[ G.R. No. L-277. August 30, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 120
[ G.R. No. L-277. August 30, 1946 ]
MANUEL BAGUIORO, PETITIONER, VS. CONRADO BARRIOS, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, AND EMILIANA TUPAS VDA. DE ATAS, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
The complaint filed on January 7, 1945, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by the respondent Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas against the defendant, petitioner in this case, reads as follows:
“Comes now plaintiff in the above-entitled cause of action, by her undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully represents:
“I. That plaintiff is a widow, of age, and resident of the City.of Iloilo, and that defendant is also of age, married, and resident of Calle Rizal, City of Iloilo;
“II. That plaintiff is the exclusive and absolute and registered owner of the following described property, situated in the City of Iloilo, pursuant to the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9644 issued in her favor by the Register of Deeds;
“TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 9644
" ‘A parcel of land (lot No. 173 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo), situated in the municipality of Iloilo. Bounded on the N. and W. by Tot No. 172; on the NW. by lot No. 583; and on the S. by calle Rizal. Containing an area of three hundred and ninety square meters (390), more or less.
“The above lot, without the improvements which were burned during the war, is assessed at P4,680.
“III, That sometime in the month of July, 1946, herein defendant verbally solicited the permission of herein piaintiff to construct a house of light materials on the lot above described of some three brazas wide and three brazas long just-enough for them to sleep, at a monthly rental of twenty pesos (P20), payable in advance, and plaintiff told said defendant that she would think the matter; but to her surprise,, because no formal agreement had been reached between them as regards the amount of the rentals and the dimension of the house, she found out that defendant had already begun the construction of a nipa and bamboo house;
“IV. That instead of constructing a house of three brazas by three brazas as above alleged, defendant has built additions after additions to the house such that the present house constructed is twenty-eight and one-half feet on the front and forty-two and one-half feet on the side, and has rented a part thereof to other persons, and that when plaintiff discovered this anomaly and violation of their verbal and initial agreement, defendant was told sometime in October, 1945, to pay a monthly rental of fifty pesos (F50) a month, or vacate the lot in question;
“V. That the rental of fifty pesos (P50) a month is reasonable and just taking into account the present assessed valuation of the lot above described and encumbrance existing thereon; and
“VI. That for the month of October,, defendant paid only the sum of P25, leaving a balance of P25, and for subsequent months defendant has refused and still refuses to pay the said rentals of fifty pesos (P50). or vacate the premises, in spite of repeated demands.
“Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered, sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of fifty pesos (P50) as monthly rentals for the lot occupied by him of the property of herein plaintiff, beginning with the month of October, 1945, or to vacate the lot in question, with costs against the defendant, and for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable.”
The petitioner filed on January 24, 1946, a motion to dismiss “on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or suit, the action being either for the collection of rentals of a real estate which do not reach to two hundred pesos (P200) or for ejectment from the premises in question. In either case this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation.” But the court denied the petition and, after declaring the defendant in default, proceeded to try the case and rendered judgment on February 18, 1946, sentencing him either to pay two hundred fifty pesos (P250) or to vacate the lot in. question.
The defendant filed with this Court a petition, for certiorari on February 24 of the same year, on the ground that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter in trying and deciding the case, and at the same time asked this Court to enjoin the respondent judge from taking further action in the case during the pendency of this petition. The preliminary prohibitory injunction prayed for was issued.
After considering the questions herein involved we hold that the lower court, presided by the respondent judge, tried and decided the action without jurisdiction.
From the complaint above quoted it appears that, had the petitioner not occupied a-.portipfl^of .land larger than that “initially agreed upon,” the plaintiff would not have demanded the increased monthly rental to P50 and filed a suit against him; and that the plaintiff’s action as alleged in the complaint is one of forcible entry, because the defendant has occupied the portion in excess and deprived the plaintiff of the possession thereof, clandestinely or by stealth, and the illegal possession thereof by the defendant at the time of the filing of the complaint was less than a year.
It is an axiom in civil procedure that if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of the plaintiff’s action, and that the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by rjim in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action. And that is the reason why it is generally added to prayers for relief, though not necessary, the words “and for such other relief as the law warrants,” or others to the same effect. So if a plaintiff alleges, for instance, that the defendant owes the former a certain amount of money and did not pay it at the time stipulated, and prays that the defendant be sentenced to return a certain personal property to the plaintiff, such prayer will not make or convert the action of recovery of debt into one of recovery of personal property, and the court shall grant the proper relief, or sentence the defendant to pay his debt to the plaintiff.
The attorney for the plaintiff, in his opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss filed in the court below, and in his answer to the petition for certiorari in this Court, contends that the plaintiff’s principal action is for breach of contract, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, because it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. There is no such kind of action. Breach of contract may be the cause of action, but not the action or relief itself. According to our Civil Code, a breach of contract is a cause of action, either for specific performance, or rescission of the contract. As the plaintiff is entitled only to one of the two reliefs, if he prays that the defendant be sentenced to perform the obligations imposed upon him by the contract the action is specific performance, and if he p’rays that the contract be rescinded the plaintiff’s action is rescission. In contracts of lease of a real estate, if the lessee violates the terms of the contract by his failure to pay the rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease, and refuses to vacate or return the possession of the property leased to the lessor notwithstanding demand to do so, the action is illegal detainer if filed within one year, and recovery or restoration of possession if filed after one year, from the demand.
That the prayer for relief in the complaint seems to convey the idea that the plaintiff would agree to let the defendant continue in possession if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff, does not change the nature of the action, since the court may only grant the proper relief according to law, that is, the ejectment of the defendant and the payment by the latter of the damages due for the occupation of the land, though the plaintiff is free to condone said payment. It is evident that the court can not authorize the defendant petitioner to continue in possession of the land as lessee if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff since such continuation depends not only upon the plaintiff’s will but also upon that of the defendant. A judgment authorizing the defendant to continue as lessee for a certain and definite period of time after the judgment, will not bind the plaintiff to grant such lease nor the defendant to continue as lessee paying the monthly rental fixed by the court. A court cannot make and impose a contract upon the parties.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the complaint may contain two alternatives or independent actions, one of forcible entry and another for recovery of rents or damages, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has no jurisdiction to entertain either one or both. It has no jurisdiction over the action of forcible entry, for it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace; nor over that of recovery of rents or damages, because the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, which determines the court’s jurisdiction, is less than tWo hundred pesos (P200). According to the complaint, the petitioner had occupied the lot in question during the months of October, November, December and January when the complaint was filed, and the total amount of rents or damages claimed as due for that occupation at the rate of fifty pesos (P50) a month, minus the sum of twenty-five pesos (P25) which was paid on account of the rent for October, aggregate only one hundred and seventy-five pesos (P175).
The fact that, in its judgment, the lower court has awarded the plaintiff the sum of P250, including the rent for February, and not the P25 paid on account by the petitioner for the month of October as alleged in the same complaint, did not confer upon the court jurisdiction over the case. If the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter according to the allegations in the complaint, it can not acquire it just because the rents claimed and those that may accrue during the pendency of the suit may amount to a sum within its’ jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would lead to the absurdity that the jurisdiction of the court depends not upon the allegations in the complaint, but upon a contingency which may or may not arise or occur. As the damages claimed in the complaint amounted to one hundred and seventy-five pesos (P175), could the lower court have sentenced the defendant to pay the amount claimed had the latter made a confession of judgment? The respondent judge’s decision in this case is set aside, with costs against the respondent Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas, So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.