[ G.R. No. L-960. December 09, 1946 ] G.R. No. L-960
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-960. December 09, 1946 ]
ALBERTO JULIAN, PETITIONER, VS. EL HONORABLE JUEZ JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID DEL JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE MANILA, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
The precise question raised in this proceeding was decided by us in Cases G. R. Nos. L-831, L-876 and L-878. In those cases, as in the instant Case, the authority of Gregorio T. Lantin, to sign informations was contested. Dr. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and attorney-at-law, Acting Chief of the Medico-Legal Section, Division of Investigation, Department of Justice, was assigned by the Secretary of Justice under Sec. 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to assist the City Fiscal of Manila. Following was the decision of a majority of the Court which controls and disposes of the present petition for certiorari:
“Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act provides:
‘Sec. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.—The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General.’
“It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express enumeration of persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed to exclude those not mentioned, according to a well-known maxim, so no distinction should be made where none appears to be intended. This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. Was it the purpose of the legislature to confine the work to be performed by the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the fiscal’s office and deny him others? If it was, the law does not say so, and one would be at a loss to know what duties were conferred and what were not. It is fair to presume that if the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal, to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated its intention by clear implication. We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to are the most important and outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs aid.
“There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, making of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law may be permitted to assume these functions. Certainly a lawyer who is invested with the same authority as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any of the duties, without exception, devolving on a prosecuting attorney. That the person designated in a particular instance does not measure up to the educational specifications imposed by law Is beside the point. It does not detract from the conclusion that, in the light of the high standard of training and experience required, there is no anomaly and no injustice is committed in lodging on the person designated by the Secretary of J ustiee those powers o£ the prosecuting attorney which we have named.
“Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. (43 American Jurisprudence, 68, 70). The authority to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act 144 and its predecessors.
“The historical background of Section 1686 of this Revised Administrative Code as amended and the construction placed on its precursors confirm our opinion.
“The initial legislation on assistance to provincial fiscals is to be found in Section 45 of Act No. 136, paragraph (e) of which provides that the (Attorney-General) shall, when required by the public service, or when directed by the Chief Executive, repair to any province in the islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, and shall assist the provincial fiscal in any prosecution against an officer of the government.’ This provision was amended by Act No. 30, Section 1, by adding at the end thereof the following words:
But, whenever it is impracticable for either the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General personally to repair to any province in the Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, or in any prosecution against an officer of any branch of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) of Section forty-five, it shall be lawful for the Attorney-General, with the prior approval of the Civil Governor, to appoint some person who may be eligible to the office of Attorney-General temporarily to represent him in such prosecution. The person so appointed shall have all the power of the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General in conducting the prosecution for which he may have been especially appointed as in this section provided. The compensation of the person so appointed shall be fifteen dollars per day for the time necessarily employed in the service of the Government, and actual traveling expenses necessarily incurred in performance of the duties.”
“Act No. 325, Section 1, amending Section 47 of Act. No. 136, created the position of supervision of provincial fiscals, whose duty it was ‘to assist the Attorney-General and under his direction to prepare rules for the guidance of all provincial fiscals, and when required by the public service or directed by the Attorney-General, he shall repair to any province in the Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties.'
“The last measure passed on this subject was Section 17 of Act No. 867 which reads:
‘Sec. 17. Fiscals may be aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney-General; duties of such appointees; compensation.—It shall be lawful for the Attorney-General to appoint any lawyer, either a Subordinate from his office, or, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist the fiscal of a province or district in the discharge of his duties and to represent the Attorney-General in such matters. The person 60 appointed shall have all the powers of the Attorney-I General or Solicitor-General in the conduct of causes in which the Government is interested and to which he may be assigned, x x x x.’
“When the administrative laws were reorganized and systematized, some of the foregoing provisions were eliminated and the rest were condensed into two paragraphs and embodied in the first Administrative Code as Section 1686. The latter section was reproduced in the Revised Administrative Code, also as Section 1686, which in turn was amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144. There has been no material alteration in the law since the administrative laws were codified, except that, whereas under the former Administrative Code the Attorney General was the officer authorized to designate a lawyer to assist a fiscal, under the Revised Administrative Code it was the Solicitor General who made the detail, and by Commonwealth Act No. 144 the authority to designate was put in the hands of the Secretary of Justice.
“It will be seen that in the original enactment-Section 45 of Act 136—the Attorney. General himself was called upon to assist a provincial fiscal in the discharge of his duties. We have no knowledge of whether the persons assigned by the Attorney General to assist fiscals under the subsequent legislation signed informations; but it is a fact, of which we may take judicial notice, that the Attorney General signed such informations. And he did it not by virtue of any express.!legal provision but on the strength, as we may suppose, of his authority to assist provincial fiscals. This was a practice that continued for a considerable length of time.'
“As contemporaneous construction this practice should carry great weight in the operation of the enactment in question. The fact that it was the chief law officer and legal adviser of the government who put it into effect and that he did it in the discharge of his duties lends added force to the interpretation. As has been well said, ‘interpretations by the Attorney General and the legal department of a state have important bearing upon statutory meaning, since the Attorney General and his office are required by law.to issue opinions for the assistance of the various departments of the government administering the law.’ (2 Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, Third Edition, 517.)
“It is not to the point to inquire whether the Sslieitor General has now the power to sign informations. Granting that he does not retain such power, a question which We do not decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we have arrived. The reason is that the power to sign informations, make[ investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power ’to assist’ a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. 1% does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations, which is inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause ‘with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General1 does not exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to which we have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the two powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney General to sign informations, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the Attorney General’s power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing informations. The phraseology of Section 17 of Act. No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney General.. In the language of this section, the person appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties.-and” (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was a surplusage.”
The petition is denied without special pronouncement as to costs.
Moran, Paras, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.