[ G.R. No. L-353. August 31, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 152
[ G.R. No. L-353. August 31, 1946 ]
PACIENCIA DE JESUS ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. INIGO S. DAZA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
HILADO, J.:
Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorari and mandamus whereby they would have this Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January 29, 1946, entered in civil case No. 3174 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the matter of the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus, which order petitioners denominate “a writ of possession,” and command the respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and the respondents Justina S. Vda. de Mang-Japus and Gregorio Leynes to return to said petitioner? the possession of the two parcels of land covered by original certificates of title Nos. 1292 and 1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of Batangas and mentioned in their petition.
Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the respondents’ answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid special proceeding No. 3174; that respondent Justina S. Vda. dc Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest, and participation of the said Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, in the said testate estate, particularly, the two parcels of land above referred to, which parcels of land were assigned to the said Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga as their shares in the same testate estate in the project of partition which was already submitted to the probate court for approval—according to the respondent judge’s order of March 11, 1946 (Appendix 1 of respondents’ answer) it had already been approved;—that on September 4, 1945, when the project of partition was approved, respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus, presented within the special proceeding a petition for approval by the probate court of said sale to her of the right, interest, and participation of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, particularly, of the said two parcels of land; that the probate court approved said sale; that on September 9, 1945, “after learning of the aforesaid sale on September 4, 1945,” petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas against respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus for legal redemption under article 1067 of the Civil Code, said action being civil case No. 3960 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas—in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4 of their answer, after admitting the institution of said action for legal redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946, the Court of First Instance of Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and supplemental complies in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as Appendix 1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that within the period prescribed by law they had perfected an appeal from said order of dismissal.
From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices and annexes, the said case for legal redemption is still pending appeal.
Respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus, by a petition dated January 17, 1946 (Annex A of petition) filed in the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus alreadv alluded to, asked the Court of First Instance of Batangas to order the provincial sheriff of said province to take immediate possession of the parcels of land in controversy and to deliver them to her afterwards. The respondent judge, acting upon said motion, entered- his order of January 29, 1946 (Annex B-1 of petition) in the same estate proceeding whereby he directed the said provincial sheriff “to make the physical delivery of the parcels of land acquired by purchase by Justina S. Vda. de Mang-lapus to the authorized representative, Dr, Gregorio Leynes of Balaynan, Batangas,” In compliance with said order, the provincial sheriff addressed a notice to Sixto de Jesus, Felina de Jesus, Elena de Jesus, Paciencia de Jesus (the last four being the present petitioners) in which he advised them of the aforesaid order of January 29, 1946, attaching a copy thereof to his notice, and required them to be present at the municipal building of Balayan, Batangas, where the said delivery of possession was to take place on February 15, 1946, at 9 o’clock a. in., and in paragraph 6 of the petition, petitioners themselves allege that on February 15, 1946, the respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas “did deliver possession of said two parcels of land to the respondent Gregorio Lcyncs, representative of respondent Mrs. Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus.”
In this connection it is asserted in paragraph 6 of the respondents! answer that when the provincial sheriff of Batangas delivered the possession of the two parcels of land in question to respondent Gregorio Leynes as such representative of respondent Justina S. Vda. de Mang-lapus “no objection whatsoever was made by the petitioners.”
The principal question raised by the petitioners is whether or not the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus, represented by her authorized representative, Gregorio Leynes, within the same estate proceeding and not in an independent ordinary action.
Rule 91, section 1, provides in “part as follows:
“SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue wade. Testimony taken on controversy preserved.—When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or Darts, to which each is entitled. and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. * * *” (Italics supplied.)
From the admitted fact that the portable court had already approved that project of partition without any reservattion as to payment as to payment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowances to the widow, of inheritance tax, it would appear that the estate was ready for distribution, pursuant to Rule 91, section 1. Neither party has made any representation to the contrary in this case. Upon this hypothesis, this case will be decided.
The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the Court of First Instance of Batangas, thus commencing civil case No. 3960 of said court, carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of said petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of the shares of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated estate, particularly, the two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly approved by the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1, confers upon such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of “any other person,” especially when “such other person” is one of the heirs themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding.
The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus was a proceeding in rem (Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co., 47 Phil., 938; 40 Cyc, 1265; 23 C. J., 1006, section 27; Michigan Trust Co. vs. Ferry, 175 Fed., 667, 674; 99 C. C. A., 221). And by the publication of the notice prescribed by the Rules and by the fact that petitioners herein were and are among the testamentary heirs of the decedent, they were and are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate court when the said court’s order of January 29, 1946, was entered and thereafter. If, even the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child may be instituted and decided within the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, 348), it would be absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the delivery of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has already been assigned to a certain person within the estate proceeding, the probate court lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the same proceeding, but should require the institution of an independent ordinary action.
To be sure, petitioners, by the notice which from aught that appears from the record, they must have been given of the hearing on the approval of the project of partition, and their consequent right to present their opposition or objections thereto, as well as the presentation of any necessary evidence which they might have offered in support of such opposition or objections, had their day in court, no less than if the questions raised thereby had been litigated in a separate action. Indeed, the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child would involve more contentious matters, and normally a greater amount of evidence, than the mere incident involved in the petition of respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus within the testate estate of Gavino de Jesus for the delivery to her of the possession of the parcels of land in controversy. And yet, this Court has held in Severino vs. Severino (supra), and other cases which need not be cited, that such action for compulsory recognition may be instituted and decided within the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the ancestor.
It may be asked, however, if it would not be more just and proper to withhold possession from the purchaser, the respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus, pending the final outcome of civil case No. 3960 of the Court oi First Instance of Batangas wherein petitioners are seeking the legal redemption of the parcels of land in controversy. We have carefully considered this phase of the case and have come to a conclusion adverse to petitioners. Among other reasons, the following brought us to our conclusion:
As already stated, the very interposition of the action for legal redemption necessarily implies admission of the validity of the sale.
Article 1067 of the Civil Code, rather than justifying the withholding of the possession from the purchaser, clearly sanctions his taking possession of what he has purchased, as his rights are absolute until and unless resolved by the timely and valid exercise of the right of redemption. The sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of the two parcels of land in question by Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga took place after the project of partition had been approved by the court (order of the probate court of March 11, 1946, in civil case No. 3960, the legal redemption case, Appendix 1 of respondents’ answer), on account of which article 1067 of the Civil Code cannot support petitioners’ claim, said article referring to a sale by any of the heirs of his hereditaxy right to a stranger before partition. But even supposing that the approval of the project of partition by the court was made after the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of said two parcels of land by Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, still that approval related back to the date of the project of partition.
“To give ‘approval’ is in its essential and most obvious meaning to confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by another. State vs. Rhein, 127 N. W., 1079, 1081; 149 Iowa, 76.” (3 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 829.)
" ‘Ratification’ operates upon the act ratified precisely as though authority to do the act had been previously given, except where the rights of third parties have intervened between the act and the ratification. The retroactive efficacy of the ratification is subject to this qualification. * * *” (30 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 131.)
Unquestionably, petitioners are not “third persons” as regards the project of partition and its approval by the court, for the simple reason that they, as co-heirs, were parties to the same project of partition as well as to the case wherein the same was approved, so that the rule of Jaw that approval or ratification relates back to the date of the act approved or ratified applies to its full extent.
If petitioners were in possession of the controverted parcels of land some time during the Japanese occupation, as seems to have been intimated in this case, their possession was merely precarious and, of course, in such a case they were acting at their risk. The petition does not allege that any reservation at all was made, or caused to be made, by petitioners in the project of partition as regards any crop of sugar cane that they might have planted on the two parcels of land in question. If they had planted such a crop, as represented in their memorandum (which, of course, can not take the place of evidence), they did so precariously and at their risk, and the fact that they do not allege having reserved any claim or right thereto in the project of partition, or in relation thereto, justifies the conclusion that they must have waived any such claim or right in consideration of the terms and conditions of the project of partition stipulated in their favor. Even in a proper case of legal redemption, to allow the rcdemptioner to have possession of the property pending final judgment in the case may lead to a positive injustice towards the purchaser—the redemptioner may in the meantime enjoy the use or usufruct of the property and even if the case is finally decided in his favor, he may allege that he has no means of exercising the right of redemption and, therefore, is forced to waive it, which, of course, would redound to the positive detriment and prejudice of the purchaser and to the enrichment of the redemptioner at the former’s expense.
We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal redemption case, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioners. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Brioncs, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,