[ G. R. No. 49158. January 31, 1946 ] 75 Phil. 824
[ G. R. No. 49158. January 31, 1946 ]
BASILIO DE CASTRO PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS OF MANILA, ARSENIO LOCSIN IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND FELIPE DE SANTOS RESPONDENTS DECISION
JARANILLA, J.:
This petition for certiorari was instituted for the review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of Manila in case C.A.—G. R. No. 2 against the herein petitioner, Basilio de Castro, confirming the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the filing of the written briefs and the hearing of the oral arguments of the parties sometime in October 1944, the record of the case was completely burned in or about February 1945, during the intensive fighting between the American and Japanese forces in the city of Manila. The record of the case was therefore reconstituted by the parties as far as could be possibly done and thereafter the case was again submitted to tills Court for decision after the filing of the brief for the respondents. In the course of the reconstitution, of the record of this case, the parties stipulated that the statement of facts appearing on pages one to four of the brief for the petitioner contains substantially all the facts of the case and that therefore they-submit this case for decision on the facts and issues recited in said statement of facts, which reads as follows:
”STATEMENT OF FACTS”
“On March 3, 1943, respondent Felipe do Santos filed a complaint to eject petitioner Basilio de Castro from the premises occupied by him at No. 1045 M. de Santos, Manila, and for the collection of rentals for said premises at the rate of P140 monthly beginning February, 1942. After due trial, the Municipal Court of Manila disclosed the complaint. Respondent Santos then appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge Arsenio Locsin. After trial in said court and while the case was pending decision the parties received notice of the decision of the Mayor of Manila rendered under the provisions of Executive Order No. 117 of the Chairman of the former Philippine Executive Commission, fixing the rentals for the premises in litigation at P100 a month. “Without losing time in order that respondent Judge may have the opportunity of considering it in the determination of the case, petitioner personally prepared and immediately, filed on September 28, 1943, with due notice to respondent Santos, his constancia informing the court of the decision of the City Mayor. That Constancia reads as follows: “‘Compareee el demandado en la causa arriba titulada por sí y en su propia representación y a este Honorable Jusgado respetuosamente hace constar; “‘Que en la solicitud No. 159, presentada por el aquí demandado ante la Comisión de Rentas de la Ciudad de Manila, pidiendo la reduccion de la rente de la finca No. 1045 Marcelino de Santos, dicha commission en una decision de fecha 10 de septierabre de 1943, ha dictaminado que cualquier aumento de alquiler de más de P100 por dicho local (1045 Marcelino de Santos, es ilegal, nulo y sin valor como se demuestra por la copia de dicha decisión que va sajunta como Exhíbito 7, y se hace parte integrante de esta constancia para los efectos que en derecho hubiera lugar. “‘Manila, Filipinas, Septiembre 28, 1943
“(Fdo.) BASILIO DE CASTRO “’Demnandado “1887 Juan Luna, Manila
“Se ha enviado copia de la anterior constancia al Abogado del demand ante Don Mariano de Joya por correo ordinario. (Fdo.)”BASILIO DE CASTRO
* * * * * * * *
“Exhíbito (7)
“(HEADING AND TITLE OMITTED) “DECISION
“Mr. Basilio de Castro, applies to decrease the monthly rental of the house located at 1045 Marcelino de Santos, Manila, and owned by Don Felipe de Santos, from P100 to P70. The prewar rate was P140 a month. “It appears that sometime in February of this year an action for ejectment was brought by the owner against the applicant; that while the decision of the Municipal Court, of Manila denied the prayer for ejection, it also ordered the defendant tenant to pay a monthly rental of P140 beginning said month; and, that although said decision has not become final and executory, an appeal therefrom having been brought to the Court of First Instance by the plaintiff-owner, the applicant lies, since the rendition of said decision, been paying the latter at the rate ordered by the Court. “It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant is under no obligation to pay a monthly rental of P140. This, for two reasons: namely, first, because said decision aid not become final and executory; second, because even if it did, the rental increases ordered by the Court is void and unenforceable (section 2, Executive Order No. 117). It is the Mayor of Manila, not the Court, which is vested with the authority to order an increase in rent; an application to increase rental, not an action for ejectment, is the procedure prescribed (section 3, id.). “It appears further that before January 4, 1943, the tenant has not consented to pay at the increased rate of P140 demanded by his landlord. A valid rental increase has not therefore been effected and the monthly rental for the house in question has always remain ad at P100, neither an increase nor decrease thereof having been duly authorized after said date. “The house in question is located in a commercial district and is actually dedicated to commercial purposes. Consequently, we do not deem unreasonable the present monthly rental of P100, which is a little less than 75 per cent of the prewar rate. The decrease herein applied for should be, as it is hereby, denied. “Manila, September 10, 1943,
“(Sgd.) LEON G. GUINTO “Mayor
“On September 30, 1943, two days after the constancia was filed, respondent Judge Locsin rendered his decision ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises in litigation and to pay a monthly rental of P140 until he vacates the premises, entirely ignoring the decision of the Mayor of Manila. Copy of the court’s decision was received by the petitioner on October 6, 1945. “On November 2, 1943, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal, paid the appeal bond, and submitted his record-on appeal for approval. “Copy of the record on appeal was sent to respondent Santos by registered mail and no opposition to its approval having, been filed within the five-day period fixed by Rule 41, section 7 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge should have approved it, but instead, for reasons that we are still trying to find out, the parties were notified that the ‘Exception and Notice of Appeal’ would be set for hearing on December 18, 1943. In this hearing, respondent Santos submitted for the first time his opposition to the approval of the record on appeal. Petitioner objected to the consideration of this opposition for having been filed too late, but this objection was overruled, a.ad on the basis of said opposition, respondent judge ordered the elimination of the Constancia from the record on appeal. “Petitioner moved to have this order reconsidered, but this was denied in the order dated January 11, 1944, which reads: “‘After considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the attorneys for the defendant on December 31, 1943, and opposition thereto of the attorney for the plaintiff filed on January 8, 1944, this Court is of the opinion that said motion should be, as it hereby is, denied. The defendant is ordered to comply with the order of this Court of December 18, 1943, within five days, otherwise his record on appeal would be disapproved and his appeal declared abandoned.’ “On January 13, 1944, petitioner received a copy of said order and the following January 17, within the period fixed therein, gave notice of his intention to file a petition for mandamus, and at the same time requested the suspension of all proceedings. We quote: “‘It is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that all proceedings in this ease be suspended, including compliance with the order dated January 11, 1944, pending the outcome of the mandamus proceedings above mentioned.’ “Due to the reorganisation of the Court of Appeals into five districts, the petition for mandamus could not be immediately accepted for filing and it was only on January 27, 1944, that it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 2 of the Court of Appeals of Manila. “The petition for a writ of mandamus was given due course and on March 18, 1944, the Court of Appeal of Manila promulgated its decision denying the petition. A copy of this decision had been attached to this brief. On April 3, 1944, within the period fixed by law, petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration citing plenty of authorities against the decision of the court. This was denied by the Court of Appeals the following day but the petitioner received notice thereof by ordinary mail only on April 10, 1944. Even before notice of denial was received, the clerk of court entered judgement, petitioner on April 8, 1944. On April 10, 1944, on the very date of the receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration and having no notice of the entry of judgement, petitioner requested permission and at the same time filed his second motion for reconsidered. This was denied in a resolution dated April 18, 1944, on the ground that judgement had already been entered. Notice of this resolution was not mailed at once and had not the undersigned inquired about the case on April 155, 1944, it is possible that it would have been received after April 18, 1944, the last day for filing the petition for review by certiorari. On certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals and the petition itself filed on the following day. “Meanwhile, in the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent judge, even while the motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals was pending; even while no entry of Judgment in the latter court had yet been made; even while the time to appeal by writ of certiorari to this Honorable Court had not yet expired; and, in spite of the fact that no resolution had yet been made on the motion before it asking for suspension of proceedings including compliance with its order about the filing of an amended record on appeal, respondent judge on April 4, 1944, made the following order: “’It appearing that more than seventeen days have already elapsed since counsel for defendant Basilio de Castro has received copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Manila, on March 18, 1944, denying the mandamus proceedings instituted by said defendant in this case; and, considering that notwithstanding this fact, he has not perfected his record on appeal in accordance with the order of this Court dated January 11, 1944, this Court, upon notion of counsel for plaintiff and, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 41, sections 7, 13, and 14, of the New Rules, of Court, hereby orders the dismissal of the appeal interposed by the defendant in this case.’ “A copy of this order was received by the petitioner on April 7, 1944. On April 15, 1944, petitioner moved to have it set aside in view of the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not yet final and reminding the court at the same time of our motion still pending asking for suspension of proceedings. The court was further told that since a record on appeal had been filed on time, all the remedies available to the petitioner having been exhausted, compliance with its order could easily be done by just crossing out the part to be eliminated and this could be done by the clerk of court himself. And upon learning that a writ of execution had already been issued, petitioner asked for its stay in view of the grounds stated above. In spite of all these, respondent judge Arsenio Locsin ordered the sheriff to execute his decision. Hence in our petition for certiorari, we prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to restrain respondent judge and all persons acting under him from executing said decision.”
The decision of the Court of Appeals referred to in the foregoing statement of facts reads:
”DECISION
“PADILLA, J.: “Petitioner prays for a writ directing the respondent Judge to allow a record on appeal filed in a case for detainer and collection of rentals appealed from the Municipal Court. “The record on appeal submitted for allowance sets out a pleading entitled constancia and a decision rendered by the Mayor of the City of Manila upon petitioner’s application for decrease of house rentals. The inclusion, thereof was objected to and the objection sustained by the respondent judge. “It is e fact that the hearing or trial of the appealed case for detainer and collection of rentals had already been terminated and the case submitted for decision when the constancia and the decision attached thereto was filed. Such being the case, the constancia and the decision have no place in the record on appeal. They are not part of the evidence submitted, and though they may have relation to the decision from which the appeal is being taken, they do not fail, however, within the purview of Rule 41, section 6, which provides: ‘* * * copies of all pleadings, petitions, motions and’ all interlocutory orders relating to the appealed order or judgment,’ for these have reference to pleadings that had been filed before the case was submitted for decision. To otherwise construe the provisions just quoted, parties who intend to take an appeal may, after the hearing or trial, file pleadings and documents attached thereto that may have reference to the issues involved—perhaps of evidentiary character—which cannot, however, be considered as such because the period for its presentation or reading in evidence had already lapsed by the very action of the parties. To allow such a practice would bring about confusion in judicial proceedings. If petitioner believed that the decision attached to his constancia would help him, why did he not take the legal step indicated by the Rules of Court? (Rule 57) At any rate, the decision attached to the constancia night at best influence the decision of the respondent judge as to the amount of rental but not as to the main action for detainer. “The act that petitioner prays this Court to order be done or performed by the respondent Judge not being ministerial, not being enjoined by law for him to do or perform, the writ of mandamus prayed for clearly does not lie. “Petition denied, with costs against the petitioner.”
With the above uncontroverted facts, no better starting point for this opinion can be found than the aforesaid incorporated decision of the Court of Appeals which the petitioner herein prays be revoked. The important question herein which merits resolution, on which the petitioner and the respondents fully disagree, relates to the constancia and the decision of the Mayor of the City of Manila, which the petitioner included in the record on appeal and the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered excluded thereform. Said documents were never formally offered as evidence at the hearing and therefore cannot be considered as such. (Section 72, Rule 123, Rules of Court.) The petitioners did not even follow the procedure outlined in Rule 37 of the Rules of Court in order that they may be admitted as evidence if he had considered them material to the case. He simply filed them after the trial of the case and while the case was already pending decision of the Court a quo. They cannot even be considered as evidence that had been offered and rejected during the hearing so that they may be include in the record on appeal. (Ayala de Roxas vs. Valencia, 5 Phil., 182.) The petitioner herein argues that the Rules of Court should be liberally interpreted so as to permit the inclusion of the said constancia and the decision of the Mayor of the City of Manila in order that he may base one of his assignments of error intended by him to be raised in the appellate court. After carefully reviewing the case, we are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner cannot be sustained for the reason that the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court (section 6, Rule 41) governing the inclusion of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records on appeal cannot be stretched to such an extent as to include such pleadings or documents not presented nor offered at the hearing of the case. In fact, when the respondent Judge of First Instance decided the case he could not take into consideration said constancia and accompanying documents because the rule is that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.” (Rule 123, section 72, Rules of Court.) Such being the case, the appellate court can neither take into consideration the same documents on appeal. It is obvious that the petitioner’s intention is to incorporate said documents in the record on appeal for the purpose of affecting the court’s sympathies and inducing it to revise the findings at trial. Such step, however, on the part of the petitioner is not sanctioned by the rules of civil procedure. (4 C. J., 226, 227, 307-310)
“* * * The object of a bill of exceptions is simply to present in an intelligible form the facts necessary to enable the appellate court to review the rulings, orders, or judgments excepted to * * *.” (Aliño vs. Villamor, 2 Phil. 234.) “Documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.” (Dayrit vs. Gonzalez, 7 Phil. 182; 5 Encyc. of Evidence, 469.)
Moreover, if petitioner’s contention is what is meant by liberal interpretation, there will be no limit as to the kind of documents, pleadings and evidence which may be included in the record on appeal. We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct and should be affirmed. The petitioner further insists that, in the event the decision of the Court of Appeals be upheld, the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the respondent judge should be ordered to approve the record on appeal filed before it with instruction “that his clerk of court or the petitioner himself cross out in the said record on appeal that part ordered to be eliminated by the trial court.” We find no law authorizing it. Section 7, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court reads in part as follows:
“* * * If the trial judge orders the amendment of the record, the appellant, within, the time limited in the order, or such extension thereof as may be granted, shall redraft the record by including therein, in their proper chronological sequence, such additional natters as the court may have directed him to incorporate, and shall there upon submit the redrafted record for approval, upon notice to the appellee, in like manner as the original draft.”
From the above-quoted express provision of law, it was clearly the duty of the appellant, or the petitioner herein, to redraft the record on appeal end present it for approval within the time limited in. the order of the court, end not for the judge to ins trust the clerk of court to perform such duty, which dearly devolves upon the petitioner. It is true that said section only provides “by including therein * * * such additional matters as the court may have directed him to incorporate * * *.” But it is quite evident, from a reading of the whole section of said rule, that the court has been given the power to exorcise full discretion to approve or not to approve the record on appeal. In view thereof, the court may also order the exclusion or; the striking out of immaterial and unnecessary matters before approving the record on appeal, formely termed by law “bill of exceptions.” (4 C. J., 226, 227)
“* * * Mandamus can issue only to compel the trial judge to act; it cannot direct how he shall act, or compel him to decide in a particular way what the bill shall contain, for the law imposes on the trial fudge alone the duty to determine whether a bill of exceptions is correct or not.” (4 C. J., 308; emphasis added.)
In the instant case, appellant was ordered to eliminate the constancia from the record on appeal, but instead of obeying the order he filed an action for mandamus. By such attitude, appellant chose to stand on his record on appeal, as it was presented, thus preferring to rise or fall with it rather than to amend it within the time fixed by the court. And, consequently, if in the mandamus proceedings the action of the Court a quo is found to foe correct, appellant would be regarded as having failed, to file in time the amended record on appeal, and the notice of appeal he had filed before would be dismissed. Accordingly, though the dismissal of the appeal decreed by the trial Court was not altogether correct at the time it was decreed because the petition for certiorari was still appealable to this Court, now it becomes well-founded for it is merely the effect of the present decision. Such being the opinion of this Court, it is necessary to pass upon the other Questions raised in this case. An urgent motion was filed by respondents’ counsel praying for the, dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction pendent lite and the issuance of the writ of execution of the decision of the respondent Judge dated September 30, 1944, alleging that the petitioner failed to file a new bond in lieu of the original bond which was lost or destroyed by fire together with the other record of the ease, and that according to Information the petitioner was trying to sublet the premises la question to some Chinese merchants, Respondents’ counsel further filed another motion for the immediate issuance of said writ of execution above referred to due to the noncompliance on the part o£ the petitioner with the provisions of section 8, Rule 72, Rules of Court. Without deciding whether these nations are well-founded or not, we believe that the court a quo, after giving due consideration to the circumstances of the case, may comply now with the provisions of the law and issue the necessary writ of execution of the judgment in this ease, which was temporarily suspended by the writ of preliminary injunction pendent lite. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby affirmed and the said preliminary injunction pendent lite dissolved, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.