[ G. R. No. 48321. August 31, 1946 ] 75 Phil. 890
[ G. R. No. 48321. August 31, 1946 ]
OH CHO, APPLICANT AND APPELLEE, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a Judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the Municipality of Guinayangan., Province of Tayabas, in the name of the applicant. The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant’s lack of title to the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain. The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940. The Solicitor-General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.) The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of predecessors in interest since time immemorial, such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U. S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594). The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141). Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141). As the applicant failed to prove title to the lot and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature, character or classification of the lot sought to be registered. It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors 4o not even object to the application filed by the vendee. Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs. Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.