[ G.R. No. L-658. October 25, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 539
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-658. October 25, 1946 ]
GABRIELA VDA. DE MENDOZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GREGORIO PALACIO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. R E S O L U T I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
On August 21, 1946, appellee filed a motion praying for the execution of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on January 22, 1946, in order that appellant may be ousted from the premises in question, because he failed to pay or deposit on or before August 10, 1946, the rent of P25 for the preceding month of July.
Not denying said failure, appellant alleges (a) that, besides having filed the appeal bond of P60, he deposited with the clerk of the court of first instance on October 6, 1945, a four-month rent supersedeas bond which, according to the appellee, amounted only to P80; and (b) that section 9 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court does not require the monthly rentals to be paid or deposited within the first ten days of the calendar month.
The supersedeas bond in the amount of P80, deposited by appellant, does not relieve him from the obligation of paying or depositing the current rents pending his appeal to the Supreme Court, as we had already declared in the case of Mitschiener vs. Barrios, (76 Phil., 55), that the purpose of the supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is to insure the payment of the unpaid back rents or reasonable value of the use of the premises in question, but not to take the place of the payment or deposit of the current ones.
Section 9 of Rule 72 provides:
“SEC. 9. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.—Where defendant appeals from judgment of the Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment shall not be stayed unless the appellant pays either to the plaintiff or into the appellate court the same amounts referred to in the preceding section to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided.”
Although it is a fact that the above provision does not specify when the monthly rents, as fomd in the decision of the court of first instance, must be paid, reason counsels that the payment or deposit of said rents pending appeal to the Supreme Court can not be left to the discretion of appellant. Section 8 of Rule 72 provides:
“SEC. 8. Immediate, execution of judgdment. How to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance, and to pay the rents, damages, and costs down to the time of the final judgment in the action, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he pays to the plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist, or, in the absence of a contract, he pays to the plaintiff or into the court, on or before the tenth day of each calendar month, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month at the rate determined by the judgment. All moneys so paid to the Court of First Instance shall be deposited in the provincial treasury, or in the City of Manila in the Insular Treasury, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on its merits. If the case is tried on its merits in the Court of First Instance, any money paid into court by the defendant for the purposes of stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, and in any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court, damages for such deprivation of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Court of First Instance disposing of the appeal. The bond above referred to shall be transmitted by the justice of the peace or munioipal court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed.”
There being en analogy between the legal position of the parties when the case is pending appeal from the justice of the peace court to the Court of First Instance the one when the case is pending appeal from the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court, it is logical that similar procedure must be followed in both situations, tod this interpretation, besides being fair to both parties, is in a sense more favorable to the tenant as he is given ten additional days within which to pay or deposit the rent, as otherwise he will ordinarily be compelled to make said monthly payment or deposit not later than the last day of the month for which the rent must be paid.
Appellee’s petition for the execution of the appealed decision of the lower court is granted,without prejudice to the appeal Interposed by defendant.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.