[ G.R. No. L-142. October 05, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 473
[ G.R. No. L-142. October 05, 1946 ]
URSU LUANGCO, ARISTON RAMOS, RESTITUTO REDOÑA, SIMPLICION IBAÑEZ, AND BENITO BAGOHEN, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, vs. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF TACLOBAN, LEYTE, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the petitioner Igmidio Lagera from the decision rendered on May 30, 1945, by the Court ofFirst Instance of Leyte presided by Judge F. Borromeo Veloso, and by all the other petitioners from the decision rendered on February 23, 1945, by the same court presided by Judge Sotero B. Cabahug, in which decisions the petitioner’s applications for writ of habeas corpus were denied.
From the decisions appealed from it appears that the petitioners in these two cases (G.R. No. L-142 and G.R. No. L-143), were members of the Philippine Constabulary of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and they were convicted, sometime during the year 1944, of the crime of robbery and of robbery homicide defined and penalized by Act No. 65 enacted by the Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction created in Leyte by Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the said Republic.
The definition of the crime of robbery found in the Revised Penal Code of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, was adopted in said Act No. 65 and penalized with a penalty heavier than that imposed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery, if committed by officers and persons, such as the herein petitioners, charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries.
The petitioners, in support of their appeal, allege that “the lower court erred in not holding that Act 65 and Ordinance No. 7 of the Republic of the Philippines were null and void ab initio, because (1) the procedure prescribed therein did not afford a fair trial and violated fundamental human rights; and (2) Ordinance No. 7 deprived the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review, reverse, affirm or modify on appeal final judgment of inferior courts in violation of the Constitution;” and “The lower court erred likewise in not holding that the punitive sentences imposed by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Act 65 and Ordinance No. 7 ceased to have legal force and effect upon the reestablishiment or restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.”
It is not necessary for us to discuss the first ground or assignment of error, for it is included in the second.
In the case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, (75 Phils., 285), the decision, concurred in by Messrs. Justices Jaranille, Pablo, Bengzon, and in its result by Chief Justice Moran, in which the same questions of fact and law we raised am decided, held that the punitive sentence rendered by the Courts of Special Criminal Jurisdiction ceased to have force and effect upon the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and in their respective five separate concurring opinions, Messrs. Justices Ozaeta, De Joya, Perfecto, Hilado and Briones held that said punitive sentence was null and void ab initio. Although, the dispositive part of the decision of the majority does not constitute a precedent for only five Justices concurred therein, it is plain that all the Justices, except Mr. Justice Paras, were unanimous in that said sentence ceased to be effective or valid at least after the restoration of the Commonwealth government. Because if it were null and void ab initio during the Japanese occupation, it must have been necessarily void also after said restoration.
Applying the decision in said case to the present, it is evident that the punitive sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Court of Special Criminal jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 of the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, for violation of Act No. 65 promulgated by the Assembly of said Republic, ceased to have any force and effect after the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and therefore the confinement of the petitioners by virtue of said punitive sentences has become illegal at lesst after said restoration.
It may not be amiss to say, in connection with Mr. Justice Paras’ dissenting opinion, that there is no legal way for this Court to order the reconstitution of the record of the criminal cases against the appellants, for there is no appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction of leyte pending before us. The appeal under consideration is from this order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus. Besides, it would be of no avail to order such reconstitution, inasmuch as, we would have, after oil, to dismiss the case against the eppellants for the reasons stated, in this decision.
Although it is not necessary to decide in this case, end there is doubt in the minds of some members of this court as to whether the appellants may after their release be prosecuted for robbery under the Revised Penal Code, the writer of this decision is of the opinion that the appellants’ conviction for violation of Act No. 65 and their release on the ground of nullity of the punitive sentence imposed upon them, will not be a bar to their being prosecuted now for robbery under the Revised Penel Code. Because the crime of robbery penalised by this Code is not the same robbery punished by said Act No. 65. The former is an offense punished by a municipal law continued in force by the invader, and the latter is a crime of political complexion created and penalized by an Act, prosecuted, under a different procedure, and before a Court of Special Original Jurisdiction (promulgated and organized by the occupant), all of which became null and of no effect upon the restoration of the legitimate or Commonwealth Government. Besides, as the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction that convicted the defendants had no jurisdiction to try offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code, the defendants could not set up the defense of double jeopardy if prosecuted now for robbery undersaid Code, for they had not been in danger of being convicted thereof by said court, although the robbery under the Penal Code vias necessarily included in the robbery penalised by said Act No. 65.
We therefore reverse the decision appealed from and order the release of the petitioners, with costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.