[ G.R. No. L-736. October 31, 1946 ] G.R. No. L-736
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-736. October 31, 1946 ]
AGUSTIN DAYOAN, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL BLANCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, AND SEGUNDO DAYOAN, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
Confined in the provincial jail of Ilocos Sur, for contempt of court, Agustin Dayoan in his several successive petitions requests principally (1) that, during the pendency of this proceeding, he be released upon such bail as we may determine; (2) that respondent Judge Manuel Blanco (or his successor Judge Ceferino de los Santos) be required to fix the amount of bail he must file for provisional release during his appeal from the sentence for con tempt; (3) that his appeal from such sentence be given due course; (4) that he be finally liberated upon a finding that such sentence was null and void; and (5) that the other respondent Segundo Dayoan be mulcted in damages.
The first request was denied by our re solution of September 14, 1946, The remaining four will presently be. taken up.
Chronologically stated, the pertinent facts, as gleaned from the pleadings and documents attached, thereto, are the following:
On January 15, 1946, the plaintiff Segundo Dayoan in Civil Case No. 2817 of Ilocos Sur charged the defendant Agustin Dayoan (herein petitioner) with contempt of court for having disobeyed s judicial order entered therein;
After hearing the parties on May 18, 1946, the Honorable Manuel Blanco, Judge, rendered a judgment of the following tenor:
“Se trata del incidente de desacato promovido contra Agustin Dayoan y Marianito Ipalari por el demandante Segundo Dayoan en su mocion de 15 de enero de este año.
“De las pruebas practicadas el. Juzgado encuentra eatable cido que los recurridos Agustin Dayoan y Earianito Ipalari, en sus respectivas calidades de depositario el primero y administrador especial el segundo, administraban 42 de los terrenos objeto de este asun.to, ios eua~ les produjieron el año 1945 un canon, equivalen ts a ochenta uyones de paley para el duefio de los terrenos, que en la proporcion de 1/6 parts en algunos de el los y 5/12 avas partes en otros que ostenta el demandante segun la decision final y firms en este asunto, le corresponderian trace (13) uyones de pa lay, los cuales recurridos Dayoan e Ipalari retienen y no Iian entregado al demandante, en contravencion de la orden ds este Juzgado de 25 de octubre de 1944 y de los requerimientos que por escrito les ha hecho aquel.
“Hechos, los arriba expuestos, establecidos por la declarscion del demandante Dayoan y sus Exhibits A, B, C y D, no refutados por prueba en contrario de los recurridos, es mas, admitidos por uno de ellos, Marianito Ipalari, que declarando en este incident a ha diolio que tiens en su casa parte de pal ay que corresponde al demandante y que si hast a ahora no lo iis entregado ai alamo es, poroue espera que su coreeurrido Agustin Jayoan ha ga lo propio respecto al pa lay del demandante que retiene en su poder, done so pretexto que demuestra la actitud del culpable cue prsteu de librarse de responsabilidad echandole la culpa al compañero, Agustin Dayoan, que en este incidence ni siquiera ha usado sentarsa en la silla testifical para nsgar el indudable jus to aserto de su hermano el aqui demandante y recurrente Segundo Jayoan.
“Los hechos arriba expuestos son, sn sen tir del que provee, constitutivos de un desa cato a este Juzgado, previsto en si inciso (b) del “articulo 5 y pen ado en el articulo 7, siabos de la Regla Judicial No. 64.
“POR TANTO, se ordena el arresto y re elusion de Agustin Jayoan y Marianito Ipalari hasta que entreguen al demandante Segundo Da yoan los treoe (15) uyones de palay arriba mencionados.”
On June 8, 1946, Agustin Dayoan was duly and fully informed of the above terms of the judgment, he having been apprehended and jailed several days before;
On June 12, 1945, he moved for permission to go out on bail, averring that he wanted to ask for new trial and engage counsel;
On objection of Segundo Dayoan, the court denied the request on June 15, 1946;
On July 3, 1946, Agustin Dayoan submitted a notice of appeal dated June 3, 1946;
On July 25, 1946, the Provincial Fiscal, in the absence of the Judge of first instance, fixed the amount of P500.00 as the bond for the prisoner’s release during the appeal; 8. 8. On August 5, 1946, Agastin Dayoan moved that his bond for P500,00 be approved, and that his record on appeal be certified and coursed;
Segundo Dayoan made objection to the last motion, asserting that the appeal had not been perfected in due time;
By his order of August 22, 1946, the Honorable Ceferino de los Santos, Judge, declined to approve both, the bond aid the record, explaining that,
“Obra en autos que el demandado Agustin Dayoan Abella fue notificado de la sentencia del incidents de desacato el 8 de junio de 1946, aunque ingreso en la earcel provincial tres (3) dias antes, o sea, el 5 de junio del mismo afio; y iiablendo ya trascurrido mas de quince {15} dias descle que el fue notificado de la sentencia hasta la fecha de la presentacion de sus dos mocion.es arriba raencionadas, este Juzgado ya carece de Jurisdiccion. (Art. 10 Regla 64 y Art. 6 Regla 118 de los Reglamentos Judiciales).”
Of course, there is no dispute that the commitment order was appealable. (Section 10, Rule 64}. It appears, however, that Agustin Dayoan1s notice of appeal was late, for, as pointed out by the trial judge, it shoulcl have been submitted fifteen clays after advice of the commitment order which was clone on. June 8, 1946. (Sec. 10, Hule 64In connection with Sec. 6, Rule 116)
As to the petitioner’s request for fixing his bail, it is clear that the Fiscal’s action, squarely met it. Anyway, his right to appeal having fizzled out, there is no occasion for any appeal bond. Heedless to add, his other requests have no factual nor legal basis.
He contends, however, that he rosy not properly be kept indefinitely in prison for failure to deliver unto Segundo Dayoan thirteen (13) uyones of palay, for the reason that, he having disposed of the cereal, his situation does not fall within the scope of section 7 of Rule 64 providing that “when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned x x x until he performs it.”
On this point our opinion is that his ability or in ability to perform was undoubtedly estimated by the commit ting judicial officer; and petitioner having neglected to take the indispensable steps to bring up his case for re view, this Court is not in a position to revise the question of fact involved, and must yield to the presumption of validity of the order. And although it must be conceded, as he argues, that he may be discharged from custody “when it appears that public interest will not suffer thereby” (Section 9, Rule 64) still, such deliverance does not rest in the discretion of this Supreme Bench but in the power of the lower court, that undoubtedly could now validly exercise its discretion in his favor considering; first, the time he has served, second, the rule was technical that deprived him of a review, and third, the circumstance that substantial compliance with the directive he has disobeyed may perhaps be obtained by a writ of execution.
The petitions will be denied. No costs.
Moran, Paras, Feria, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.