[ G.R. No. 783. December 18, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 752
[ G.R. No. 783. December 18, 1946 ]
A. V. BRODETT, SANTOS CARMELO, G. NArCISO AND JOSE ELORIAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIANO L. DE LA ROSA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND SAbINA S. VDA. DE ESCALER, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
PERFECTO, J.:
On July 24, 1946, a complaint for ejectment was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila in the case of Sabina S. de Escaler vs. Dan Zamora. Decision was rendered against defendant, who appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where, after the trial, a decision was rendered on December 6, 1946, in accordance with the terms of a written stipulation agreed upon by the parties. Under the stipulation, the parties renounced their right to appeal from the decision and defendant waived whatever rights he may have by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 689, and said defendant was allowed to remain in possession of the premises located at 289 San Rafael, Manila, only until May 31, 1946.
It appearing that the four petitioners were occupying also the premises with the consent of Dan Zamora, they were ordered by the lower court to show cause why they Ehould not be ejected, as the defendant himself, from the premises, and at a hearing, upon the lower court’s suggestion that an amicable settlement be entered into between the petitioners and the owner, they agreed that petitioners will vacate the premises on August 2, 1946, and to give them facilities to said effect, it was agreed that, if they could not find another house to transfer to, they may, occupy plaintiff’s house at Sotu 8, Quezon City, at a monthly rental of P250.
The lower court approved the agreement and accordingly issued on July 16, 1946, an order to make it effective.
About one week later, on July 22, 1946, petitioners filed a motion praying that the order of July 16, 1946, be set aside upon the following grounds: That the court has no jurisdiction on petitioners’ persons; that the order denied petitioners of the constitutional due process of law; and that respondent Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa has not been appointed in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and, therefore, has no authority to issue the order.
The motion was denied and petitioners come to us to secure relief against the lower court’s order of July 16, 1946.
Respondents alleged, and petitioners did not deny, that in the complaint for ejectment plaintiff prayed that not ¦only the defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, but also all others claiming under him; that petitioners were aware of the filing of the complaint as they are closely related with Dan Zamora, A. V. Brodett as father-in-law, S. Carmelo as brother-in-law, and G. Narciso and Jose Eloriaga as close friends; that upon expiration on May 31, 1946, of the period agreed upon in the written agreement of December 6, 1945, which is embodied in the decision of the same date, plaintiff filed on June 6, 1946, a petition for execution which was granted on June 18, and served on the defendant on June 21; that defendant filed on June 21, a petition praying for an additional period of three months to vacate the premises, to which plaintiff filed an opposition, notwithstanding which, the lower court granted defendant additional ten days within which to vacate the premises in an order issued on June 29; that on May 29 petitioners knew that the defendant was ordered to vacate the premises, and they requested, by letters sent to plaintiff, to grant them reasonable time to vacate the premises; that petitioners are subtenants, relatives, friends of evacuees who have entered into the possession of the premises through defendant’s consent without the knowledge and intervention of plaintiff, and being successors of or privies to defendant Zamora, they are likewise bound by the decision to vacate, a suit for unlawful entry and detainer not being a procedure purely in personam but quasi in rem; that petitioners arc simply possessors in bad faith, who, without any rights whatever, would abuse the property rights of plaintiff and nullify court proceedings.
Under the undisputed facts in this case, petitioners, being near relatives and friends of defendant Dan Zamora who allowed them to reside in the premises as his house guests, occupy the same legal position of petitioner Alonzo in the case De la Cruz, vs. Roxas 75 Phil., 457 a case where the facts are similar to those in-this case.
In said case this Court declared:
“Francisco de la Cruz, the real tenant, has left the premises already. His house guest, petitioner Alonzo, from the point of view of owner Quesada, is no more than a mere intruder. If he has any right to stay in the house that right was subsidiary to that of tenant Francisco de la Cruz, he being a mere house guest of the Bame. After Francisco de la Cruz left the house, Alonzo has absolutely no legal standing to remain in the house.” (P. 460.)
In one sense, petitioners’ position is even worse because, upon knowing that Dan Zamora was to be ousted from the premises, they wrote letters to plaintiff requesting for extension of time to remain in the house, as can be seen in Annex 6 of respondents’ answer, and later they personally appeared in the lower court before which they entered into an amicable agreement in which they committed themselves to vacate the premises on August 2, 1946, and if they cannot find another house to transfer to, to occupy another house of plaintiff located at Sotu 8, Quezon City.
Petitioners cannot complain of having been deprived of the constitutional protection of due process of law. In the first place, they being in fact, privies of defendant Dan Zamora, in subsidiary or accessory position in regard to him, they cannot claim separate and independent process than the one duly accorded to their principal, and, in the second place, after they had communicated by letter with plaintiff, asking her time for them to remain in the premises, they voluntarily appeared before the lower court at the hearing to determine the question why petitioners should not be ousted from the property, and at said hearing they entered into an express agreement with plaintiff to vacate the house on August 2, 1946, and accepted the facility offered by plaintiff that, in case they could not find another house to transfer to, they may occupy plaintiff’s house at Sotu 8, Quezon City, at a monthly rental of P250, and the lower court approved the agreement in its order of July 16, 1946. When two parties appear before a court of justice, voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction, and secure its approval to an agreement freely entered into by said parties to settle a dispute between them, it would be unreasonable for any one of the parties to complain that he was denied the protection of due process of law. The parties having settled their dispute by agreement and secured the court’s approval to said agreement, they enjoyed benefits that cannot be improved by those that can legally . be accorded to them by the most elaborate and exacting judicial procedure.
The standard set by the definition of due process of law us the one which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, and that every citizen shall hold his rights under the protection of the general rules which govern society, the classical one in the Darmouth College case (4 Wheaton, U. S., 518, 581), the very authority cited-in the memorandum of petitioners’ counsel, in petitioners’ case has been fully met, because they were heard by the lower court which proceeded upon inquiry and rendered judgment after a hearing, in which petitioners were accorded all opportunities to be heard and, in fact were heard, to the extent that they took full advantage of the proceedings to secure the court’s approval to an amicable agreement which, at the time, petitioners themselves have considered advantageous or, at least, fair. There is no doubt that petitioners were accorded the full protection of the general rules which govern society.
The last question raised by petitioners is the one concerning the validity of the actuations of Judge De la Rosa, whose authority they impugn because said officer was appointed before July 4, 1946, under the Commonwealth Government and he was not reappointed by the President after the proclamation of independence.
Petitioners failed to be more explicit in the exposition of their theory, but from their allegations they seem to in- . sinuate that, because Judge De la Rosa was appointed under the Commonwealth Government, the authority of his appointment is not derived from what they call the “Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,” implying that the Republic has its own Constitution, separate and independent from the Constitution in effect during the Commonwealth. The theory is wrong. The Constitution under which the Republic exists and is functioning is but the same under which the Commonwealth existed and has been functioning. ^The Convention drafted the “Constitution of the Philippines,” the title it gave to the document, for both the Commonwealth and the Republic as can clearly be seen in Article XVIII thereof which is as follows:
“SECTION 1. The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United Stales and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.”
There being absolutely no reason to disturb the order of the lower court dated July 16, 1946, ordering petitioners to vacate the premises in question located at 289 San Rafael Street, Manila, on August 2, 1946, petition denied and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 2, 1946, is dissolved, with costs against petitioners.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.