[ G. R. No. L-492. June 28, 1946 ] 76 Phil. 748
[ G. R. No. L-492. June 28, 1946 ]
TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI), PETITIONER, VS. WILHELM D. STYLER, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES. WESTERN PACIFIC, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
MORAN, C.J.: This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner Teodoro Cantos (Teodoro Tatishi) against Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, upon the ground that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, residing in Hang, Davao City, and is now confined by order of the respondent at the residence of the High Commissioner in Manila, Philippines, with no legal cause whatsoever.
Petitioner was born in Davao on December 7, 1913, his father being Japanese and his mother, Filipino. At the age of 27 he elected to become a Filipino citizen under the name of Teodoro Cantos, and was given Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Davao on September 17, 1938. On March 25, 1946, he was indicted for war crimes before the military commission duly constituted by order of General Styer, respondent. The charges are as follows:
“SPECIFICATIONS
“1. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Tibungko, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 28 December 1941, during a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully and unlawfully kill Sixto Babao, Dalmacio Babao, Francisco Cobling and Martin Marquez, unarmed, non-combatant Filipino civilians, by striking them with a saber, and by shooting them, in violation of the laws of war.
“2. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did, at or near Hang, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 7 January 1942, during a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully, unlawfully and forcibly take and loot personal property of Justina Larracoecha Babao, in violation of the laws of war.
“Dated: 25 March 1946.”
The military commission, after hearing, found petitioner guilty of the charges and sentenced him to death by hanging.
There seems to be no question that petitioner is charged with war crimes before a military commission duly constituted. It is maintained, however, that the petitioner being a Filipino civilian when he allegedly committed the crimes charged and the Philippine courts being open and capable to administer justice, the military commission has no jurisdiction to try him. It is well settled that war crimes may be committed not only by lawful belligerents but by any “men and bodies of men, who, without being lawful belligerents” “nevertheless commit hostile acts of any kind.” (Par. 351, Rules of Land Warfare). “Persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines of hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, etc.” are also war criminals subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions. (Par. 352, id. id.). And in the preamable to the Hague Convention it is declared that “until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law if nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”
All this goes to show that war crimes may be committed by any person regardless of his nationality. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex garte. Quirin (317 U. S., No. 1 [Off. Rep. Sup. Ct.], pp. 37, 38), said that “citizenship in the United States of an enemy elligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military army of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”
Here, the petitioner is a Filipino citizen though of a Japanese father, and associating himself with Japan in the war “against the United States of itaerica and the Philippines, committed atrocities against unarmed and noncombatant Filipino civilians and looted Filipino property. He is, indeed, a war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission, and his confinement by the respondent is not illegal. (In re Yamashita, 66 Sup. Ct., 340; 90 Law. ed., 499.)
It is argued that, by direction of the President of the United States of America, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Imerican Military Forces, on September 12, 1945 5 instructed General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, to proceed with the trial before appropriate military tribunals of such Japanese war criminals as have been or may be apprehended, and that, therefore, the petitioner, who is a Filipino citizen, cannot be a Japanese war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission constituted under such presidential authority. There is before us no conclusive evidence that General Douglas MacArthur’s authority is thus limited. At any rate, we believe that the military commission may look through the naturalization papers into the real nationality of a person with Japanese blood charged with war crimes. After due hearing the military commission found the petitioner to be a Japanese mestizo. The certificate of Filipino citizenship was issued in his favor after he had sworn to have renounced his allegiance and fidelity to Japan and pledged faith and allegiance to the United States of America and the Philippines. But there is evidence before the military commission to the effect “that during the war he was a member of the Japanese civilian army and committed atrocities against unarmed and noncombatant Filipino civilians. In his oath of naturalization he swore that he owned real property in the Philippines worth P1,200 as required by the Naturalization Law. It appears, however, from his sworn testimony before the military commission that he never owned any property in the Philippines. If the military commission believes, as it apparently does, that, by reason of the above circumstances, the petitioner never acquired Filipino citizenship or he already lost it, we certainly find no reason to interfere.
For all the foregoing, petition is dismissed, without costs.
Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.