[ G.R. No. L-700. August 16, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 34
[ G.R. No. L-700. August 16, 1946 ]
LUIS MENESES, PETITIONER, VS. M. L. DE LA ROSA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
HILADO, J.:
This is a petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus wherein petitioner seeks the annulment of the decision of November 6, 1945, rendered by the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 71369 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and of certain subsequent proceedings in the same case, petitioner further praying for an order to the respondent judge to proceed with the trial of the aforesaid case in his court. The material facts are:
In Civil Case No, 1098 of the Municipal Court of Manila, respondent Angel Reyes was the plaintiff and petitioner Luis Meneses the defendant, the complaint therein being concerned with the possession of the premises or accessoria No. 855 Piy Margal, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which the therein plaintiff was seeking to recover together with certain rentals therein also specified, legal interest, and costs. Judgment was rendered by the Municipal Court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, whereupon the latter appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein it was docketed as Civil Case No. 71369.
On November 6, 1945? said case was called for hearing with the presence of ooth parties. Upon the case being thus called, both parties appeared and made of record the compromise agreement which is now found incorporated in said court’s decision of that same date (Exhibit “E” of petition) which says:
“DECISION
“Al llamarse a vista este asunto, awbas partes comparecieron e hicieron constar en el record el siguiente convenio:
“Que el demandante Angel Reyes extiende el plaso del arrendaraiento de la casa 855 Pi y Margal de esta ciudad de Manila, que ocupa actualmente el demandado Luis Lemeses, hasta el 15 de mayo de 1946;
“Que el demandado Luis Meneses se obliga a evacuar la referida casa en 0 antes del 15 de mayo, 1946, sin prorroga, y renunciando a los plazos que otorga la Ley 689 y asimismo se obliga a pagar los alquileres fijados por el Juzgado Municipal, que conocio originarianiente de esta causa, a razon de P25 al mes desde el primero de septiembre proximo pasado hasta cue lo desaloje;
“Que los referidos alquiieres de P25 al mes, el deraandacio los pagara. dentro de los prinieros diez (10) dias de cada mes, y en caso de no hacerlo asi, se expedira la ejecucion correspondiente por dichos alquileres;
“Que el demandado autoriza al demandante a retirar de la Escribania de este Juzgado los depositos hechos por el demandado en concepto de alquileres correspondientes a los meses septiembre y octubre, proximo pasado, y su fianza de supersedeas por la cantidad de P50, como alquileres de este mes de noviembre y diciembre entrante; y
“Que ambas partes suplican se dicte, hoy, decision de acuerdo con este convenio, dandose por notificados de la misma desde esta ischa, y renunciando a toda apelacion, sin costas.
“EN SU VIRTUD, se dicta sentencia a tenor del concvenio arriba transcrito. Asi se ordena.
Manila, noviembre 6, 1945.
(Fdo.)” M. L. DE LA ROSA
“Juez”
Article 1816 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 1816. A compromise shall have, with respect to the parties, the same authority as res adjudicata; but only a compromise made in court may be enforced by execution.”
Petitioner has not succeeded, in our opinion, in establishing any legal or equitable ground for voiding the compromise entered into by him with respondent Reyes in open court and submitted by both parties to the said court in order that it might serve as the basis for the latter’s decision. Hence, it must be complied with by both parties.
The lease under which petitioner Luis Meneses was occupying respondent Angel Reyes’ aforesaid premises was from month to month, the rentals being payable monthly and there being no showing that it was for any other period (Art. 1518 Civil Code). It appears that when the action was lodged in the Municipal Court said tenant was in arrears for the rental corresponding to the month of September, 1945—the very compromise agreement incorporated in the decision of the Court of First Instance, in its second paragraph; makes the rentals to be paid date from the 1st of September, 1945.
One of the requisites of res adjudicata is the finality of the judgment determinative of the controversy. And, of course, a final judgment is executory. In accordance with Art. 1816 of the Civil Code, above quoted, even if the compromise between petitioner and respondent Reyes above referred to had not been submitted to the court, it still would have had the same authority as res adjudicata. A fertiori, should the judgment of the court, which was based upon and incorporated it, have the authority of res adjudicata from the moment it was rendered. The fact that about one month after the date of said compromise and judgment, November 6, 1945, respondent Reyes moved to one of his apartments at No. 853 Pi y Margal, Sampaloc, Manila, adjoining the premises herein in question (because the former occupant of said apartment No. 853 unexpectedly vacated the same), does not and cannot bring the case within the purview of Rule 38, section 1. When that compromise was entered into and the judgment based on it rendered, petitioner had, in fact, already forfeited, his right to continue occupying respondent Reyes’ aforesaid premises through the former’s default in the payment of the rentals corresponding to the month of September, 1945, and subsequent ones (second paragraph of Exh. A and third and fifth paragraphs of EXhibit B of petition). Article 1569, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code confers upon the lessor the right to judicially dispossess his lessee upon the non-payment of the agreed price. Without that compromise petitioner would have had no right to continue occupying the premises in question. He was given under the compromise an extension of his lease up to May 15, 1946, “sin prorroga; y renunciando a los plazos que otorga la Ley 689 y asimismo se obliga a pagar los alquileres fijados por el Juzgado Municipal, que conocio originariamente de esta causa, a razon de P25.00 al mes desde el primero de septiembre proximo pasado hasta que lo desaloje” (decision, Exhibit B of petition). As above stated, petitioner has not in our opinion shown that respondent Reyes resorted to fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or any other illegal or immoral means when he entered into that compromise. From aught that appears in the record, we cannot but assume that the initiative for entering into that compromise came from petitioner, respondent Reyes merely granting his lessee a further forbearance whose consideration could only be the new undertakings which the lessee offered, and by the compromise bound himself to fulfill. To grant the remedies prayed, for in the present proceeding would inevitably prevent such fulfillment to the damage and prejudice of the other contracting party.
In paragraph 5 of the petition it is alleged that on May 8, 1946, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to set aside the above-mentioned decision of November 6, 1945, on the ground of fraud, mistake, and misrepresentation. It thus appears from the petition itself, in relation to its pertinent exhibits, that said petition to set aside was filed more than six months after said decision and more than sixty days after petitioner yes notified thereof. Rule 38, section 3, limits the filing of such petition to sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken. Therefore, the respondent judge correctly denied the petition. On May 14, 1946, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the petition to set aside (petition, paragraph 6). On June 15, 1946, petitioner filed his notice of intention to appeal from said order of May 14, as well as from those of June 13 and 17, 1946, alleged in the petition (petition, paragraph 9) and on June 17, 1946, petitioner filed his record on appeal (Exhibit C of petition).
In view of the facts and circumstances above narrated, it is very clear that the motion to set aside the decision of November 6, 1945, was filed beyond the maximum period allowed by Rule 385 section 35 and, consequently, the respondent judge could not legally grant the motion for reconsideration of the order of denial filed by petitioner on May 17, 1946 It results, therefore, that any appeal from those determinations of the respondent judge would be frivolous. In paragraph (b) of the prayer of his petition, however, petitioner does not ask us to compel the respondent judge by mandamus to allow his appeal, but to proceed with the trial of said civil case No. 71369. This obviously we cannot grant either.
Wherefore, the petition is dismessied, with costs to petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.