[ G.R. No. L-523. September 30, 1946 ] G.R. No. L-523
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-523. September 30, 1946 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEOPOLDO GUYAL AND DIONISIO GUYAL, DEFENDANTS-APPELANTS. D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
The appelants in the present appeal are Leopoldo Guyal and Dionisio Guayal who, upon being tried for murder, were convicted by the Court of first Instance of Sorsogon of homicide and sentenced to be imprisoned for an indeterminate period of from 10 years and 1 day, prision mayor, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, reclusion temporal, with legal accessories and the right to be accredited with one-half of their preventive imprisonment; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Miguel Espela in the amount of two thousand pesos; and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The principal witness for the prosecution is Bernardo Glipo whose testimony is more or less of the following tenor: In the morning of October 13, 1941, he was a passenger in a bus heading towards the municipality of Bulan, province of Sorsogon. When the vehicle reached Sitio Tagna, it stopped to pick up another passenger, Miguel Espela. The latter had hardly gotten into the bus when the two appellants arrived, accusing Miguel Espela of having stolen from Leopoldo’s plantation the Bananas which Miguel had just loaded in the bus. Whereupon, after a brief exchange of words, Leopoldo G-uyal hit with a bolo the right arm of Miguel. This was soon followed by another blow on Miguel’s back. Instinctively to avoid further injury, Miguel Espela jumped out of the bus and proceeded to run away, but was pursued and actually overtaken by the appellants. After having inflicted a bolo wound near the left ear of Miguel Espela, the appellant Dionisio Guyal held the former. At this juncture the other appellant, Leopoldo Guyal, accomplished the last phase of his role, — a bolo cut on the back near the left side of Miguel Espela.
The latter unquestionably died as a consequence of the wounds thus received by him; and the efforts of counsel for the appellants herein are merely directed to the propositions that the testimony of Bernardo Glipo, star witness for the Government, is inherently insufficient and that, at any rate, the appellant Leopoldo Guyal counterattacked Miguel Espela in self-defense. In effect it is contended that if said witness were to fee believed, the fatal incident occurred in two places, kilometer 6 and kilometer 7 of Sitio Tagna; that he failed definitely to state whether he executed one or two affidavits before the justice of the peace; that his testimony in court is glaringly inconsistent with his affidavit wherein he failed to incriminate the appellant Dionisio Guyal.
There may be some justification for doubting the veracity of the witness Bernardo Glipo, if the appellant Leopoldo Guyal had not admitted that he delivered only two blows, one on the right arm and another on the back of Miguel Espela, and if the victim’s body did not exhibit more than two wounds, which logically shows that the other wounds must have been inflicted by Dionisio Guyal, in the absence of any pretense that anybody else had taken part in the attack. Moreover, Bernardo G-lipo is from all appearances a disinterested eyewitness; and the flaws in his testimony obviously indicate that he was not rehearsed before testifying. Indeed, appellants’ criticisms relate to unimportant particulars, except perhaps the alleged omission of the witness to include in his affidavit Dionisio Guyal as one of the assailants; but even this circumstance had been somewhat explained by the witness when he said that he made the proper reference to said appellant but that he did not know why the affidavit, prepared for his signature by Dionisio himself, did not contain that detail. The appellants could, but did not attempt to, rebut the explanation.
The theory of self-defense must, therefore, also fail. It may be added that the appellants had more reason than Miguel Espela to be resentful and aggressive, because the latter allegedly stole their bananas. Besides, Miguel would not ordinarily dare provoke a fight against a greater number; and if as claimed by the appellants, Miguel was known to them to be pugnacious, it is reasonable to suppose that they, who chose to follow Miguel and accused him of theft, would certainly not permit the latter to have a chance to attack them first.
The appellants clearly took advantage of their superior strength; but contrary to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we hold that the same should be considered, not as a qualifying circumstance, but merely as an aggravating circumstance. This view is fair to the appellants, taking into account the very allegations of the information and the conclusion of the trial court.
The appealed judgment — which is in harmony with the facts and the law — is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not take part.