[ G.R. No. L-402. August 14, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 18
[ G.R. No. L-402. August 14, 1946 ]
ESTER CRUZ ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. FERNANDO JUGO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
From February to October, 1945, petitioners were occupying, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, the house of Rafael Perez Sanianillo located at 451 Perez, Paco, Manila, hindering the occupation thereof by laboralera to whom it was leased in March, 1945. On October 29, they were required in writing to vacate the house and, upon their refusal, they were sued in ejectment, the complaint.praying besides the payment of P300 monthly as reasonable value of the use and occupation of the house.
Judge Orisanto dragon of the Municipal Court of Manila rendered a decision on November 27, ordering petitioners to vacate the premises on or before December 31, 1945, and to pay costs. No adjudication was made for the payment of rents or reasonable value of the occupation of the property becaxxse the owner condoned. the payment thereof.
On appeal, Judge Fernando Jugo of the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered on March 5, 1946, a decision ordering petitioners to vacate the house and to pay costs.
On March 6, the day petitioners received copy of Judge Jugo’s decision, plaintiff filed a motion for execution which was not set for hearing, petitioners complaining that this omission is a violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 26 of the Rules of-Court, and the respondent judge justifying it under the authority of Sec. 9 of Rule 72.
On March 11, respondent judge issx;ed an order for immediate execution of his decision upon the special reason that defendants were squatters who occupied the house without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff and without any contract of lease.
To stay the execution of Judge dragon’s decision, defendants filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of P60 as fixed in an order issued by Judge Jugo on January 7, 1946. On March 12, defendants filed their notice of appeal against Judge Jugo’s decision, an additional supersedeas bond in the amount of P180 to stay said decision, and an appeal bond. On the same day they filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting immediate execution, alleging that the same was issued against the rules, the defendants having already deposited the amount of P180 as additional supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment, ana that they have already filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond, invoicing to said effect Sec. 8 of Rule 72 and section E of Rule 39.
On March 27, the motion for reconsideration was denied and on ilarch 29 the sheriff of Manila was commanded to proceed with the execution of the judgment.
Alleging that the order for execution of March 11 and the order of March 27, denying the motion for reconsideration, are illegal and were issued with abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction and will set at naught defendants’ statutory right of appeal, defendants come to us for relief.
Respondent judge alleges that defendants did not even have the color of right to occupy the precises; that immediate execution before the filing of the appeal is justified under the decision in Pascua vs. Nable, (71 Phil., 186); that when execution of judgment was ordered, defendants had not as yet perfected their appeal, and that they have no valid defense and their attempted appeal is purely for the purpose of delay and intended to deprive unjustly respondent Samanillo of his lawful right to possess the house.
The pertinent and applicable provision of Law in this case is that contained in section 9 of Rule 72, which reads:
“SEC. 9. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.—Where defendant appeals from judgment of the Court of First Instance execution of said judgment shall not be stayed unless the appellant pays either to the plaintiff or into the appellate court the sarae amounts referred to in the preceding section to be disposed of in the same manner as therein provided.”
The provision presupposes three alternative situations, i.e., (a) when no appeal is filed either by plaintiff or defendant; (b) when plaintiff is the one who appeals; and (c) when defendant is the one appealing. Concerning the first two situations, there being no specific directive as to what is to be done, it is presumed that the general rule should be followed — that no execution shall be issued before the decision becomes final and executory. In the third situation, which, is the one we are concerned with in this case, section 9 of Rule 72 indicates two courses of action: 1st, during the time and while defendant has not as yet filed his appeal no execution shall be issued until the period of time for perfecting the appeal has expired and the judgment has become final; and 2nd, where the appeal is filed, the court of first instance may order execution if the defendant does not comply with the condition required by said section, that is, of paying either to plaintiff or into the appellate court the amount referred to in section 8 of Rule 72, consisting of rents due from time to time or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises at the rate determined by the judgment. This means that if defendant complies with the condition, execution shall not be ordered. The evident purpose of the provision is to insure the collection by plaintiff of said amounts in case the appellate court should affirm right to collect them, but in no case to defeat defendants’ right of appeal.
The present case presents an instance in which, by plaintiff’s express renunciation, no adjudication has been made in the decision for defendants to pay any rent or any amount as reasonable value of the use and occupation of the house. Defendants are thereby placed in the privileged situation of not having to comply with any condition to secure the stay of the execution. Their situation can not be worse than the situation of a defendant who, being under obligation to comply with such a condition, effectively fulfills the obligation required thereto.
The fact that defendants are designated as “squatters” because they came to occupy the house without any lease contract and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, does not make them less entitled to the benefits of the law to which even those who, in the words of section 1 of Rule 72, take possession of any land or building “by force, intimidation, threat, strategy,” are entitled. From the facts, it can be gathered that petitioners occupied the house in question by stealth, a means certainly not worse than, not even as bad as, force, intimidation, threat, or strategy.
The allegation that at the time the execution was ordered, defendants had not as yet perfected their appeal, has no validity upon our pronouncement to the effect that, whether to issue or not to issue an order of execution, the lower court must have to wait until the appeal is filed, if at all, otherwise appellants will be deprived, of their statutory time within which to appeal and will compel them to engage in a race with the court, whether they file their appeal first and before the court issues the order of execution, with the result that appellants will be always placed in the losing end, as they can never be in a bettor position than the court to foresee when the decision will be rendered and promulgated.
The last allegation to the effect that defendants have no valid defense to the action and their appeal is purely dilatory has nothing to do with the application of section 9 of Rule 72.
For all the foregoing, the lower court’s order of March 11, 1946, decreeing immediate execution of the lower court’s decision, having been issued against the rules, is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I concur in the positive part.