[ G.R. No. L-128. March 02, 1946 ] 76 Phil. 237
[ G.R. No. L-128. March 02, 1946 ]
JOSE GUEKEKO, PETITIONER, VS. TEOFILO C. SANTOS RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
Petitioner seeks to oust respondent from the office of Mayor of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the former, and not the latter, is entitled to hold said office.
Petitioner was elected Mayor of Malabon in the general election held on December 10, 1940, and qualified as such in January of 1941. Respondent filed an election protest against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, which was decided against respondent, whereupon he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals has not been promulgated to date. For the purpose of deciding the petition in this case, we may assume that the petitioner was definitely elected Mayor of Malabon in the said general election.
Petitioner held the office of Mayor of Malabon throughout the Japanese occupation and after the reoccupation until the official restoration of the Commonwealth Government on February 27, 1945, when all government officials were directed to vacate their posts, and in compliance with said order petitioner vacated his office of Mayor.
On November 5, 1945, respondent was appointed Acting Mayor of Malabon, Rizal, by the President, and qualified on November 9, 1945.
Petitioner bases his claim on three main grounds: First, that his term of office has not yet expired, inasmuch as the period of Japanese occupation during which he continued to serve as Mayor should not be taken into account in fixing the term of his office. Secondly, that, assuming that his term of office had already expired, the Chief Executive should have exercised his appointing power in accordance with section 16 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357, and appointed the petitioner instead of the respondent, because the latter does not belong officially to the Nacionalista political party of which petitioner is a member. And thirdly, that petitioner should have been appointed to the office, on democratic principles and in accordance with the announced policy of the President to reinstate officials elected in the 1940 election, unless there be strong reasons for not doing so.
(1) As to the first ground, in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, promulgated on February 1, 1946 (p. 12, ante), this Court held that “the contention that petitioners are entitled to continue in office because they have not completely served for three years due to the war, is untenable, even assuming that they had not discharged the duties of their office during the Japanese occupation of Manila. For the simple reason that the term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one an other. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle, law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war. This ruling holds true a fortiori in the present case, for petitioner continued to discharge the duties of his office during the occupation, although not under the legitimate government.
(2) With respect to the second, we have also decided in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles (supra) that provincial, city and municipal officers are not entitled to hold over. In fact, petitioner himself does not claim to have the right to hold over. Therefore, inasmuch as respondent was appointed to fill the office left vacant after the term of office of the petitioner had expired on December 31, 1943, the provisions of subsection (b), section 16, of Commonwealth Act No. 357 do not apply to the case at bar, because this subsection refers to vacancies resulting from the death, resignation, removal or cessation of the incumbent during the term of office.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that said subsection (b) is applicable, as the President is not required by law to appoint the petitioner or any other particular member of the Nacionalista Party, petitioner can not, in his own behalf or in that of any other person belonging to his party, claim to be entitled to the office of Mayor of Malabon.
(3) And as to the third ground, the announced policy of the President to reinstate or recall pre-war elected officials except for strong reasons, does not confer a legal right on said officials to appointment, since that policy does not impose upon the President a legal obligation to make such appointment. It is within the exclusive province and discretion of the President to follow strictly or not such policy, and therefore this court can not declare petitioner entitled to the office.
In view of the dissenting opinion of several Justices of this court which holds that under our present laws, elective municipal, city and provincial officers are entitled to hold over, reiterating in this case their stand in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles (supra) recently promulgated, we deem it proper to emphasize here that the dissenting opinion in the Topacio Nueno case is based upon an incorrect minor premise.
The rule enunciated in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., Vol. 11, article 507, is the following: “In the absence of express provisions and unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest, municipal officers hold over until their successors are provided.” This is substantially the same rule as that enunciated in 46 Corpus Juris, 968, which we have quoted in our decision in the said case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, which says: “In the absence of an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor is appointed or elected and has qualified.”
The dissenting opinion of the minority enunciates the same rule as follows: “In the absence of an express constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, public officers have the right, as well as the duty, to continue in office under the principle of hold over until their successors are duly elected or appointed and qualified, unless there is a manifest implied intention in the Constitution or the laws to prohibit such hold over.”
After enunciating the rule, however, and stating that the minority agrees with the majority in that the suppression (by Act No. 2774) of the provision for holding over found in the original provision of section 2439 of the Administrative Code, could not imply a legislative intent to abolish the rule of hold over, since that phrase (provision) would anyway be a mere surplusage for the reason that a similar provision was found in the second paragraph of section 2440 of the Administrative Code, the minority concludes without much ado that such suppression “does not imply an intention—much less a manifest intention— on the part of the legislature to prohibit the right to hold over to the members of the Municipal Board of Manila.”
We say without much ado, because the dissenting opinion of the minority does not say a word on the fundamental ground of the majority opinion in the said Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles case, to wit: That, subsequently, the remaining hold over provision in said section 2440, as well as the identical provisions in sections 2074 and 2177 of the Administrative Code relating to elective provincial and municipal officers, respectively, were expressly repealed by section 184 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, known as the Election Law; and that said repeal and the enactment of section 16 of said Act No. 357, which provides for the filling of all vacancies, temporary or otherwise, which might occur during and after the expiration of the term of office, so as to avoid the necessity and even the occasion for holding over, clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to suppress the hold over.
Before concluding, it may not be amiss to say that the authorities or cases cited in the dissenting opinion in support of the minority conclusion were out of place. It is evident that the rule of hold over applies where there is no express or implied legislative, intent to the contrary. But it can not be applied if there is such legislative intent. Therefore, it is improper to quote cases decided in the United States, as the minority did in said dissenting opinion, in which the right of certain officers to hold over was recognized or declared, for in said cases, as in all others, the courts have applied the rule because the legislative intent, express or implied, to the contrary was not manifest. In the same way, it would have been improper and misleading for the majority to cite or quote cases or decisions in support of our conclusion (there are also many, some quoted in the concurring opinion), for in such cases the rule has not been applied because there was an express or implied legislative intent to the contrary.
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the office of Mayor of Malabon held by the respondent, and has no right to institute an action of quo warranto against the latter according to section 6, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court. It is not, therefore, necessary for us to discuss whether or not the respondent is entitled to the office or is illegally withholding it as claimed by the petitioner (Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, supra).
Petition in this case is therefore dismissed with costs to petitioner. So ordered.
Jaranilla, De Soya, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.