G.R. No. L-375

BASILIO AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PABLO ANGELES DAVID, AD INTERIM JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, AND MARIA CORREA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-375. August 27, 1946 ] G.R. No. L-375

[ G.R. No. L-375. August 27, 1946 ]

BASILIO AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PABLO ANGELES DAVID, AD INTERIM JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, AND MARIA CORREA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

In an ejectment suit “brought by the petitioner against the respondent Maria Correa in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 60), the latter, after filing her answer claiming ownership of the land involved therein, prayed ex parte for the appointment of a receiver. The respondent court granted the petition, and appointed a receiver for the land as well as for the palay harvested therein. A motion for reconsideration of the order appointing the receiver was denied. Thereupon, the petitioner instituted this special civil action to have the order annulled for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of discretion.

The parcel of land—the subject matter of litigation in the respondent court–forms part of the Buenavista Estate leased “by the Government with an option to purchase and was in the possession of the petitioner prior to 1940. For failure to pay the rental, his contract of lease was cancelled on April 1, 1940. Thereafter, the land was leased to Simeon de los Santos, husband of the respondent Maria Correa, who entered upon and took and enjoyed possession thereof until sometime in November 1944, when the petitioner regained possession of the land and since then has been in possession thereof.  These facts are not disputed.

How the petitioner regained possession of the land is disputed. On the one hand, the petitioner pretends that sometime in November 1944, Simeon de los Santos willingly and spontaneously returned to him the possession of the land; on the other, the respondent Maria Correa claims that the petitioner availing himself of the prevailing lawlessness and with the aid of gangsters deprived her husband of the possession of the land. It may thus be seen that the petitioner, plaintiff in the ejectment suit brought in the respondent court, has been in possession of the land since November, 1944.

Who is the owner or the one entitled to possession of the land involved in the ejectment suit is yet to be determined by the respondent court. In the meantime, the possession of the actual occupant of the land should not be disturbed. It is a settled rule that a possessor of property should not be deprived of his possession by the issuance of a writ of injunction (Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273; Evangelista v. Pedreños, 27 Phil., 648; Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil., 542; Asombra v. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil., 883; Golding v. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941; Liongson v. Martinez, 36 Phil., 948; Gordillo and Martinez v. Del Rosario, 39 Phil., 829; Kabankalan Sugar Co. v. Rubin, 54 Phil., 645; Santos v. De Leon, 60 Phil., 573; Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S., 119, 36 L. ed., 368), or by the appointment of a receiver, which may “be made only in extreme cases and on clear showing of necessity therefor in order to save the plaintiff from grave and irreparable loss or damage.”  (Mendoza v. Arellano and B. de Arellano, 36 Phil., 59.) This is a salutary rule, for a possessor of property should not be deprived of such possession but only after trial or he airing and by virtue of a final judgment-.  Hence the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the land involved in the ejectment suit brought in the respondent court constitutes a grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside. There is no adequate process to correct it except by this extraordinary legal remedy. Inasmuch as the order of February 21, 1946, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of January 23, does not clearly discharge the receiver for the land involved in the litigation, the writ applied for must be granted.  On the other hand, the appointment of a receiver for the palay reaped from the land does not constitute an abuse of discretion. It may stand.

Petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The order appointing a receiver to take possession of the land involved in the litigation pending in the respondent court is annulled, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Hontiveros, and Feria, JJ., did not take part.