G.R. No. L-351

HANS J. SAMETH, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-351. April 30, 1946 ] 76 Phil. 613

[ G.R. No. L-351. April 30, 1946 ]

HANS J. SAMETH, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

DE JOYA, J.:

On March 7, 1946, petitioner Hans J. Sameth filed a petition for habeas corpus in this Court, alleging that he is a Czechoslovakian citizen, unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent, in the New Bilibid Prisons, in Muntinglupa, Province of Rizal; that said imprisonment and restraint of liberty are illegal, and that the illegality consists in that:

On June 12, 1945, he was apprehended and detained by the U.S. Army authorities, through its Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), on charges of collaboration; that on October 25, 1945, he was turned over to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, by which he continues to be detained to this day; that on November 10, 1945, he filed before the People’s Court a petition for provisional release under bail, which was denied; that on February 1, 1946, he filed a petition for reconsideration, at the hearing of which, the special prosecutors stated that there were no criminal charges against him, except one for allegedly impersonating a United States Army officer, but the People’s Court, nevertheless, refused to act on the matter, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, as a consequence of which ruling, he continues to be detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, although no complaint or information has been filed against him, and notwithstanding the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code; and that being a foreigner, he cannot be prosecuted for treason, under existing legislation in the Philippines.

On March 30, 1946, the respondent filed his answer, alleging that, according to his certificate of citizenship, dated September 28, 1926, petitioner is a citizen of Austria; that petitioner was apprehended and detained on June 9, 1945, by direction of the Commanding Officer, 43d CIC Detachment, United States Army, upon charges of collaboration with the enemy and of impersonating a United States Army officer, by wearing the insignia and uniform of a second lieutenant of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army; that the subsequent investigation of petitioner has disclosed that, during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he was an agent in the buy-and-sell business, dealing in all types of supplies; that said arrest and detention of petitioner were valid and legal, and that his subsequent detention, upon the transfer of his person to the Commonwealth Government by the United States Army, was a mere logical sequence of his previous commitment and, therefore also valid and legal; that, although, petitioner is a foreigner and hence not chargeable with treason against the Commonwealth of the Philippines, petitioner was convicted on February 17, 1944, and sentenced to imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Manila, on three (3) charges of estafa, and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, on March 18, 1944, which sentence he was serving until February 5, 1945, when he was released upon a verbal order of the Japanese detachment commander in the New Bilibid Prisons, before said detachment retreated, upon the approach of the United States Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Forces; that said verbal order was null and void, and did not efface, remit nor terminate the punitive sentence meted out to petitioner; that considering the validity of the aforementioned judgment of conviction, herein petitioner is subject to detention and imprisonment for the unexpired portion of his sentence, namely, for an additional period of one (1) year, one (1) month and six (6) days; that even if petitioner should be credited with the entire period of his detention and confinement by the Commonwealth of the Philippines, from the date his person was transferred to the same by the United States Army, to wit, from October 25, 1945, to March 30, 1946, or a period of five (5) months and five (5) days, petitioner would still be bound to serve his unexpired sentence, to wit, eight (8) months and one (1) day, which, together with the above stated period of five (5) months and five (5) days, would complete the portion of his sentence remaining unserved on February 5, 1945, when he was illegally released; and that all the documents and papers, in connection with the charge against the petitioner, for impersonating a United States Army officer, had been endorsed and forwarded to the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, for the filing of the corresponding information.

From the facts stated above, it is evident that the judgment of conviction rendered against herein petitioner, in each of the three (3) cases, for estafa, filed against him, in the Court of First Instance for the City of Manila, during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, was legal and valid, having been rendered and pronounced by a competent court duly organized under the de facto government established in this country, under the Japanese Army of occupation. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113.)

And the only question that remains to be decided, is the validity of the alleged pardon granted verbally to herein petitioner, on February 5, 1945, by the Japanese detachment commander in the New Bilibid Prisons, in Muntinglupa, Province of Rizal.

If the alleged pardon had been granted by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, while they still had effective and exclusive control and authority over the Philippines, and particularly over the city of Manila and the province of Rizal, there could be no question as to the legality or validity of the pardon so granted; because the authority of the military occupant over the territory under his effective and exclusive control is supreme. (Hague Convention, 1907, Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 42; Wilson, International Law, 3rd Ed., 1939, pp. 307- 308; Wheaton, International Law, 7th Ed., 1944, Vol. II, War, pp. 232-233); Hyde, International law, 2nd Ed., 1945, Vol. III, p. 1881).

The court takes judicial notice of the fact that on February 5, 1945, the seat of the government of the so-called Philippine Republic had been transferred to the city of Baguio, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces had likewise left the city of Manila; and that the Japanese Imperial Forces no longer had effective control over the city of Manila and the province of Rizal, as they had been retreating to the mountains, pursued by the United States Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Forces; and, consequently, with the loss of effective control over the city of Manila and the province of Rizal, the authority of the enemy forces of occupation had ipso facto ceased. And any order given or issued under the circumstances, by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on February 5, 1945, would be null and void. (Wilson, idem., p. 316; Wheaton, idem., pp. 232-233; Hyde, Idem., Vol. III, p. 1881.) A fortiori, any verbal order for the pardon or release of herein petitioner, allegedly given or issued on February 5, 1945, by the Japanese detachment commander in the New Bilibid Prison Muntinglupa, Province of Rizal, before abandoning the said place, to avoid annihilation or capture by the approaching United States Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Forces, was absolutely null and void and of no legal force and effect whatsoever. Hence, herein petitioner must serve the unexpired portion of the sentence imposed upon him in the three (3) estafa cases mentioned above, after giving him credit for his detention, under the authority of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, after he had been turned over thereto, by the United States Army, on October 25, 1945.

And the right of the United States Army authorities to order the arrest and detention of herein petitioner is unquestionable.

Wherefore, the petition for habeas corpus, filed in this case, should be denied and dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.