[ G.R. No. L-178. November 29, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 664
[ G.R. No. L-178. November 29, 1946 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SIXTO IBAÑEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.:
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of October 21, 1944, appellant Sixto Ibañez, through his brother Alejo Ibañez, summoned the deceased Cosme Magalong to discuss a transaction regarding the sale of some hogs, in which business both Sixto and Cosme were partners. When Cosme was approaching Sixto’s house, the latter met him at the gate of the yard and both proceeded to discuss the sale of the hogs, the buyers of which were waiting at Sixto’s house. Irineo Ibanez, brother of Sixto, joined the discussion, during the course of which a quarrel ensued. At this moment, one of the trio mentioned the word “fight,” and Cosme started to run towards his house. Irineo pursued him, closely followed by Sixto. When they caught up with Cosme, Sixto held Cosme around the neck from behind and proceeded to tighten his grip. While both were thus struggling, Irineo approached, whipped out a dagger and suddenly stabbed Cosme in the chest just below the left nipple. Sixto, followed by Irineo, hurried from the scene of the affray. Cosme died about twenty minutes later, and upon examination, the assistant sanitary inspector of the municipality of Manaoag found that death resulted from hemorrhage caused by the stab wound. Irineo Ibañez is still at large, but Sixto Ibanez was accused and found guilty of the crime of murder, and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs. Hence, this appeal of Sixto Ibañez.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. In other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is, furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime. (Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, May 23,1905, Viada, 5 Supp., p. 169; Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, June 28, 1901, Viada, 4 Supp., p. 196.) Such knowledge, however, may be inferred from the peculiar circumstances of each case such, for instance, as the concert of action and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered in the consummation of the crime (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil, 38.)
The quarrel between the deceased Cosme Magalong and the herein appellant sprang spontaneously out of a business discussion. Both were partners in the trade of raising and selling hogs and there was no prior ill-feeling between them. Irineo Ibañez was not directly involved in the business but merely obtruded into the discussion to support the interest of his brother Sixto. There was no preconceived plan or agreement between the brothers to assault the deceased. Upon the contrary, the records of the case clearly show the spontaneity of the occurrence, for the buyers of the hogs were at Sixto’s house ready to consummate the transaction. The subject of their quarrel was a more incident of such transaction and it was brought about at that very moment by the refusal of the buyers to get one of the hogs which they agreed to purchase.
The fact that the two brothers, Irineo and Sixto, pursued Cosme is no proof that their intention was to kill. There is no proof that they pursued Cosme because they had accepted a challenge coming from him. Apparently, their intention was merely to prevent him from taking from his house a weapon with which to carry out an attack. They were, therefore, just advancing a legitimate defense by preventing an illegitimate aggression. If the intention of a person should be determined from the acts he has actually performed, Sixto’s act of holding Cosme’s neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that time he did not know yet what his brother’s intention was. It is not shown that Sixto knew that his brother was armed. Irineo stabbed Cosine in such a sudden and unexpected manner that one of the eyewitnesses, Antonio Calagdan, did not even notice that Irineo’s blow carried a dagger with it. And Sixto showed surprise when later he saw the blood-stained dagger of his brother Irineo, and asked him “what did you do?” True the act of Sixto coincided with Trineo’s act of stabbing, but “simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals.” (United States vs. Magcomot, 13 PhiL, 386, 389.)
A case directly in point is that of People vs. Tamayo (44 Phil., 38). The facts briefly were as follows: A quarrel arose between the accused Hilario Tamayo, Ramon Tamayo, Jose Tamayo, Federico Tibunsay and Teodoro Caspellan on the one hand, and Catalino Carrera (the deceased) and Francisco Carrera on the other, over irrigation water that ran between the properties of both parties. When Hilario Tamayo advanced to break down a dam built by the Carreras, the deceased Catalino Carrera confronted him threateningly, whereupon Hilario Tamayo seized the deceased firmly by the neck, choking him and rendering him incapable of effectual resistance. Francisco Carrera then intervened to aid his brother and succeeded in separating the two combatants. As soon as Hilario was pulled away from the deceased, Ramon Tamayo closed in and took his turn at holding the deceased and choking him. It was at this moment that Jose Tamayo, son of Ramon, ran up and hit the deceased with a bamboo stick on the side of the head just above the left ear. The deceased at once fell limp and Ramon Tamayo continued choking him until dead. The medical examination showed that the blow by Jose Tamayo caused the death of Catalino Carrera. During the affray, the other two accused, Tibunsay and Caspellan, were standing by, allegedly encouraging their co-accused. The lower court held Hilario, Ramon and Jose Tamayo guilty as principals, and the remaining two as accomplices. On appeal, this court acquitted all of them except Jose Tamayo who was found guilty as principal and Ramon Tamayo, as accomplice. The guilt of Jose was clear since he delivered the fatal blow. Ramon was found guilty as accomplice because the fact that he continued choking the deceased after the blow by Jose shows that he approved of the blow and therefore displayed his participation in the criminal design of Jose. The other appellants were not made liable for the murderous acts of Jose Tamayo because of lack of guilty participation in the criminal design of Jose Tamayo.
In other authoritative decisions of this court, defendants were acquitted on facts analogous to those of the case at bar. (See United States vs. Manayao, 4 Phil., 293; United States vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil., 386; United States vs. Reyes and Javier, 14 Phil., 27; People vs. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil., 993.) The Supreme Court of Spain has likewise rendered similar decisions, as extensively quoted by Viada. (Viada, 2 Supp., 116; Decision, November 4, 1892, and Decision, December 4, 1889; Viada, 2 Supp., 124. Decision, 1892; Viada, 3 Supp., 142; Decision of November 20, 1895; Viada, 4 Supp., 196; Viada, 5 Supp., 169; Decision of June 28, 1901.)
In Viada, cases holding contrary rulings are also quoted. However, a close scrutiny of these cases reveals the existence of facts or circumstances by which complicity of design or purpose is strongly deducible. In one of these the deceased challenged the two accused, who accepted, assaulted and killed the challenger. The acceptance of the challenge by the two accused and their concert of attack clearly showed a community of purpose and design. (Viada, 5 Supp., 167; Decision of June 13, 1904.) In another case, after the deceased had already fallen to the ground wounded, the accomplice proceeded to boot him on the chest and forehead, and by such acts, as the court held, “coopero a sus funestos resultados simultaneamente.” (Viada, Vol. 1, 375; Decision of December 29, 1884.) This is similar to the Tamayo case wherein the accused Ramon Tamayo who held the victim was convicted as accomplice, because even after the latter had been fatally injured by Jose Tamayo and was prostrate on the ground, Ramon continued holding and choking him until the victim died.
The case of People vs. Aplegido (76 Phil, 571), is not here applicable, for the circumstances therein proved show community of purpose on the part of the defendants.
Appellant’s participation in the criminal intent and design in the killing of Cosme Magalong not having been proven, and such participation being essential to the criminal responsibility charged in the information, judgment is reversed, acquitting the herein appellant Sixto Ibañez, with costs de oficio.
Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.