[ G.R. No. 49187. December 18, 1946 ] 77 Phil. 764
[ G.R. No. 49187. December 18, 1946 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE, VS. GUILLERMO SUMILANG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT. R E S O L U T I O N
FERIA, J.:
The petitioner in this case was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from 5 years 4 months and 21 days of presidio correcional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court. The petitioner filed on June 14, 1944, a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the petition was denied on July 5, 1944. A motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner on July 17, 1944, and also denied.
From the records it appears that a copy of the resolution of this Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney at his address 307 Palma, Quiapo, Manila, on July 17, 1944. But the attorney for the petitioner alleges now, in his petition, that he did not receive the notice because then “he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla officer of the Markings guerrilla,” and “prays this Court that the reading of the sentence of the accused be suspended and that said accused be permitted or allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the accused.” And the petition is based on the resolution of this Court of October 1, 1945, which suspends, until further notice, section 8 of Rule 53, and provides that judgment shall be entered, not upon the expiration of fifteen days after the promulgation thereof, but upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.
It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for rehearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (section 1, Rule 54) ; for said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case.
As to the suspension of the reading of the sentence of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance, prayed for in the petition, we have noted that, after receiving the record of the case remanded by the clerk of the appellate court for execution of the latter’s decision in accordance with section 9, Rule 53, made applicable to criminal cases by section 17 of Rule 120, it is generally the practice followed by the clerks of Court of First Instance to require the accused to appear, or his bondsmen to produce the body of the defendant to the court, for the reading of the sentence. Such a practice is not in accordance with law. The judgment or sentence which, according to section 6, Rule 116, must be promulgated in the presence of the defendant, is the sentence rendered by the Court of First Instance after the trial of the case by said court; and the right of a defendant to be present at the promulgation of the judgment granted by section 1, Rule 111, refers also to said sentence or judgment of the Court of First Instance.
The certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of Rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for execution of the judgment against him. It is not necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that the accused or his attorney had already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the same Rule 53.
If the accused desires to have the execution of the judgment in this case temporarily suspended for some justifiable reason, the petition must be filed with the proper Court of First Instance.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.