice and six other Justices are disqualified or not has been considered and the Court, by majority vote, adopted the opinion that said several members are not disqualified and, therefore, should continue taking part in the disposal of this case. Of the five members who voted in support of the theory of disqualification, one, the Chief Justice, abided by the majority opinion and remained participating in the consideration of this case up to its final decision, while the remaining four, Mr. Justice Panis, Mr. Justice Briones, Mr. Justice Hontiveros and Mr. Justice Padilla, withdrew from the case. The court deemed it unnecessary to take further action on the matter. The above is a conclusive evidence of the fact that all the members of the Court, either expressly or impliedly, were, at the time the incident was considered and disposed of, unanimous in the opinion that the question of disqualification of any member of this Court rests exclusively in the power of said member to decide, and whatever his decision, is final and binding. The decision in the case of Dais vs. Torres and Ibañez (57 Phil., 897-905) is pointed as a source for the missing principle, to find which in our search we may need the lantern of Diogenes. Upon the facts in the said case it clearly appears that the trial judge had shown in his decision evident bias and prejudice against one of the parties, an attorney, the mutual animosity and hostility between the judge and the lawyer arising from the fact that the lawyer filed with the Supreme Court a complaint for misbehavior, while a complaint for malpractice was also filed against the lawyer. The Supreme Court found that the judge resented the attorney’s filing of charges against him, leading to bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the judge’s decision. This Court concluded that the judge could not be disqualified under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which are reproduced in Rule 126, but suggested that the effects of said bias or prejudice could not be left without relief, the suggestion appearing in the following paragraph that we quote:
“Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge’s bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice. “It was said in State vs. Board of Education (19 Washington, 8; 67 A. S. R., 70(5, 713), that the principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the history of courts; in fact, the administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgment of the inviolability of this principle which gives credit, or even toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which disregard this safeguard to litigants would more appropriately be termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be as shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious to the public interest. The learned and observant Lord Bacon well said that the virtue of a judge is seen in making inequality equal, that he may plant his judgment as upon even ground. Caesar demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond suspicion; and the state should not be any less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose keeping are placed not only the financial interests, but the honor, the liberty, and the lives of its citizens, and it should see to it that the scales in which the rights of the citizen are weighed should be nicely balanced, for, as was well said by Judge Bronson in People vs. Suffolk Common Pleas (18 Wend., 550): ‘Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.’ "
We will see that, while our study of the decision in the Jurado case gave a negative result in our investigation, the decision in the Dais case offers a positive result but in the reverse, because there it is unmistakably asserted that the biased judge may not be disqualified but a new trial is suggested as a remedy of the mistrial caused by the bias or prejudice of the judge. The pronouncements in Day vs. Day (12 Idaho, 556; 86 Pac, 531) ; Williams vs. Robinson (6 Cush. [Mass.], 333) and in 33 C. J., section 129 B, quoted in the memorandum for the petitioner and in the opinion dated November 8, 1946, of Judges Veluz and Abad Santos granting the motion for the disqualification of Judge Lopez, besides the fact that it has not been shown that the opinions therein are based on identical or similar legal provisions in. effect in the Philippines, failed to render any specific statement upon which a legal principle may be gathered in support of the move to disqualify Judge Lopez. The lengthy memorandum for the petitioner fails to invoke better authorities. On the other hand, in a line of decisions such as the ones rendered in Joaquin vs. Barretto (25 Phil., 281) ; Clarke vs. Manila” Candy Co. (27 Phil., 310) ; Perfecto vs. Contreras (28 Phil., 538) ; United States vs. Baluyot (40 Phil., 89; Benusa vs. Torres (55 Phil., 737); Dais vs. Torres and Ibañez (57 Phil., 897); and Artache vs. De la Rosa (58 Phil., 589), this Court has consistently maintained the position that those mentioned in section 8 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, now Rule 126, are the only grounds recognized by law upon which a judge may disqualify himself or be disqualified. If there is no law, rule, or legal principle upon which Judge Lopez may disqualify himself or be disqualified, it stands to logic that his colleagues in the Second Division of the People’s Court, notwithstanding the fact that they constitute the majority, have no power, jurisdiction, or authority to disqualify Judge Lopez and, therefore, their decision or resolution granting the motion to disqualify the respondent judge is null and void per se. Even if there is any legal ground disqualifying Judge Lopez, which in the present case has not been shown, the power to decide the question of disqualification under Rule 126 resides in Judge Lopez’s hands alone and not in any or both of his colleagues in his division or in the whole People’s Court. The procedure outlined by section 2 of Rule 126, which is no different from the one provided by section 8 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, is predicated on the purpose of protecting the judges who fall under the provisions of section 1 of Rule 126 from any misunderstanding as to their judicial actuations, but never under the assumption that because they are thus situated, they are incapable of rendering true justice. The rule for disqualification is rather directory than mandatory in nature. If judges falling under section 1 of Rule 126 feel that they are not able to act with impartiality or, even if they can do so, their actuations may be misunderstood by the parties or the public in general, they are free to take advantage of the rule in order to abstain from taking cognizance of cases in which their competence is liable to be challenged. But if they are sure that they can render true justice and they are not afraid from the effects of any possible misunderstanding arising from their actuations, they are free to proceed. The authors of the rules knew from history and personal experience that antecedents or relations mentioned in section 1 of Rule 126 are not insurmountable obstacles for an impartial judgment. The fact that Peter the Great consented to the execution of his own son, Prince Alexis, because the latter happened to be balky and fled to a foreign country, is well-known to students of history. The fact that the prince died while being investigated in prison does not affect the impartiality of judgment shown by the dynamic personality that created modern Russia. As a matter of principle, the idea of recognizing in the majority of a collegiate court the power to disqualify a member thereof is repugnant and destructive of the very nature of such court. The basic assumption behind the creation and existence of a collegiate tribunal is that it has to pass upon highly debatable juridical or factual issues and that, to obtain the wisest possible conclusion, full opportunity must be given for each side of a controversy to present and argue their contentions. The decision rests in the hands of the majority, but the opposition or the minority must enjoy the same rights, prerogatives, freedom and opportunity as the majority to express their opinions and convictions. The majority have the authority to take action, by a right or wrong decision, but the minority must be granted the untrammelled expression of their views whether the latter are correct or mistaken. The essential characteristics of a collegiate tribunal are the same as those of a democracy, a government of free opinions. The freedom to express them being indispensable to guide the future to persist in following the wise footsteps of the past or to correct the mistakes and blunders which are always possible in the system of trial and error of all human society. Freedom of expression of the minority will be empty words if the majority should wield the power to eliminate, obliterate or nullify the minority through the process of disqualification which, by its practical effects, is tantamount to removal or dismissal from office. To recognize in the majority of a collegiate court the power to disqualify a minority member thereof is to enthrone a tyrannical rule which, not because it is wielded by the majority, are exempted from cure of the abhorring evils and bathyal depravities characterizing all tyrannies. Suppose the majority of the Second Division of the People’s Court have the authority to disqualify Judge Lopez and it so happens that the remaining other judges of the People’s Court share the views of Judge Lopez. No other judge of the People’s Court may take the place of Judge Lopez, and if substitution is to be made, the practical result will be the elimination of the other judges of the People’s Court by a process of successive disqualifications which may be decreed by the majority of the Second Division. Suppose in another division the majority share the views of Judge Lopez and opine that the minority member, sharing the views of Judges Veluz and Abad Santos, is disqualified. Then that other division may eliminate by a process of successive disqualifications the judges sharing the views of said minority member. The practical effect is to create a situation in which all the fifteen judges of the People’s Court will stand disqualified by reciprocal disqualifications. The resulting chaos and anarchy will be a ludicrous spectacle in the administration of justice. Of course, the parties—the prosecution and defense—should not be expected to remain idle, and where there is a minority member that they feel, rightly or wrongly, antagonistic to their respective positions, they will seek from the majorities of their respective divisions the expected decree of disqualification. The proposition that the majority of a division in the People’s Court may disqualify a minority member nullifies the legislative intent in creating a corporate tribunal, which must function and act as a single unit, with the same legal singleness of an individual person. In the same way that a person, just because he happens to be shifting, when deciding a highly controversial question, from one tentative decision to a contrary one, should not be expected to have a surgeon sever a portion of his brains in order to attain a singleness of decision, a collegiate court should not be expected to sever one of their members so as to secure unity of opinion. To entertain such an idea is to adhere to Fascist, Nazi or any other totalitarian ideology. In a collegiate tribunal conflicting views are to be expected. The drafters of our Constitution had such an expectation. They acted upon the basic assumption that a corporate body may often be divided on questions submitted to their decision and in order to guarantee the freedom of expression of the minority, they inserted in our fundamental law the provision that “any Justice dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons for his dissent,” (section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution), and that mandate is binding for the minority to comply with and for the majority to respect. Conflict of views are only natural in any group of per-sons, in the same way that collision of ideas is unavoidable in the mind of any single individual. Contrary promptings are constantly exerting their pressure in his conscience. Good and evil, noble and ignoble, lofty and base, generous and selfish, far-sighted and narrow-minded, are only sketchy predicates of the unbounded sphere of conflicting ideas which are bombarding each other in the synchrotrom and cyclotron on his brains. In that mental cosmos, ideas are scattered and mingled, like stars, planets and asteroids in the firmament, and there also work as shooting meteors opposite feelings and passions—love and hate, generosity and ingratitude, magnanimity and meanness, courage and fear, cruelty and tenderness. Thus man very often is placed in an intellectual, moral or spiritual crossroad, where he has to endure the pangs of doubt and the excruciating anxiety for the choice that may happen to be wrong. Mental and moral conflicts that often place a man in an agonizing uncertainty are to be multiplied by the number of individuals composing a collegiate tribunal, and then we will see how absurd it is to expect unity or singleness of opinion therein. There cannot be any question that the reglementary mandate that “justice shall be impartially administered”, implies that those who are called to administer it mast act freely from all the factors that may impair their impartiality. Bias is one of them. It deprives the person shackled by it of the opportunity to have a clear view of the pending issue so as to form a sound judgment and of the freedom of choice between right and wrong in a given litigation. However, not all bias is harmful. No judge is required to be free from all kinds of prejudice. To make that requirement is to attempt an impossibility. No son of woman is free from all prejudice. It is impossible to find a person who can be absolutely impartial on every-thing. All judges have their prejudices. Each and everyone of the members of the Supreme Court entertains some kind of prejudice, whether political, moral, religious, artistic, economic, legal, or otherwise. Each one of us is the child of our past personal experience, surroundings, education, training, associations, and each one of these tends to create some kind of prejudice. It is hard to set a dividing line between harmless and harmful prejudices. Each case ought to be considered according to the circumstances surrounding it. In the present case there are strong indications to the effect that Judge Lopez entertains prejudices that deprive him the freedom of choice essential for him to render impartial and sound judgment in the treason cases against Benigno S. Aquino, Antonio de las Alas, and others similarly situated. The statements he made in his concurring opinion in the Francisco case and in other opinions show that he is placed in a position that he is unable to render judgment but. only for acquittal of no small group of those indicted for treason. The People’s Court has been created by Congress to try those accused of treason and other crimes or offenses against national security committed during the Japanese occupation. , In enacting the law, Congress took for granted that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code punishment treason and other offenses against national security are valid during said occupation and therefore enforceable. Judge Lopez entertains a contrary view. When he accepted the position as an associate judge of the People’s Court it should be assumed that lie accepted it with the full knowledge that it was his duty to enforce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code for which the People’s Court was created. The fact that, notwithstanding his opinion that the provisions of law in question are not enforceable against the accused, he accepted the position, depicts a bias in favor of said accused. But the fact alone that Judge Lopez entertained harmful bias, depriving him of the freedom of choice needed to administer justice impartially, does not authorize anybody to disqualify him without any legal provision to support his disqualification. Ours is a government of laws. Under our system, the law is supreme. While it is the duty of Judge Lopez to administer justice impartially and he will be accountable if his failure to do so amounts to a serious misbehavior, yet nobody is authorized to supply by his own will the absence of a provision of law, just to disqualify said judge. Such an attempt is violative of the principle of independence of the judiciary, and is corrosive of the fundamental principles upon which is premised our constitutional system of democracy.
“Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent in popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A history of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary, prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The American people considered it necessary ’that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government.’ (Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which was Instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.
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“Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the court has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment. (Ocampo vs. Cabañgis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guariña [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said: " ‘The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and effectiveness is necessary to the present form of Government. * * * It is clear * * * that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the power to maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do or order done. But the right to live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not only the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence disappears and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to control, and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really essential for the administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator did not itself subordinate them.’ “A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision which will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a far cry from this premise to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of military discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government. We are pleased to think of judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office because when asked if in the future he would delay a case at the Kind’s order,’ replied: ‘I will do what becomes me as a judge.’” (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322, 329-333.)
For all the foregoing, we conclude: 1. That in his opinions in the Guillermo B. Francisco case and other cases mentioned in the pleadings, Judge Lopez appears to entertain prejudices that will not permit him to render an impartial judgment in the treason cases against Benigno S. Aquino and Antonio de las Alas and other cases of similar nature. 2. That although in Rule 124 there is the mandate that “justice shall be administered impartially,” there is nothing in said rule or in any other part of the Rules of Court that may support the theory that violation of the mandate is a ground to disqualify a judge, although if the violation should amount to a serious misconduct or incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, it shall be u good ground for a complaint in a proceeding to remove the judge in accordance with Rule 129 and section 9, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 3. That, much as we may desire to see the mandate of Rule 121 that “justice shall be administered impartially” to be a ground to disqualify and exclude from a case a judge whose bias will preclude him from taking an impartial view of the case, we cannot do so without declaring and decreeing the existence of a legal provision which, in fact, does not exist, a thing not permissible under and within the system of a government of laws, which is the one established by the Constitution. 4. That although the Supreme Court is empowered to amend the Rules of Court and it may amend it to include bias or prejudice among the grounds for disqualification of a judge, if it decides to introduce such an amendment so as to fill a legal void, it may not, nevertheless, apply the amendment to the case at bar without violating the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws. (Sections 1 and 2, Article III, of the Constitution.) 5. That no grounds for disqualification of judges are recognized by law except those provided in section 1 of Rule 126 and in sections 7 and 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, and in case a judge is challenged to take cognizance of a case on any of said grounds, the procedure that should be followed is the one outlined in section 2 of Rule 126. 6. That the provisions of Rule 126 and of section 8 of the former Code of Civil Procedure which it superseded, and of sections 7 and 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, in so far as making effective the disqualification therein provided, are rather directory than mandatory in character, as they are predicated on the idea of giving judges who may fall within these provisions the right and opportunity to withdraw, in order to protect themselves from any public misunderstanding in their actuations, but never on the idea that they are incapacitated to render justice. 7. That, although according to the procedure outlined by section 2 of Rule 126, the challenged judge is the only one empowered to decide the question whether or not he is disqualified to take cognizance of and decide a given case, any arbitrariness he may commit is not without remedy, because an appellate court may make corrections or order re-trial and, if arbitrariness should amount to serious misbehavior or show inefficiency or inability to properly discharge his official duties, the judge may be removed from office by the procedure outlined in Rule 129. 8. That prejudice or prejudices as the one shown by Judge Lopez are not among the grounds for disqualification mentioned in section 1 of Rule 126 and sections 7 and 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. 9. That the majority of the judges of the Second Division of the People’s Court have no jurisdiction or power to act on the question whether Judge Lopez should or should not disqualify himself, and their opinion on said question has absolutely no legal effect, although, if sought by Judge Lopez himself, they may issue it in a merely advisory character. 10. That to disqualify Judge Lopez and, therefore, impede him from taking cognizance from one or more cases upon grounds not provided by law, is tantamount to his removal from office without due process of law and in open violation of the independence of the judiciary. 11. That the rule prevailing in the Supreme Court to the effect that each Justice is the sole judge on the question as to his disqualification to take cognizance of and participate in the decision of any given case, is the same that must be followed in all other collegiate courts. 12. That although the action of Judge Lopez in accepting a position in the People’s Court, entrusted to enforce laws which he believes unenforceable and to pass judgment on the guilt or innocence of many accused whom he believed from the very beginning to be not guilty and hailed to be patriots or heroes, is not beyond reproach and may give the implication that he accepted the position to favor said accused, the drafters of the law creating the People’s Court must have foreseen the possibility of such a situation when they created a collegiate tribunal as a means of avoiding possible miscarriage of justice through unipersonal judicial actuations. 13. That at the time Commonwealth Act No. 682 was enacted there were strong public feelings and prejudice as regards the conduct of those against whom informations were later filed with the People’s Court and to avoid the evil effects that individual judges may be swayed one way or the other, by said feelings and prejudice, the system of collegiate court was adopted to guarantee a proper administration of justice, and the effectiveness of the device adopted is shown in the instant case in which the actuations of a prejudiced judge may be overruled by a majority who do not share the same prejudice, and the majority opinions in deciding a case are the decisions of the court. 14. That the petition in this case has no legal ground to stand on. After this case was firstly heard and submitted for our decision, the Justices taking part were equally divided and no decision could be rendered; so we ordered a rehearing in accordance with section 2 of Rule 56 in relation with section 1 of Rule 58. Said section is as follows:
“Where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.”
The case was submitted anew for deliberation and decision. The vote was 4 to 4. Again we have to apply section 2 of Rule 56, which only embodies a wise parliamentary rule, well-recognized in democracies. The petition is denied.